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The thesis focuses on the response of Venice province population to the rise of Fascism and 
to the regime’s attempts to fascistise Italian society. Key concepts discussed in this thesis 
include local identity, forms of individual and group loyalty, passive resistance, and social 
mobilisation – all factors that have been mentioned by historians in the past when discussing 
the Venice case but that have not yet been subject of a methodical study. Contributing to the 
ongoing historiographical debate on the nature of the Fascist dictatorship, the thesis argues 
that the regime did not manage to fulfil its totalitarian aspirations. This argument is 
developed around analysis of popular opinion and the way in which limited local consensus 
for the Fascist regime contributed to Fascism’s downfall.  
 
In order to offer a discussion of the extent to which Venetian society was fascistised, this 
thesis looks at numerous local social groups, at their attitudes towards the regime, and at how 
the rise of Fascism changed their internal dynamics. The thesis begins with a discussion of 
the Party, and to provides a clear picture of how ‘national’ and ‘local’ interacted alongside 
the establishment of the structures. The focus then shifts to the working class and the way it 
came to terms with the Fascist regime. The third chapter deals with two groups that provided 
a particular challenge to the regime’s totalitarian aspirations: Venetian Youth and the 
Catholic Church with its attempts to resist and to jeopardize the regime’s intention to 
monopolise every aspect of social life. The fourth chapter is a case-study of the Venetian 
Jewish community, of how the Race Laws affected the life of Venetian Jews. Lastly, the fifth 
chapter, by way of a conclusion, studies the ‘Fascist War’ (1940-1943) as a microcosm that 
explains for the local Venetian context how the lack of popular consent enhanced the 
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1. Fascism and ‘Divided Memory’: politicians, historians and the post-war 
discourse on Fascism 
        Post-war Italy was characterised by divided memory.
1
 Contested and contrasting 
interpretations of the country’s recent past made it extremely difficult for the political 
institutions to build a ‘shared memory’ relating to Fascism.  
 
       The formation of the Republic in 1946 was only a brief moment of unity when the 
contrasts and the factions were concealed. The creation of a dominant anti-Fascist culture and 
the exclusion of the narrative of the defeated created a discursive hegemony. Italian public 
opinion after the Second World War was completely immersed in the victors’ vulgata and the 
issue of the divided memory among Italians remained unsolved.
2
 This narrative already 
started developing in the course of the war with the complicity of the monarchy, the 
Committee of National Liberation and the Allies. The aim of this national discourse was to 
blame Mussolini for having brought Italians into the war through an unnatural alliance with 
Germany and counter the repubblichini’s accusations that anti-Fascists were traitors of the 
country. This narrative was further reinforced by two main events: firstly, Gen. Dwight 
                                                 
1 
F. Focardi, La guerra della memoria (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2005), 6. The war produced different experiences 
and multiple memories: the Italian African campaign veterans, those of Albania, Greece and Yugoslavia (D. 
Conti, L’occupazione italiana dei Balcani. Crimini di guerra e mito della ‘brava gente’ (1940-1943) (Rome: 
Odradek, 2008), the partisans of different parties, the fascists of Salò (R. Chiarini, L’ultimo fascismo. Storia e 
memoria della Repubblica di Salò (Venice: Marsilio, 2009), the deported in the Nazi camps (L. 
Klinkhammer, Stragi naziste in Italia (Rome: Donzelli, 1977), the exiles from Istria and Dalmatia and those 
killed and put into the foibe (R. Pupo, Il lungo esodo. Istria: le persecuzioni, le foibe, l’esilio (Milan: Rizzoli, 
2005). 
2
 J. Foot, Italy’s Divided Memory (New York:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 12. 
9 
 
Eisenhower’s public announcement of the surrender of Italy to the Allies and Italy’s signature 
of an unconditional Armistice on the 8 September 1943; secondly, the deposition of 
Mussolini from power in favour of Gen. Pietro Badoglio, the man who had assumed power in 
Mussolini’s stead by request of King Victor Emanuel.
3
 According to this narrative, Italians 
had no need to feel guilty about their Fascist past, the blame was only on Mussolini and his 
fellow Fascists. The scope of Fascism’s demonisation was to establish an implicit distinction 
between ‘good Italians’ and ‘bad Fascists’.
4
 The resistance against Germany was portrayed as 
a new popular Risorgimento in which Italians, innocent victims of the fanatic Fascist regime, 
were revolting against Mussolini. This propaganda also contributed to establishing a 
widespread narrative of Italiani brava gente (Italians, good people), a myth which has been 
promoted by the new post-war Italian Republic, claiming the purported ‘humanity’ of the 
Italian people and soldiers during the war with the intent to blame Mussolini and the German 
allies for Italy’s war crimes, while absolving the population from the responsibility.
5
 The 
myth had traction, especially in its contrast to the image of the evil Germans portrayed as 
remaining fanatical, cruel and loyal to Hitler until the end.
6
 The belief that ‘good Italians’ 
                                                 
3 
For an extensive account of the Republic of Salò period, see L. Ganapini, La repubblica delle camicie nere. I 
combattenti, i politici, gli amministratori, i socializzatori (Milan: Garzanti, 2010), A. Lepre, La storia della 
Repubblica di Mussolini. Salò: il tempo dell’odio e della violenza (Milan: Mondadori, 1999) and R. Moseley, 
Mussolini: The Last 600 Days of Il Duce (New York: Taylor Trade Publishing, 2004). 
4
 P. Corner, Popular Opinion in Totalitarian Regimes: Fascism, Nazism and Communism (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 122. See again Focardi, La guerra della memoria, 62-66 and A. Del Boca, Italiani 
brava gente? (Vicenza:  Neri Pozza, 2005). 
5
 D. Rodogno, Fascism’s European Empire: Italian Occupation During the Second World War (New York, 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 362. See also Del Boca, Italiani brava gente?, 8. “The myth of the ‘Italians 
good people’ has covered infamies (...). It has neither right of citizenship, nor historical foundation. It has been 
used arbitrarily and cunningly for over a century and even today has its lovers, but the truth is that, in some 
situations, Italian conduct was extremely brutal, exactly like other people on the same occasions. Therefore, they 
have neither right of clemency, nor least of all self-absolution”.  
6
 F. Focardi, ‘“Bravo italiano” e “cattivo tedesco”. Riflessioni sulla genesi di due immagini incrociate’, in Storia 
e memoria, V, 1996, 1, 55-83, 62-66. 
10 
 
were different from ‘bad Fascists’ was a manufactured perspective that was to become a key 





       During the war and then on 2 June 1946, when Italians opted for the abolition of the 
monarchy, the resistance progressively became a political and moral legitimation for the anti-
Fascist parties.
8
 Crucial elements like the existence of a popular consent towards the regime 
were omitted in this interpretation.
9
 In the public discourse of the post-war an alternative 
narrative was not able to emerge and Italian politicians preferred to exalt the role of the 
resistance as a popular rebirth instead of inspiring a kind of French union sacrée.
10
 As Filippo 
Focardi stated, politics and the Italian post-war ‘public memory’ increased the contraposition 
between the Fascist and the anti-Fascist memory.
11
 Until the 1960s and 1970s, Fascism was 
deliberately removed from the public discourse, but also from the historians’ discourse. Paul 
Corner poignantly characterised the preference for mere chronicling at the expense of critical 
analysis as ‘convenient’ for some historians, likening the absence of any serious debate to 
Fascism ‘disappearing into a black hole.
12
 On an academic level, the history of anti-Fascism 
had been disconnected from that of Fascism. Historians studied Fascism and anti-Fascism as 
antithetical matters and the research did not take into account sufficiently social life under the 
regime. On the one hand the atmosphere in Italy of the 1960s and 70s was one of the public 
                                                 
7
 For the decisions relating to the Italian peace treaty see A. Varsori, L’Italia nelle relazioni internazionali dal 
1943 al 1992 (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1998), 27-42. 
8
 See A. Mola, Declino e crollo della monarchia in Italia. (Milan: Mondadori, 2008). 
9
 Focardi, La guerra della memoria, 10. See also S. Colarizi, L’opinione degli italiani sotto il regime 1929-1943 
(Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1991), 334-339. 
10
 R. J. B. Bosworth, Mussolini’s Italy: Life Under the Dictatorship 1915-1945 (London: Penguin Books, 2006), 
60. 
11
 Focardi, La guerra della memoria, 62-66. 
12
 Ibidem, 41-53. See also Corner, Popular Opinion, 122. 
11 
 
(and the media) searching for an anti-Fascist absolution, and historians providing the 
narrative that allowed it to develop. Historians established a narrative that provided some 
relief, especially to those who might have somehow supported the regime.
13
   
The dominant imperative in post-war Italy to demonstrate allegiance to global politics and 
international community required an emphatic repudiation of Fascist rule. It was in this 
constructivist climate that the anti-Fascist ‘vulgate’ became successful also among historians, 
heavily influenced by the cultural turn. The memory of the new Republican Italy was forged 
through stories, monuments and other cultural artifacts that came to serve as memory places 
(lieux de mémoire) within the country. Italian intellectual and political elites deliberately 
produced a memory, which has been consumed by the Italians.
14
 The key feature of this 
narrative has been portraying Italians as victims of Fascism and of a war desired almost 
exclusively by Mussolini, which redimensions the responsibility of Italy within the Axis. The 
anti-Fascist narrative aimed at displaying a sense of new beginning for the entire country.
15
 
The result of the focus on an anti-Fascist narrative was that only a modest amount of attention 
was devoted to local history; and what little local history there was, had a tendency of 
viewing it through distorted reconstructions of the Fascist period. However, local forms of 
memories were not completely replaced by the state memory created from above. People 
continued to identify with the past of their home town or region, even when national 
authorities tried to impress a ‘national memory’ upon them. “Because of its materiality and 
its sheer ‘presence’, the local mnemonic framework cannot simply be downsized by 




                                                 
13




 C. Karner-B. Mertens, The Use and Abuse of Memory: Interpreting World War II in Contemporary European 
Politics (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2013), 139. 
16
 Beyen-Deseure (ed.), Local Memories, 8. 
12 
 
       The effect of the diffusion of a hegemonic narration from the state channels and media, 
was that local works about the life under the regime, especially those coming from a neo-
Fascist side, were seen as countermemories, or as counterinformation with respect to the 
official memory of the state.
17
 Examples of neo-Fascist countermemories were diaries of 
former army officials or repubblichini which started to spread between the mid-1950s and 
early-1960s. An example is Gen. Rodolfo Graziani’s Ho difeso la Patria. Graziani (1882-
1955) was a prominent Italian military officer in the Italian Royal Army, primarily noted for 
his campaigns in Africa (Libya and Abyssinia) before and during World War II as 
Commander in Chief of Italian North Africa and as Governor General of Libya. Graziani was 
the only Italian Marshal to remain loyal to Mussolini after the Grand Council meeting which 
dismissed the Duce from the role of Prime Minister in 25 July 1943. He was appointed 
Minister of Defence of the Italian Social Republic by Mussolini. He was sentenced for his 
collaboration with the Nazis in 1948, but he was released after serving only a few months of 
the sentence. In the early 1950s, Graziani became the ‘Honorary President’ of the post-
Fascist party MSI (Movimento Sociale Italiano) in 1953.
18
 Ho difeso la Patria was a memoir 
written by Graziani during his imprisonment at Procida in 1946. Published by Garzanti in 
December 1947, when Graziani was under trial, this autobiographical book served as a 
defence against the accusations of war crimes in Africa. 
 
       A challenge to the main anti-Fascist narrative was also presented by Giorgio Pisanò’s 
works (1924-1997). Pisanò was a war veteran in the XMAS (Decima Flottiglia Motoscafi 
Antisommergibili: Tenth Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron), an Italian commando frogman unit 
                                                 
17
 Focardi, La guerra della memoria, 8. 
18
 See R. Graziani, Ho difeso la Patria (Milan: Garzanti, 1948). For a profile of Rodolfo Graziani, see R. 




of the Italian Royal Navy created during the Fascist regime. Pisanò was Senator for the neo-
Fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano from 1972 to 1992. During the post-war period Pisanò 
worked as a journalist and essayist for the Rizzoli Group, writing about the Second World 
War, Fascism during the Italian Social Republic and the so-called ‘Civil War’. Pisanò’s 
Sangue chiama sangue and Storia della guerra civile in Italia (1943-1945) wanted to give 
voice to the legacy of Salò. Pisanò underlined the role of the RSI in protecting Italy from the 
Nazi project to occupy Italy. He wanted to discredit the fact that RSI was merely an 




       A different perspective was also prompted by the memories written by war prisoners and 
later the soldiers of the Italian Social Republic, like the Venetian army official Armando 
Boscolo who later will work as a journalist and essayist, collaborating with important 
national newspapers. Among the prisoners there were eminent profiles like the writers 
Giuseppe Berto, Dante Troisi, Gaetano Tumiati and Vezio Melegari, the painters and Alberto 
Burri Alberto Fagan, musician Mario Medici, the future politicians Roberto Mieville, Beppe 
Niccolai, the labour law expert Gianni Roberti, the mathematician Mario Baldassarri or the 
journalist and the writer Fernando Togni. They all refused to cooperate with the allies and the 
US government after their capture and serve in the ‘Italian Service Unit’ after the 8th 
September armistice, being interned in the Hereford Military Reservation and Reception 
Center (commonly known as ‘Fascists Criminal Camp’) in Texas. The detention camp was 
the second largest of the United States POW (prisoner of war) camps built during the Second 
World War and it housed approximately 5,000 Italian prisoners. The life within the camp was 
well described in Boscolo’s Fame in America. He explained the reason behind their choice to 
not collaborate with the Allies, which was to remain loyal to their country (and to Mussolini), 
                                                 
19
 See G. Pisanò, Sangue chiama sangue (Milan: Pidola, 1962) and G. Pisanò, Storia della guerra civile in Italia 
(1943-1945) (Milan: Edizioni FPE, 1965). 
14 
 





       Neo-Fascist ‘public memory’ was relegated to be something like commemorations of the 
Fascist period or pro-Fascist leanings in the memorialisation of the Fascist period.
21
 This 
happened because neo-Fascist memories, even local ones, would have contested the image of 
the Italian Republic promoted by the post-war governments, that was born spontaneously 
from a popular riseing against Fascism, rather than how it had actually been established, from  
a civil war.
22
      
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
       After the 1973 Pinochet’s coup in Chile, there was cooperation between the PCI and DC 
that became a political alliance in 1976. After the happening in Chile, Berlinguer thought that 
                                                 
20
 A. Boscolo, Fame in America (Milan: Edizioni Europee, 1954). Italian service units (ISU) was the official 
name given by the US authorities to the Italian prisoners and soldiers cooperating with the US military after the 
proclamation of the Armistice of Cassibile (8 September 1943). See M. De Prospo, ‘I prigionieri di guerra 
italiani negli Stati Uniti e il dilemma della cooperazione (1944-46)’ in Diacronie. Studi di Storia 
Contemporanea, 1, 2 (2010), 1-15, and F. G. Conti, I prigionieri di guerra italiani 1940-1945 (Bologna: Il 
Mulino, 1986).  
21
 For more towards the Republic of Salò see R. Chiarini, L’ultimo fascismo. Storia e memoria della Repubblica 
di Salò (Venice: Marsilio, 2009) and M. Borghi, ‘Tra fascio littorio e senso dello Stato: funzionari, apparati, 
ministeri nella Repubblica Sociale Italiana (1943-1945)’, in A. Ventura, La società veneta dalla Resistenza alla 
Repubblica. Atti del convegno di studi. Padova, 9-11 maggio 1996 (Padua: Cooperativa Libraria Editrice 
Università di Padova, 1997), 118-139. For what concerns the treaty of peace see Varsori, L’Italia nelle relazioni 
internazionali, 27-42. See also the Alcide De Gasperi’s discourse pronounced during the conference of peace in 
Paris (10 August 1946): “The punitive character of the treaty is clear in its territorial provisions (…) as Italian I 
am not asking any particular concession (…) I ask you to give scope and credibility to the Italian Republic: 
47,000 people of workers are ready to connect their scope with yours to create a righter and human world”.  
22
 See P. Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics, 1943-1988 (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003), 256-257. For the connection between the Republic and the popular discourse, see Saragat’s 
speech during the inauguration day: “The Republic was born from the Resistance (…) it was born spontaneously 
from all the classes (…). Atti parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati-Senato della Repubblica, IV Legislatura, 
Seduta comune di martedì 29 dicembre 1964, Giuramento e messaggio del Presidente della Repubblica. 
15 
 
the Communist Party could not lead the country without allying with the moderate forces of 
the country. Berlinguer distanced the party from the USSR by launching ‘Eurocommunism’ 
along with the Spanish Communist Party and the French Communist Party. The egemonic 
antifascist narration highly benefited from this political climate of national unity. The PCI 
started to provide external support to the Christian Democratic one-party government led by 
Andreotti. However, several radical communists in the PCI, mainly non-members of the 
parliaments, boycotted the government and there was an increase in far-left terrorism, mainly 
led by the Red Brigades (Brigate Rosse). The centre-left governments and their response to 
terrorism takled both the criticism made by the radical communists (sinistra 
extraparlamentare) and that one led by the neo-fascists supporters of an antagonist memory. 
However, the Brigate Rosse kidnapped Aldo Moro, the then Party President of DC, on 16 
March 1978. After several consultations in the Italian Parliament, the government refused the 
terrorists' conditions, and Moro was killed on 9 May 1978. A strong anti-communist 
sentiment raised, and the PSI, along with the far-right Italian Social Movement (MSI) 
increased their votes in the 1979 general election. Nevertheless, the Compromise continued 





       These political developments of the 1970s indicated that the time was right for a re-
evaluation of the Fascist period, and indeed, Renzo De Felice’s pioneering work on 
Mussolini was followed by a serious debate about the Fascist regime and resulted in the 
revision of the previously dominant image of popular support for the resistance.  
 
                                                 
23
 The Historic Compromise (Compromesso storico) was an Italian historical political alliance and 
accommodation between the Christian Democrats (DC) and the Italian Communist Party (PCI) in the 1970s. 
16 
 
If the 1960s and 70s demonstrated the close connectivity between political developments and 
popular discourse about the Fascist past, the 1980s presented further evidence of this 
relationship, if with different political actors and a focus on the political left rather than right. 
The political leadership of the anti-Communist socialist Bettino Craxi triggered a renewed 
popular debate about the previously largely uncontested anti-Fascist vulgata,  The determing 
factor that increased the level of criticism towards the anti-fascist memory, was the change of 
the political framework and the born of the pentapartito, a coalition of five parties formed by 
Christian Democrats, Italian Socialist Party, Italian Democratic Socialist Party, Italian 
Republican Party and Italian Liberal Party which politically isolated the Communist Party.  
An important stimulus to the revisionism of the anti-fascist memory came from the political 
necessity of a deep institutional renewal promoted by Bettino Craxi. The so-called "Grande 
Riforma", was thought by Craxi as an important step to modernise Italian institutions in order 
to promote the growth of the country. The anti-fascist constitution constituted an important 
obstacle for the Craxi attempted reform. Revisionism promoted by Craxi led eventually, in 
1991, to Claudio Pavone describing the period of 1943-1945 as a ‘Civil War’, a definition 
widely rejected by the Communist Party and, until then, used exclusively in neo-Fascist 
narratives to describe the period of 1943 to 1945.
24
  Neo-Fascists used the definition of ‘Civil 
War’ to support their accusation that the partisans to have caused a fratricide war. Pavone, a 
former partisan who worked for many years as a State archivist in Rome when the war ended, 
asserted in his controversial work Una guerra civile that the main cause of the removal of the 
‘Civil war’ from Italian history was the political needs of anti-Fascism to found the post-war 
Italian republic on the values of the anti-Fascist resistance. For the author, this process 
divided Italy between ‘good Italians’ (the partisans) and the ‘bad Italians’ (Mussolini’s last-
hour Fascists). Pavone’s use of the definition of ‘Civil War’ shocked Italian public opinion as 
                                                 
24




it was coming from an eminent historian, himself a former resister. However, more recently, 
the Left wing journalist and writer, Giampaolo Pansa, has recuperated the theme of the ‘Civil 
War’, writing a series of books on the partisans’ violence and crimes during and after the 




       The idea of the resistance representing one faction in what could be understood as a civil 
war between different sections of Italian society representing Fascist and anti-Fascist 
attitudes, gained some ground also with the former partisan Vittorio Foa agreeing to the idea 
of the resistance as a war between Italians in which Fascist and anti-Fascist beliefs collided. 
But despite these relative revisions, the myth about Italians having been opposed to 
Mussolini’s regime remained largely intact.
26
 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the break 
down of established Cold War symbols such as Berlin Wall and more locally,3 of established 
party political patterns, led to a questioning of what had previously been regarded as an 
immovable status quo. This significant change in the Italian political landscape also impacted 
on the memorialisation of Italy’s past, and the political instrumentalisation of public memory. 
It made the pacification between Fascist and anti-Fascist memory more pressing.
27
 The 
political utilisation of a relatively positive memory of Fascism increased under the leadership 
of Silvio Berlusconi (1994-2011). During Berlusconi’s premiership, the trial against the 
former SS-Hauptsturmführer Erich Priebke, one of those responsible for the infamous Fosse 
Ardeatine massacre in Rome in March 1944, revived the stereotype of the ‘cruel German’ 
                                                 
25
 G. Pansa, Il sangue dei vinti (Milan: Sperling & Kupfer, 2003) and then I vinti non dimenticano. I crimini 
ignorati della nostra guerra (Milano: Rizzoli, 2010). 
26
 Interview with Vittorio Foa, “L’Unità”, 25 April 1995. See also Del Boca, Italiani brava gente?, 124-127. 
27
 Tangentopoli is a term which was coined to define the pervasive corruption of the Italian political system 
verified in the ‘Mani Pulite’ investigations between 1992 and 1996. The scandal led to the disappearance of the 
dominant parties. The Christian Democratic and the Socialist parties collapsed. This process redefined the 
Italian political landscape and brought about the formation of new parties: Forza Italia, Lega Nord and the post-
Communist party Democratici di Sinistra. See also Ginsborg, Italy and its discontents, 249-285. 
18 
 
and accentuated again the distance between the different memorial discourses.
28
 Many 
important anti-Fascist scholars had argued against the image of the ‘good Italian’. The 
important studies of Angelo Del Boca, Giorgio Rochat, Enzo Collotti and Nicola Labanca 
investigated the Italian crimes committed in the colonies and in the territories under Italian 
occupation in South-eastern Europe.
29
  A heated debate developed between the nostalgic 
supporters of the ‘good Italian’ and those who proposed a revised interpretation. The 
discussion primarily involved Indro Montanelli and Angelo Del Boca and focused on the 
Italian use of gas against the indigenous population in Ethiopia in 1936.
30
 Other Italian war 
crimes surfaced including the occupation of Greece and Albania. The persecution of Jews by 
the Fascist regime also went under scrutiny. Researchers such as Michele Sarfatti vigorously 
attacked the long presumed absence of Italian racism and Anti-Semitism.
31
 The relative 
dismantling of the traditional ‘First Republic’ parties increased the importance of the role of 
the president of the republic as the holder of the ‘official national memory’, an official anti-
Fascist line.
32
 Thanks to their popular appeal, the presidents Sandro Pertini and Carlo Azelio 
Ciampi, both former partisans, and later the post-Communist President, Giorgio Napolitano, 
                                                 
28
 Focardi, La guerra della memoria, 72-74. 
29
 See the works N. Labanca, Oltremare. Storia dell’espansione coloniale italiana (Bologna: il Mulino, 2002), 
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became the guardians of this widely-accepted memory.
33
 Having explored how the political 
establishment in post-war Italy attempted to usurp historical memory, we will now 
investigate some of the historical debates around totalitarianism and ‘Generic Fascism’ in 
Italy and beyond, which allowed such an instrumentalisation. 
 
2. Totalitarianism and ‘Generic Fascism’: the Historiographical Debate 
       Before looking at the historiographical debate regarding the totalitarian aspirations of the 
Fascist regime, it is essential to understand how totalitarianism and Fascism have been 
defined by historians. The notion of totalitarianism as a total state political control and power 
was firstly formulated in 1923 by the anti-Fascist Giovanni Amendola, who described 
Fascism as “a promise of total dominium and complete and unchallenged mastering of 
political and administrative life”.
34
 The term was later assigned a positive meaning by the 
Fascist regime, and its principal theorist, the philosopher Giovanni Gentile, used the term 
totalitarian to refer to the ultimate goal of the regime as the subordination of the individual to 
a ‘totalitarian’ state that was to control all aspects of national life.
35
 “Gentile’s use of the term 
‘total’ conveyed Fascism’s claim to ubiquity and a comprehensive, all-encompassing outlook 
on life, like a religious faith inspiring all facets of existence”.
36
 In Gentile’s work, the State 
was an ethical state which embodied and inculcated values. Such a theory was endorsed by 
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Benito Mussolini, who during a speech in October 1925 declared that the Fascist Totalitarian 
State had to be characterised by “everything within the state, nothing outside the state, 
nothing against the state”.
37
 The notion of totalitarianism started to be extensively studied in 
the early post-war period. The most widely accepted definition of totalitarianism came from 
Hanna Arendt who provided a relational analysis of totalitarianism and propaganda. Her 
work The Origins of Totalitarianism laid the foundations of the subsequent totalitarianism 
debate.  Also, and of particular importance for the discourse on popular attitudes, consent and 
dissent is the use of violence within totalitarian regimes. According to Arendt, the three key 
pre-conditions indispensable for the rise of totalitarianism were the weakening of the national 
State and the rise of Imperialism; the demise of the class system and its values; and the 
atomisation and individualisation of modern mass society.
38
 Throughout the 1950s and 1960s 
and even in the 1970s, the main interpretations tended to identify totalitarian regimes as 
political machines which ruled with coercion rather than consent. The general trend of this 
interpretation led to emphasis upon a population reduced to helpless passivity by the 
repression and terror of the state. The notion of totalitarianism was frequently utilised during 
the Cold War by political scientists used a meter of comparison to study the Soviet Union. 
The authors primarily responsible for reformulating the concept of totalitarianism were Carl 
Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski in their work Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy. 
For the authors, a totalitarian system could be defined as a single hierarchical mass-party 
usually led by one man, monopolistic control of the armed and police forces and full state-
control of the media and the economy.
39
 For Friedrich and Brzezinski, their list of 
characteristics represented the best way to assess whether regimes were totalitarian or not. In 




 H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Cleveland and New York: World, 1961), 341, 372-388. 
39




this sense, they were moving in the opposite direction to Arendt. While Arendt thought that 
totalitarianism was applicable only to Nazism and Stalinism, Friedrich and Brzezinski, 
studying totalitarian systems on a more empirical and comparative footing, found that other 
regimes like communist China and Mussolini’s Italy possessed totalitarian characteristics.
40
 
However, as Giulia Albanese suggested, “theorists of totalitarianism may have disagreed 
whether the population was terrorised or mesmerised, in fear or thrall, but even the latter 
condition precluded the independence of mind necessary to give consent”.
41
 Indeed, this 
thesis will explore in the case of the Veneto, the interconnectedness of popular appeal, 
mesmerisation, opportunism, but also fear and terror, in an attempt to come to a view as to 
whether the region willingly consented, acquiesced or dissented. 
 
       The discussion about Fascism within social science and the history of ideas stimulated 
Anglo-Saxon scholars to elaborate a model of ‘Generic Fascism’ that could include all the 
features of the authoritarian movements and regimes that rose in Europe between the wars. 
Discussion about a ‘Generic Fascism’ involved eminent scholars such as Ernst Nolte, Stanley 
Payne, George Mosse, Roger Eatwell and Roger Griffin. Stanley Payne argued that fascism 
was the vaguest as well as the most abstract word of the major political terms in the twentieth 
century. In his assessment, the common characteristics of the fascist movements were the 
specific philosophical and moral beliefs in their ideology and their palingenetic 
characterisation.
42
 The authors who were proponents of a generic definition of fascism 
referred to it as an international alternative response to modernisation. However, according to 
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Stanley Payne and Roger Griffin, fascism was a phenomenon not limited to the interwar 
period; on the contrary, it is was a ‘continuing phenomenon’ which is meant to be studied in 
our time.
43
 Or as Griffin would formulate it, fascism was inspired by the conviction that a 
process of national rebirth (palingenesis) has become essential to bring to an end a protracted 
period of social and cultural decadence, and expressed itself ideologically in a revolutionary 
form of integral nationalism (ultra-nationalism).
44
 Griffin’s original definition focused on the 
ideology, considering style and organisation irrelevant for its conceptual definition.
45
 
Progressively, he enriched this definition of ‘Generic Fascism’ by supplementing it with 
additional characteristics such as the introduction of mass support as a distinguishing feature. 
His most recent interpretation in Modernism and Fascism is the most sophisticated version of 
his views. Here Griffin introduces new significant elements. In particular, he defines fascism 
as a revolutionary form of political modernism and he specifies that his palingenetic 
characteristic is related to the national and ethnic ‘rebirth’.
46
 He argues that fascism is a form 
of ‘programmatic modernism that seeks to conquer political power in order to realise a 
totalising vision of national or ethnic rebirth’. This interpretation has been contested in 
particular because Griffin explored fascism in terms of ideology rather than regime. The main 
criticism of generic fascist studies is the lack of focus on the manifestations of the movement 
with all its violence and suppression.
47
 Studies about an archetypal definition of a ‘Generic 
Fascism’ provided historians with an opportunity to seek out analogies and differences 
among the various forms and manifestations of Fascism, enhancing a series of new ‘Fascist 
comparative studies’. Iordachi’s latest work, Comparative Fascist Studies, refers to Fascism 
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as a highly eclectic ideology, a mixture of both rightist and leftist ingredients in a ‘new key’, 
a ‘Third Way’, as an alternative to both liberal democracy and revolutionary socialism.
48
  
Fascism was not a static or immutable phenomenon and it adapted to the local conditions 
where it developed. Thus, in the next section we focus on Italian Fascism, highlighting its 
peculiarity among totalitarian regimes and zooming in on the theme of consent or coercion.  
 
3. Totalitarianism in Italian Fascism 
       A study of Venetian life under the dictatorship, like any other research on Fascist state-
control of individuals and organisations needs to show an awareness of the historiographical 
debate surrounding the totalitarian aspirations of the regime. Over the last three decades the 
success (or otherwise) of the project to fascistise Italians has become a most controversial 
historiographical field with two interesting trends. Firstly, there is a line of argument 
established by Renzo De Felice in the 1960s and 1970s, and recently defended by his pupil 
Emilio Gentile, which argued that the Fascist regime possessed a coherent totalitarian 
ideology. The second stance is primarily represented by foreign contributors to the Fascism 
debate who contested the notion of meaningful consent to Fascism. 
 
       A challenge to early totalitarianism theorists’ stereotype about Fascist Italy as less 
totalitarian than its German and Russian counterparts was instigated by Renzo’s De Felice’s 
work from the late 1960s. In Interpretations of Fascism, De Felice referred to the Fascist 
regime as a totalitarian one, although some totalitarian characteristics were not implemented 
in their entirety.
49
 Comparing the different authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, De Felice 
concluded that – despite their differences – the Italian and the German regimes stood out as 
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being genuine Fascist and totalitarian regimes; therefore he argued for a distinction between 
Fascism and other forms of ‘local’ authoritarian and conservative regimes, like Latin 
American caudillismo.
50
 More recently, his most prominent student, Emilio Gentile, 
developed further the idea of an Italian totalitarianism. Criticising Hanna Arendt’s 
interpretation of early Fascism as non-totalitarian,
51
 Gentile recalibrated the Fascism debates 
by reconceptualising Fascism as faith, as a political and coherent religion made up of ‘true 
believers’.
52
 He focused attention on Fascist language, theatre, art and architecture in order to 
confirm that the regime had its own ideology and culture that involved people and generated 
popular consent.
53
 Gentile argued that Fascism was born in Italy after the First World War as 
a social, nationalist, modernist, revolutionary, totalitarian, mystic and palingenetic new 
political movement. This movement was organized into a new political regime based on 




Gentile did not discuss whether these true believers were a mass or not. He shifted the 
historical discourse from the issue of consent to more cultural aspects. He focused on 
Futurism and on ‘the sacralisation of politics’ that was not only a prerogative of the 
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dictatorships but also of democracies, as in the United States.
55
 Gentile’s approach attracted 





However, his idea of Fascism as an ‘imperfect’ totalitarianism, was contested by some 
scholars like Alberto Acquarone and MacGregor Knox who queried the validity of the 




Similarly, outspoken criticism of Gentile’s characterisation of Fascism have come from two 
other prominent Anglophone historians, R.J.B. Bosworth and Paul Corner, who have 
challenged De Felice’s and Gentile’s positions on the totalitarian nature of Fascism. 
 
      Bosworth’s Mussolini’s Italy is a series of “journeys through a totalitarianism that 
somehow never became fully normalised and that always remained open to some form of 
manipulation or at least to the expectation of it”.
58
 The main theme of the book is to 
demonstrate that the regime met with difficulties to break the traditional background of 
Italian society, made up of Catholicism and patronage. The regime reaffirmed ancient 
customs, where women – even upper-class women – could not challenge men. People were 
merely an instrument for the regime’s propaganda.
59
 Bosworth focused on the extent to which 
the regime was able to realise its totalitarian project and which forms of adaption were 
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assumed by the Italians during the Fascist dictatorship. The author demonstrated that even 
when at its most intrusive, the regime was not able to control its ‘subjects’ and manage their 
consciousness.
60
 Bosworth, influenced by the New Historicist writing, focused on the 
anecdote as a means of describing vast complex social structures,
61
 focussing on the local 
Fascist ambitions – a mix of corruption and pragmatism – that contributed to the destruction 
of the totalitarian Fascist project to build the ‘new Fascists’. The practice of patronage, one of 
the defining features of Liberal Italy, still remained commonplace during the entire Fascist 
period. There was nothing ideological – Bosworth argued – in corruption.
62
 Bosworth 




Roger Griffin, in turn, challenged Bosworth’s interpretation of Fascism and he considered 
Mussolini’s Italy “an intricate patchwork of individual case studies elegantly sewn 
together”.
64
 For Griffin, Bosworth’s work possessed a ‘frog view’ which was merely at 
ground level, in contrast with the ‘bird-eye-view’, typical of Generic Fascism research.  
With Paul Corner, the historical analysis moved in a significant new direction, namely local 
and regional history. Corner analysed popular opinion in the provinces on the basis of Fascist 
Party documentation — especially the reports on popular and public opinion by a vast 
network of police informers. Accepting the premise that the Fascist regime had a totalitarian 
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ideology willing to create new Fascist men and women and to nationalise Italians, the central 
theme of most of his work, nevertheless, is the failure of the Fascist totalitarian project. 
Corner highlighted that Fascism was a “series of essentially local movements, centred on a 
town, or at most, a province, in which the aims of the Fascists might be very different from 
one another, according to local circumstances”.
65
 Historiographically, Corner contested 
Gentile’s interpretation of Fascism as ‘political religion’, arguing that Fascism was only an 
extreme solution to the problem of nation-building, which had not been achieved since 
territorial and political unification. In his oeuvre Corner attempts to reconstruct the world of 
provincial Fascism as it was actually shaped by its exponents and experienced by the Italian 
people, using it to produce a compelling portrait of, and explanation for, the PNF’s 
totalitarian failures at regional and national level. His core observation is that the Fascist 
Party, the Partito Nazionale Fascista (PNF), was the main totalitarian instrument through 
which the Fascist regime sought to ‘fascistise’ Italians involving them in a wide range of 
activities. Yet, it proved incapable of nationalising itself and of superseding the Fascist 
movement’s provincial and local origins.
66
 This mutual interdependence of local, regional 
and national events will be at the core of this study of the Veneto. As much of this regional 
analysis will evolve around the question of popular consent to Fascism, it is imperative to 
explore the historiographical debates around consent, acquiescence, dissent and resistance in 
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4. The Debate on Fascist ‘Consent’ 
       In the fourth volume of his monumental Mussolini biography, Mussolini il duce I: Gli 
anni di consenso, 1929–1936, Renzo De Felice established the parameters that delineate the 
historiography of Fascist Italy to this day. As his work’s subtitle suggests, De Felice asserted 
that by the late 1920s, Fascism had achieved genuine and widespread popular consent. He 
argued that Mussolini had eliminated internal opposition (anti-Fascist parties); he had won 
admiration for the 1929 Lateran Pacts, which resolved the old dispute between the Italian 
state and the Catholic Church; and many Italians lent their moral support to the regime, 
enthusiastically participating in its rallies and rituals. Furthermore, consent for Mussolini’s 
regime was bolstered by recognition abroad and through the Fascist organisations offering 
moral and material security to families and working class during the Great Depression. De 
Felice qualified his notion of consent, placing it at its strongest point in the period from 1929 
to 1934, curiously leaving the Ethiopian war out, which is where historians have 
conventionally located the peak of the regime’s popularity. 
 
       Thus, De Felice reassessed what had been the prevalently anti-Fascist historiography of 
the 1950s-1960s, where the only relationship portrayed between the populus and the regime 
was one of antagonism. The argument challenged orthodoxies that had prevailed in Italy 
since 1945: namely, that the Fascist regime had been a brutal imposition on the Italian people 
and that the anti-Fascist Resistance had been the genuine expression of the national will. 
 
      De Felice returned to the anatomy of ‘consent’ in the fifth volume of the biography, 
asserting that widespread discontent was emerging among all social classes and groups in the 
period between 1936 and 1940, but at no point did it become active anti-Fascist opposition. 
De Felice’s claim that a not insignificant part of the country displayed attitudes of consent to 
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the regime, its ideology and the person of the Duce himself, was controversial.
67
 He was 
attacked for both the methodology and content of his work. Critics of De Felice’s 
interpretation portrayed De Felice as dazzled by the personal magnetism of Mussolini and he 
was accused of methodological shortcuts in his archival research, by relying too much upon 
documents from Fascist archives without resorting to a broader range of alternative sources.
68
 
The 15-year period between 1974 and 1988 saw the Fascism debate transgress from a 
primarily academic discourse into the media sphere, not unlike the Historikerstreit in 
Germany in the mid-1980s.
69
 De Felice and his opponents used the public media platform to 
publicise their views and argue their cases, thus allowing the historical debate to be 
instrumentalised politically and conversely the political debates to be instumentalised for 
historical ‘scholarship’.  
In subsequent decades, De Felice’s ‘consent’ thesis was perceived as provocative. Social 
historians sought to demonstrate the depth of popular support for the regime or, conversely 
(and especially on the left), to document working-class resistance and resilience in the face of 
Fascist coercion. At the same time, cultural historians explored the regime’s ‘sacralisation of 
politics’ and its use of aesthetics and rituality to manufacture consent and engineer a ‘New 
Man’ and a ‘New Italy.’ Not surprisingly, De Felice’s views on Mussolini reignited interest 
in Fascism research in other countries. A number of De Felice’s works’ (although not his 
monumental biography) were translated into English.
70
 The extent of de Felice’s influence is 
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evident in the reception of his work by historians from diverse backgrounds including those 
with Marxist leanings, such as Giorgio Candeloro, Marco Palla, Patrizia Dogliani and Alberto 
De Bernardi. Despite their critical attitude of De Felice’s interpretation, many utilise De 
Felice’s scholarship and adapt his notions of consent for the regime in the 1930s.
71
 For 
example, Patrizia Dogliani in Il Fascismo degli italiani admits that between Fascism and 
Italians existed a deep relationship, but that the regime was not able to impact on Italian 
society in a profound way as they would have liked in accordance with their totalitarian 
aspirations
72
. De Felice’s influence has been amplified by his exposure on state television, by 
his journal, Storia contemporanea, but first and foremost by the work of his students. In 
regard to a penetration of the English-speaking world, De Felice’s evident successor has been 
Emilio Gentile, who moved on from the question of consent to a more culturally oriented 
study of Fascism as a movement and as an ideology. Influenced by George Mosse, Gentile 
portrayed Fascism as a new a new ‘political religion’ with the regime attempting to achieve a 
‘cultural revolution’. Gentile owed much to the work of George Mosse, introducing the 
process of the ‘nationalisation of masses’ and the concept of ‘lay religion’ into the Italian 
Fascist historiographical categories.
73
 Gentile concluded that despite Fascism’s failures and 
limitations Mussolini presided over an example of genuine ‘totalitarianism’.
74
 The difficulty 
in evaluating the relationship between the Italian people and the regime is also underlined by 
Simona Colarizi in L’opinione degli italiani sotto il regime, who describes consent as a 
delicate balance between coercion and persuasion and whose work raises the significant 
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question of the nature of popular opinion.
75
 Ian Kershaw, who researched popular opinion 
under the Nazi dictatorship, distinguished between ‘popular opinion’ and ‘public opinion’. 
According to him, public opinion refers to the plurality of freely and publicly expressed 
opinion; in contrast ‘popular opinion’ is non-quantifiable, diffuse, and is comprised of ill-
coordinated opinions held by large but indeterminate sections of society.
76
 These eclectic 
views are essential to an understanding of consent and dissent; as Victoria De Grazia argued 
in The culture of consent, it was the strategy of the little groups, the families and individuals 
that caused the reciprocal adaption between regime and society.
77
 The most recent responses 
to De Felice’s challenge of consenso have approached the question transcending its original 
framework. Christopher Duggan’s ambitious Fascist Voices (FV) scrutinises Italians’ 
sentiments and attitudes towards the regime in great detail. Moving beyond De Felice’s 
consensus theory which was based more on the absence of active resistance to the Fascist 
regime than direct interrogation of people’s sources, Duggan explores “how men, women and 
children experienced and understood the regime in terms of their emotions, ideas, values, 
practices and expectations”.
78
 One of Duggan’s most important claims is that the values of 
the church and the regime formed a single ‘emotional continuum’, contesting previous 
scholars – above all Emilio Gentile – who have portrayed Fascism as a ‘political religion’. 
Therefore, Duggan suggests that for many Italians, being a good Fascist meant being a good 
Catholic, and vice versa.
79
 In addition, the author argues that Mussolini’s personality cult 
(Ducismo) was the most powerful driving force. Within the Fascist movement, Mussolini 
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functioned as ‘an element of cohesion’ which performed the vital function of deflecting 
criticisms towards the regime.
80
 Whereas Duggan foregrounded the intimate relationship 
between the Duce and the masses, the series of essays collected in In the Society of Fascists, 
edited by Giulia Albanese and Roberta Pergher, emphasise the complexity and the flexibility 
of the relationship between the Fascist regime and Italians. 
The work tries to engage with De Felice’s consensus thesis arguing for a different approach 
that explores the importance of intermediary structures. Albanese and Pergher argue that 
previous historians’ obsession with testing Renzo de Felice’s assertion that Fascism enjoyed 
the broad support of Italians has meant that, whether one agreed that Italians consented to 
Fascism or not, the focus has been almost entirely on how Italians responded to the regime. 
This potentially obscures “the ways in which the population (or significant segments thereof) 
may have set the agenda for the regime, forcing a course of action upon the dictators and their 
inner circle, rather than the other way around”.
81
 Second, the assumption present in the 
consent/coercion binary that consent is born of ‘positive’ propaganda and personal benefit 
from the regime’s policies and, conversely, that coercion and repression must always give 
rise to fearful and begrudging submission is flawed.
82
  
An important perspective is added by Baris, who introduced the term ‘passive consent’ to 
avoid the historians’ difficulty in moving beyond the old binaries of consent and coercion. He 
asserted that de Felice’s claims of middle-class ‘consent’ did not explain how Fascism could 
rule a country for over twenty years.
83
 The problem of terminology comes to the fore when 
analysing De Felice’s work in an international context. As Albanese and Philip Morgan 
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argued, there is a problem with the use of the words consent and consensus when analysing 
the relationship between people and the regime.
84
 While in Italian the word consenso is used 
to signify both consent and consensus, in English consent and consensus imply a slightly 
different quality in this relationship. The word consent suggests an enthusiastic mental and 
physical act of endorsement and therefore an active engagement with the regime. Consent can 
be individual, while consensus suggests something broad and it is related to agreement with 
the opinion of a group and not an individual agreement. Consensus also denotes a passive 
attitude which describes people merely responding to the policies of the regime. Consent is 
used to emphasise the difference with the traditional full-group consensus model.   As 
Morgan noted, De Felice borrowed the term from sociology as well as ordinary usage, 
without making a distinction between the two terms consent and consensus.
85
 Neither consent 
nor coercion can be understood without the corrective of the other and both terms, 
inadequately reflect the “balance between pressure and voluntarism, imposition and 
contestation, allegiance and evasion, high-flying rhetoric and grubby reality” that shaped life 
under Fascism.
86
 What we still lack is a full exploration of what the terms that might replace 
or supplement ‘consent’ and ‘coercion’, entail. Discourse outside Italy has contributed to a 
widening of the conversations about the nature of Italian Fascism and the issue of consent 
and dissent. Philippe Burrin, for instance,  who worked on Vichy France, investigated the 
varied forms of French ‘adaptation’ or ‘accommodation’ (beyond simple collaboration) to 
German hegemony, including behaviours by government leaders, sectors of civil society, and 
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partisan groups of assorted persuasions.
87
 Burrin refuses to characterise the French people as 
either a nation of collaborators or a nation of resisters - or to label those in the middle 
‘functional collaborators’ or ‘functional resisters’.
88
 His characterisation that “to be a hero is 
honourable; not to be one is not necessarily dishonourable” is also applicable to the Fascist 
case. This means that the general historians’ approach to the dominant tone of ‘the black 
years’ of the Fascist ventennio may need to abandon the binary interpretation of consent and 
dissent in favour of a more nuanced approach. Thus, as has been demonstrated convincingly 
for the German case, historians of Italian Fascism, too, are beginning to discern polycratic 





5. Local Fascism: Themes and Debates 
       The tension between the national and local dimension is a familiar theme in Italian 
historical studies, especially given the marked Italian regionalism that survived the country’s 
Unification. The relationship between the local and the national becomes even more 
important for the analysis of the Fascist movement that claimed to be centralised and 
totalitarian (“everything within the state, nothing outside the state, nothing against the state”) 
at a time when most Italians would continue to define themselves and their identities in 
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 The theme of the organisation and the functioning of the Fascist regime at 
local level was first addressed in the 1970s from Ernesto Ragionieri for the case of Tuscany. 
Ernesto Ragionieri identified new angles from which to study Fascism: the role of the PNF in 
the periphery, the formation of a ‘fascistisised’ ruling class and the adhesion of civil society 
to the totalitarian project of the regime.
 91
 The work of Ragionieri has been a reference point 
for subsequent historians;
92
 not least for Marco Palla, one of his students who developed 
Ragioneri’s ideas further.
93
 A central theme to these local studies, has been the role of the 
Fascist Party. As Palla highlighted, the Party with its flexibility and hold over the society at 
local level “became an instrument of coordination of the local life, essential for the 
functioning of a State and a dictatorship in the periphery”.
94
 Significant works on Ferrara, 
Bologna, Florence and Brescia appeared in the mid-1980s with a special reference to the 
formative phase of Italian Fascism, providing a valuable insight on the economy and pre-
Fascist political affiliations.
95
 In that period, special attention to the urban and regional 
history of Italy had been paid by Anglo-American scholars like Paul Corner, Frank Snowden, 
Alice Kelikian and Anthony Cardoza who gave local Fascist studies an international 
circulation. As Alice Kelikian noted, much of the effort has been put on testifying to the 
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“highly localised and·1oosely integrated” structure of Italy even after national unification.
96
 
These works have proved to be an effective attempt to highlight ‘local diversity’ under the 
regime. For example, Alice Kelikian’s work on Brescia contrasted the works of Paul Corner 
on Ferrara and Anthony Cardoza on Bologna, which emphasised the rapid growth of the 
Fascist movement among both the rural and town middle-classes in 1921-1922 under the 
impact of the squads’ punitive expeditions.
97
 What most of the local studies lack, however, is 
a detailed discussion of how Fascism impacted on popular attitudes and vice versa. Yet, as 
Tommaso Baris argued, despite the absence of this and an adequate comparative analysis 
which could allow to draw up a clear balance sheet of the individual works, local Fascism is 
undoubtedly one of the most appropriate paradigms through which we can verify the various 
interpretative models about the Fascist experience.
98
 Over the past few years, provincial 
studies have re-generated great interest thanks also to the larger availability of archival 
documents. Recent works demonstrated that the province is an appropriate observatory for a 
discussion of the effects of Fascist politics on Italian society. Tommaso Baris’ Il Fascismo in 
provincia. Politica e società a Frosinone (1919-1940), for instance, reconstructs the 
physiognomy of Frosinone province. With a focus on the Party, Baris’ analysis explains the 
relationships between the national processes activated by the regime and their 
implementation at local level. Baris’ work confirms a general trend identified in other local 
and regional studies that showed pre-Fascist political and social forces surviving under the 
name of Fascism.
99
 The important theme of who effectively ran the provinces and to what 
extent the Fascist totalitarian project took place in the periphery has been well-documented 
by Paul Corner’s latest work, The Fascist Party and Popular Opinion in Mussolini’s Italy. 
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Based on original archival research, the author reconstructs the world of provincial Fascism 
as it was implemented by its proponents and experienced by the Italian people. The central 
theme of his discussion is the regime’s attempt to reform Italian institutions and society. The 
regime abolished local elections and imposed unelected mayors (podestà) appointed by the 
Ministry of Interior under the supervision of the prefect. The regime centralised the selection 
of the local elite in order to pursue its totalitarian ambition, achieve control of the province 
and avoid mismanagement of power. Crucial for the Fascist totalitarian system was the role 
of the Partito Nazionale Fascista (PNF), as the main instrument through which the Fascist 
regime sought to fascistise the Italian society. Yet, Corner demonstrates that the PNF proved 
incapable of educating Italians to be ‘good Fascists’. The failure of the project was mainly 
due to the lack of competence of the provincial Fascists leaders and their inability to deliver 
an intransigent Fascist message. What mattered to the local Fascist leaders was the contest for 
local power, patronage and status. The consistency of these themes throughout the documents 
analysed by Corner, is a clear indicator that, as Baris already argued, the modus operandi and 
the dynamics through which the various local factions competed for power were similar 
across the country.
100
 In this respect, the failures of the Fascists resembled that of the liberal 
state: both failed to overcome the strong power bases of the local elites required for a genuine 
transformation of Italy commensurate with the political ambitions of either political project. 
Although the Party remains a crucial subject for the study of local Fascism, a new generation 
of historians has highlighted the necessity to cross-checking the levels of analysis (histoire 
croisée-crossed history) utilising a diversified approach which comprises an intertwined 
study of the social, administrative and institutional history of Fascism.
101
 The recent literature 
on local Fascism has shed light on aspects of the subject that have not yet received sufficient 
historiographical attention. Corner and Galimi’s recent edited collection, Il Fascismo in 
                                                 
100
 Baris et al., Fascismi Periferici, 15. 
101
 R. Camurri (ed.), Fascismi locali (Sommacampagna: Cierre Edizioni, 2011). 
38 
 
provincia: Articolazioni e gestione del potere tra centro e periferia, is a useful snapshot of 
the current focus of historical interest in this respect. It extends the spectrum of research to 
other Fascist institutions, such as the GUF (Fascist University Groups), ONMI (National 
Organisation for Maternity and Childhood), industrial groups and the Fascist trade unions. Its 
aim is an inclusion of ‘local Fascism’ into the national debate in order to explain national 
processes.
102
 A core aspect of the different contributions is the process by which the Fascists 
attempted to nationalise the provinces by establishing dynamic relations with the periphery. 
The volume argues convincingly that local Fascists were not mere executors, but they were 
able to translate the national input into a more digestible message for the periphery. This 
thesis will add to the debate by exploring in detail how this relationship between the centre 
and the periphery developed in the Veneto, in particular with regard to the Fascist attempts at 
generating popular consent through regional forces.   
 
6. Veneto and Venezianità 
       Since the 1970s, the case of the Veneto Region has already been scrutinised by eminent 
authors like Silvio Lanaro, Mario Isneghi, Emilio Franzina and Ernesto Brunetta.
103
 The 
peculiarity which has come to the light from the Veneto region characterised by the 
leadership role of the Church, is the continuity with the political structures of the liberal age 
under Fascism.
104
 In other words, a new Fascist generation of politicians appeared incapable 
of challenging the power of the traditional local elites. However, this is not to say that, over 
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time, the Veneto did not see the emergence of a new Fascist ruling elite, but as Baris noted, 
the replacement of the old traditional elites happened only towards the end of the regime’s 
life, around 1942 and therefore was not instrumental in shaping the relationship between the 
centre and the periphery in its formative phases.
105
 Renato Camurri had already argued that 
the network of local notables had not been corroded by the attempt of the various local 
federali found a new political order at local level.
106
 On the contrary, the Fascist Party made 
use of the local aristocracy to pacify the internal situation of the Party by appointing them to 
hold offices of crucial importance. In 2011, the official historical journal of the Veneto’s 
universities (Venice, Verona and Padua), Venetica, dedicated an entire volume to the study of 
the regional Fascism. This Fascismi Locali made an important contribution to the history of 
Veneto under Fascism. The volume confirmed a new interest in local Fascism from a new 
generation of historians. It examines the rise of local élites and their relationship with the 
National Fascist Party (PNF) in the provinces of Padua, Belluno, Verona and Rovigo. The 
clear focus of the book is on an agrarian brand of Fascism (Padua, Verona and Rovigo), with 
the only exception of the province of Belluno which geographically (mountain community) 
and politically (consistent socialist political pre-Fascist affiliation) is not comparable with the 
other provinces which are object of the study. The articles of Alessandro Baú, Francesco 
Chiari,  Carlo Monaco and Valentino Zaghi, with minor differences from province to 
province, substantially confirm previous accounts on the Veneto region: the regional Fascist 
ruling class is a hybrid, a mix between old and new elites, where the new Fascists were much 
weaker than what was suggested by the regime’s propaganda.
107
 And in some cases, as 
argued by Alessandro Baú for the case of Padua, Fascism “was born weak and hesitant and 
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remained so also in the following years”.
108
Although Fascismi Locali provides interesting 
ideas regarding the development of Fascism in the region, it does not include more detailed 
analysis of developments in the province of Venice which held a strong leadership role within 
the Veneto movement, yet, in stark contrast with the rest of the region, possessed a marked 
urban frame.  
 
       The theme of Fascism in Venice has been touched upon by a number of historians of the 
region. For years, the work Venezia, edited by Emilio Franzina, has been the main point of 
reference for the general historiography of Venetian Fascism, until the turn of the century 
when in 2001 Giulia Albanese published Alle origini del fascismo. La violenza politica a 
Venezia 1919- 1922. This, in 2002 was supplemented by the multi-volume Storia di Venezia, 
edited by Mario Isnenghi and Stuart Woolf. Albanese made a significant contribution to our 
knowledge of the formative phase of the Fascist movement in Venice. However, the book 
does not provide an account of Fascism in power as the narration stopped at 1922. Storia di 
Venezia covers the entire Fascist period from a local perspective, contains different 
contributions on the Fascist regime from different local historians. The most significant 
article is that of Renato Camurri, La classe politica nazional fascista, shedding new light on 
the local Fascist ruling class though again with a focus on the earlier period, and without 
specific focus on Venice City and its relationship with the rest of the province and the 
region.
109
 The above-mentioned authors have made a great contribution to emphasising the 
specificity of the Venice province political tradition. However, this work is asking a set of 
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questions that has not been explored in detail before, such as the mental attitude of the 
Venetian people and their response to the various challenges presented by the regime. 
 
       Recently, Venetian Fascism has also attracted the attention of non-Italian historians. In 
Everyday Life in Fascist Venice, 1929-40, Kate Ferris uses an approach similar to that of 
Sheila Fitzpatrick’s work on Russian Stalinism,
110
 exploring microhistories related to young 
people, popular celebrations, Fascist autarchic policy, and Fascist funerals. Inspired by De 
Certeau’s The practice of everyday life, she investigates the ‘tactics’ excogitated by local 
people to respond to, and sometimes resist, the regime’s policies.  One of the principal 
strengths of the work is Ferris’ ability to provide a detailed socioeconomic overview of the 
city in the interwar period together with an account of the local manifestations of the 
hardships of the Great Depression that its people shared with other Italians. In addition, Ferris 
describes well Venice’s distinctive history and artistic patrimony, and the city’s reliance on 
tourism. Ferris provides an analysis of the efforts made by the regime in order to reach the 
local population and she also explains convincingly how the regime made frequent recourse 
to the myth and the rituals of the Venetian Republic, Risorgimento nationalism, and the 
Catholic Church, to find support for Fascist indoctrination. Unfortunately, as suggested by 
Anthony Cardoza, the documentary evidence in the individual case studies does not always 
sustain the authors’ claims and aspirations.
111
 In particular, she makes creative use of forty-
seven essays submitted by nine- and ten-year-old students for a local writing competition in 
1935 in order to give voice to Venetian middle class children. Likewise, the chapter on the 
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regime’s efforts to appropriate pre-existing festivals, and celebrations is not convincing, since 
its assessment of popular reception relies largely upon the memoirs of a single source, Gino 
Damerini’s wife, who was a member of the Venetian social elite. Bosworth’s Italian Venice: 
A History explores Venice city from the fall of the Republic in 1797 and the Risorgimento up 
through the present day.
112
 It contains interesting accounts on the two faces of the city: 
modernisation-consumerism and culture. With regards to the Fascist period the author 
discusses local Fascism with a particular focus on the process of industrialisation of the city 
driven by the leading figures of the Venice’s resurgence, such as the industrialist Giuseppe 
Volpi. Before joining the Fascist regime and being appointed Minister of Finance, Volpi was 
already a successful businessman who was entrusted with several political and administrative 
missions under Giovanni Giolitti. He served as a delegate at the Peace Conference in Paris 
and was appointed governor of Tripolitania (Libya).
113
 
Despite imperfections, what is clear in both Ferris and Bosworth is that Venice is not only 
important for its diversity in terms of origins, physiognomy of power, economy, religious 
affiliation and geography, but first and foremost for its dynamic relation with local identity 
(Venezianità). Venice city and its territory had developed in large measure an independent 
identity from the other Italian areas since the Risorgimento. References to venezianità have 
continuously been made in the main works on the local history of the province and of the city 
of Venice, and also more recently. To a large degree the history of Italy has been the country 
of the cento città (one hundred cities), each with its own characteristics. The negotiation 
between municipal, regional and national identities has involved the liberal as well as the 
Fascist elites, with the main preoccupation being to turn a country into a nation and ‘make 
Italians’. Similar tensions were played out in Venice. However, nationalism was not a 
contradiction in term of loyalty to the Venetian past and neither precluded loyalty to Italy. 
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Venezianità could sit quite comfortably with the commitment to the nation and to Fascist 
imperialism and romanità. Some of the rhetoric and myths of the Serenissima (ancient 
Republic of Venice) were recuperated to invent and express the new paradigm of the nation. 
Therefore, Venice’s singularity was seen as a strength at the service of italianità 
(Italianess).
114
 Not dissimilar to what Celia Applegate and Alon Confino have demonstrated 
for Germany, the province, and in this case Venice, presented a singular case which 
strengthened national identity. Venezianità has been a building block for nationalism and 
Italianness.
115
 As Elsa Damien argued, the spatial identity appears to be relevant for a better 
understanding of Venetian history. In addition, the relationship between venezianità and 
nationalism and Fascism helps to demonstrate that identity can evolve, circulate and be 
appropriated by most diverse political agendas.
116
 However, the Fascist recovery of the 
Venetian past was achieved through a compromise which had to be found between the 
traditions of venezianità and modern financial planning and the regime’s political 
requirements. In this perspective, the Venetian ruling class aimed at linking local identity and 
Fascist ideology to the common object of Venice’s economic rinascimento. 
 
7. Thesis Outline 
       The aim of this thesis will not be confined to challenging the historiographical debate 
surrounding the Fascist regime. This dissertation will focus on the relationship between 
consent and dissent in order to investigate local active support or resistance to the regime. 
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Attention will be paid to the variety of attitudes of local people towards the regime. This 
research will emphasise the crucial role of societal responses in supporting or undermining 
Italian Fascism.  
 
       The Italian research on Fascism has often focused on political or military history, 
whereas this work will contribute to developing the field of social studies of Fascism which 
the Anglo-Saxon historians such as Richard J. B. Bosworth, Paul Corner and Philip Morgan 
have lately been moving towards. Based on a thematic structure, this research aims at 
offering a more comprehensive social and cultural history of an important province of Italy.  
 
       This thesis will consist of five chapters, each describing and analysing a different piece 
of the Venetian social jigsaw and asking a set of questions that has not been explored in detail 
before. The chapters will be devoted to different sections of local society, to their actions, and 
to their complex relations with the Fascist regime from 1922 until 1943.  
 
       Given the amount of the available literature on popular opinion under the regime, this 
work has needed to select what kind of sources, perspective and methodology to apply to this 
research. Of the works available, Paul Corner’s and Philip Morgan’s large output on Italian 
Fascism has arguably been the most inspiring for the drafting of this thesis. Morgan’s and 
Corner’s research about Italian Fascism has crucially contributed to inspire this work to 
examine in depth the ‘question of consent’.
117
  These authors have also influenced the 
methodological approach of this research by influencing the choice of the kind of primary 
sources to scrutinise, namely the local and national Fascist archives with a focus on the police 
reports, in order to investigate the relation and the relation between people and regime. In 
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addition to these two important authors, this thesis has drawn inspiration from studies on 
other European countries like Nazi Germany. In this respect, we have concentrated our 
attention on the excellent works of Ian Kershaw and Philippe Burrin on Nazi Germany and 
the German occupation of France which have provided additional guidance on the kind of 
social grouping to investigate, and they have significantly impacted on the way this work has 
questioned documents in order to answer the main questions of the research.  On one side, 
Kershaw’s Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich: Bavaria 1933-1945 has 
provided  a further framework for the kind of sources to be investigated, namely the reports 
on opinion and morale compiled during the regime by party, state, police, and other official 
agencies.
118
 On the other side, Burrin’s Living with Defeat: France Under the German 
Occupation, 1940-1944 has encouraged me to explore the institutions of Venice society: the 
Communist Party, the trade unions, the Church, the business community, and the 
intellectuals.
119
 This thesis aims to paint a clear picture of Venetian society during the Fascist 
era, by describing how the various Venetian social groups fundamentally maintained and 
defended their autonomy. 
 
        We shall be focusing in turn upon five chapters, all of which manifested the basic 
elements of consent and dissent during the dictatorship. The first chapter of this thesis will be 
dedicated to the local ruling elite, to its process of fascistisation (whether complete or not) 
and the related role of Fascism in stabilising power at the local level. This chapter will also 
introduce some of the social groups that will be playing a crucial role during the regime, like 
industrialists and other groups of interests. The key element will be the relationship between 
centre and periphery and the role of the notabilities (podestà, federale and prefetto) in 
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controlling power at local level.
120
 This chapter will attempt to demonstrate the limited 
success of the regime in winning over local traditional elites as even those considered to be 
‘true’ Fascists were able to retain the style and political transaction attitudes typical of the 
pre-Fascist period. After the first chapter, the focus will shift onto the relationship between 
workers and the regime focusing on the Depression period. The second chapter will look at 
working class participation in the Fascist regime. So far, research on the Italian working class 
has benefited from the works of Tobias Abse and Tim Mason, with Abse focusing 
predominantly on the years of the Fascist seizure of power in 1918-1922, whereas Mason 
concentrated on last two years of the war (1943-1945).
121
 This analysis will redress the lack 
of research with regards to the workers under the regime by taking inspiration from the 
rigorous scrutiny that Richard Bessel, Conan Fisher and Detlef Muhlberger have conducted 
of the German workers under the Nazi regime. The chapter will argue that the regime failed 
to achieve consent from the workers.   
 
       The third chapter will then look at youth under the regime with a particular focus on the 
Catholic Church youth groups and its strong social power over the Venetian population 
during the Fascist era. A particular reference will be made to its capacity to organise and 
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mobilise local society. The chapter will analyse the complex relationship between the 
Catholic Actions youth groups and the Fascist youth groups, as well as the extent to which 
both high prelates and parish priests managed to keep themselves from entering political 
debate (whether to support or to challenge the regime). The most crucial part of the chapter 
will present the success of Catholic youth organisations – between 1929 and 1931 - that 
closely resembled those of their Fascist counterparts. I will also underline the capacity of 
local and traditional society initially to resist through their involvement in the catholic 
organisations, the Azione Cattolica and the FUCI (federation of catholic students), and then I 
will focus on the compromise made by the local Church in order to accommodate the regime 
in the late 1930s. 
 
       Catholic youth groups represented a serious blow for a dictatorship whose ambitions of 
total social control were essentially based on the regimentation of the Italian population and 
on constant displays of popular support. Catholics possessed their own youth and social 
organisations which represented a real source of alternative education and indoctrination for 
people (and youth in particular), being a source of real challenge for the regime’s project to 
fascistise Italians. Therefore, this chapter will question the regime’s formation and education 
of a new and completely fascistised ruling class.  In order to do that, this thesis will examine 
the level of repression of alternative and pre-existent local groupings like the Catholics and 
the degree of mobilisation produced by the regime’s mass organisations like Gioventừ 
Italiana del Littorio, Gruppi Universitari Fascisti, Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro and Opera 
Nazionale Maternità e Infanzia.  
 
       The fourth chapter will be dedicated to the local Jewish community, the dynamics of 
integration within the Venetian society and the crucial role they played in various Venetian 
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social and interest groups. This chapter will analyse the effect of the Race Laws on the 
Venetian Jewish community, the reaction of the local people and how local Fascists and 
Fascist elites collaborated in persecuting or rescuing Jewish citizens. The chapter will provide 
further background on the institutions and the decision makers that were responsible for the 
implementation of the Race Laws at local level. This section will also focus on the peculiarity 
of the Venetian experience of the Race Laws, namely how the laws were executed compared 
to other similar regions of Italy, such as Ferrara, Turin and Trieste.  
 
       The final chapter of the thesis will focus on Venice society’s shift away from the regime 
during the first three years of the Second World War (1940-1943). I will move on to an 
analysis of the ‘fracture of the consent’ produced by the conflict and its social impact at all 
levels: politics, economy, women and youth. The war contributed to the rapid collapse of the 
regime which officially happened on 25 July 1943 with Mussolini’s dismissal enacted by the 
King. However, this chapter will end with Field Marshal Pietro Badoglio’s taking of power, 
the armistice signed with the Allies on 8 September 1943 and the following proclamation of 
the Italian Social Republic allied with the Nazis in the north of Italy. The speed of 
disintegration is one of the ways in which the regime differed most obviously from Nazi 
Germany and may point to a significantly different composition of popular support for the 
regime. This chapter will discuss the process of people’s detachment from the regime during 
the progression of the conflict. 
 
8. Methodology and Sources 
       Much of this work is based on research I conducted on the files of Fascist archives at the 
State Central Archive in Rome which I have visited multiple times during the period of the 
doctorate. The material was selected to throw light on the core theme of consent and dissent 
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during the chosen time period, and the work predominantly draws on the police reports on 
popular opinion. 
 
       This work predominantly draws on the reports of the regime police that was controlling 
Italian society. The source of the reports could be some Fascist officials, the militia, 
syndicalists or state employees. In addition to sources produced by state employees, we can 
also find material supplied by private individuals such as businessesmen or hotel and pub 
owners, who were legally obligated to collect information on suspicious citizens for use of 
Fascist law enforcement.  
 
       These sources offer broad temporal, geographical, and social perspectives. The work 
entailed an enormous task, involving the close examination of more than 5,000 documents on 
the experience of particular groups (for example, the Party, the Fascist Youth, workers, the 
Jewish community, the Church and material relating specifically to women). 
 
       Although it seems that the research has relied on one typology of files which might 
appear to be a relatively narrow archival base, in reality this work has a broad perspective, as 
it also consisted of a meticulous scrutiny of local archives, such as the municipal archives of 
Chioggia, Portogruaro, Venice, Cavarzere and San Dona’, or the archive of the provincial 
organisations of the regimes, like the GUF (University students), the Opera Nazionale Balilla 
(ONB) and Organizzazione Nazionale Maternità e Infanzia (ONMI).  
 
       The documents about ‘popular opinion’ are not an objective description of the reality on 
the ground; they are sources provided by informers who had their own agendas, 
preconceptions, and interests in portraying certain people in a certain way at certain times. 
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But they nevertheless provide us with very useful information, and read critically and with 
the necessary caution and supplemented by alternative sources, they provide the researcher 
with an effective measure of shifts in public opinion. This is the reason why this research 
does not take documents at face value, but there is an effort to provide background and 
interpretation, also through robust support of secondary literature available for the province 
of Venice.  
 
       As Ian Kershaw already argued for the Bavarian case, the task of reconstructing trends in 
popular opinion in “a climate of ideological dictatorship with systematic and draconian 
repression of nonconformist opinion and attempted steerage of opinion by means of a 
comprehensively organised propaganda machine backed up by coercion and control of Party 
and State, is faced with some obvious and daunting problems”. 
122
 One of the greatest 
problems is to establish whether patterns of development in political attitude and opinions 
were genuine expression of popular attitude or not. People’s lives and their political 
comments were recorded by others in reports that were meant to be a compiled for the 
regime’s specific purpose to control society and they contain their own internal bias and 
colouring. For evident lack of alternatives, historians have used the voluminous archives of 
the police, prefects and Fascist Party. The problem with these reports is that they deliver a 
message which is from the perspective of the powerholders rather than the people. These 
surveys report attitudes and behaviours that the regime was meant to repress. Most of the 
reported incidents were triggered by economic hardship, especially during the Great 
Depression, and were often described as being isolated events, and promptly repressed by the 
police; therefore, they did not cause a serious threat for the regime. 
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However, two different tendencies can be observed when scrutinising the police and 
prefectural summary reports to the Ministry of the Interior. The first is related to the prefect’s 
summaries on the political situation of the province (Situazione politica delle province). As 
has been demonstrated in previous works, especially by Simona Colarizi’s L’opinione degli 
italiani sotto il regime, these kinds of documents have the tendency to portray the local 
political situation in a ‘positive’ and ‘constructive’ way as the prefect, virtually in charge of 
the province, had to show to the Ministry of Interior, and therefore to his boss, that the 
situation was under control or at least that the ‘public order’ was recoverable under his 
leadership and directive. Despite being conveyed from a similar standing point and with a 
similar style, the police reports have a slightly different tone. Police reports are usually 
related and focused on recording anti-Fascist activities and the distinguishing factor was the 
absence or presence of anti-Fascists and their organisations in triggering or exploiting protest 
and agitations. What mattered to prefects was to prevent and repress popular attitudes that 
might have caused a threat to the Fascist ‘system’. Meanwhile, police officers, namely anti-
Fascist hunters, were more interested in reporting protests that might have been politically 
motivated and directed by clandestine anti-Fascist organisations and propaganda. “Despite 
the different tone of these documents, the reports of the internal authorities generally imply 
conformity and support for the regime, whatever the specific criticism alluded to”.
123
 On the 
contrary, the anti-Fascists of the clandestine Communist Party, who produced memoires after 
the fall of the regime, emphasised the rejection of the regime. However, memoirs of the 
militants are understandably retrospective and judgemental and “the impression is conveyed 
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The material collected by the Fascist authorities is variegated and it goes from the recording 
of an event, the reproduction of verbatim letters they intercepted, the anti-Fascist song 
appearing on public walls, the subversive songs sung in pubs and during moments of 
conviviality, insults passed by individual workers, confiscated posters and leaflets. However, 
one of the most interesting sources of information were the anonymous informers, especially 
when the OVRA, the special political police unit in the Ministry of Interior, was established 
in order to investigate anti-Fascist activity and social life. This was an exceptional source of 
information for the regime. As Morgan argued, “anonymous informers were expected to mix 
with people and register what they actually said, to gauge a public mood which had no open 
way of self-expression in a dictatorship”. They “were were often used as a check on the 
operations of their provincial and local organisations (...)” and “they became the most 
important source of information for the regime’s leadership on the fluctuations in popular 
attitudes”.
125
 However, as Morgan has also admitted, the sources have self-evident 
limitations, as “opinions and conversations overheard in various public places were welded 




       The sources regarding the popular mood and voice, the material is often so direct and 
expressive that there can be little mistaking the broad lines of mood and opinion.
127
 For 
example, one of the approximations made by De Felice, especially regading the regime’s 
surveys on popular opinion, was to assert that consent for the regime was demonstrated by 
the fact that agitations were primarily due to economic claims. De Felice excluded any form 
of anti-Fascism, but at the same time he failed of cross check his information with a large 
number of secondary sources. 
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Historians have explored alternative approaches, like the use of oral history. The work of 
Luisa Passerini on Turin has revealed a large span of political dissidence which remained 
hidden and not recordable during the regime. But the so-called ‘cultural resistance’ cannot 
fully explain the development of popular opinion under the regime. First and foremost, 
‘cultural resistance’ refers to specific social groups; in Passerini’s work the protagonists were 
the workers. Secondly, oral sources are judgemental and recorded after the fall of the regime, 
and as Michael Frisch already noted, by using oral sources there is a danger of appropriating 
experience for theory rather than using theory to make sense of experience.
128
 Alistair 
Thomson has argued, that historians want to explore how past events have subjectively 





       In what follows, as Kershaw has already done, the documents “will be given the full 




The research is based on documentary evidence from an extensive number of public and 
private sources. An approximate number of three thousand documents have been consulted. 
The main sources are located at the Archivio Centrale dello Stato in Rome. Particular 
attention has been paid to the documents of the Ministry of the Interior. I have consulted the 
documents related to the apparatus of control and repression of the regime related to 
Direzione Generale di Pubblica Sicurezza which provide crucial information about the 
regime’s system of control over the population. This material gives a clear panoramic view of 
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the regime’s action of repression enacted over political dissidents. Popular opinion 
assessment has been conveyed by the police and prefects’ reports on single cases and on the 
general situation of the province. These documents have been shown to be of particular 
interest in discovering local popular mood during crucial periods of the dictatorship, like the 
proclamation of the Race Laws and the outbreak of the war. In addition, a wide range of local 
newspapers were available to provide crucial information on the political, economic and 
cultural happenings of the time.  
 
       In the attempt to outline the profile of the local Fascist ruling class, the lack of 
accessibility of important family archives of eminent local figures like Pietro Marsich and 
Giuseppe Volpi, necessitated reliance on secondary sources and plausibility arguments. In 
some cases however, like that of the federale Giorgio Suppiej, primary sources could be 
consulted. The files of the Segreteria Particolare del Duce, for instance, provided interesting 
insights into the relationship between the Fascist leader and the local ruling class. 
 
       A crucial step towards the completion of the archival research has been the cross-
checking of the information made through the consultation of local and municipal archives 
and local archives of the Fascist organisations. I consulted the Archivio di Stato di Venezia 
with a focus on the files regarding the Prefecture of Venice (Gabinetto di Prefettura), as well 
as the municipal archives of Venice, Chioggia, Portogruaro and San Donà, which have been 
indispensable for understanding the functioning of the local Fascist administration at 
province level. Although in some cases documentation is incomplete, the municipal archives 
have been of particular interest in supporting the relevant national documentation scrutinised 
in Rome and monitoring the activity of some minor figures of the local Fascism, the 
funzionari. In addition to the municipal sources, I have been able to consult the Archivio 
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Storico della Regione Veneto, where two important Fascist organisations’ archives are held: 
Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro (OND) and Gioventù Italiana del Littorio (GIL), which gave a 
good insight into the local Fascist organisations’ internal structure and financial situation. 
However, the most interesting and what complex organisation archive consulted has been the 
Archivio Storico dell’Università Ca’ Foscari with material concerning students’ life, the 
Gruppo Universitario Fascista (GUF), the official university celebrations and the 
correspondence of the Rector. This documentation has proved to be of particular importance 
in assessing the level of integration of the new Venetian Fascist ruling class within the party 
(especially for the 1930s) and in discovering the biography of an eminent Fascist like 
Agostino Lanzillo who was the rector at Ca’ Foscari between 1934 and 1938, that is, in the 































1. The Fascist Party in Venice province (1919-1943) 
Introduction 
       The Fascist regime had totalitarian ambitions; its totalitarian ‘project’ was to ‘fascistise’ 
Italians, to create new Fascist men and women and cohere a recalcitrant, individualistic, and 
locally-rooted people into a national and nationalised block capable of fighting and winning 
wars of imperial expansion. In this perspective, Fascism was an extreme solution to the 
problem of nation-building, which had not previously been achieved despite the late-
nineteenth century process of territorial and political unification under Liberal governments.  
 
       This chapter explores how those messages were received at local level. Using 
voluminous State and Fascist Party archive documentation ‒ especially the reports on popular 
and public opinion by a vast network of police informers and rank-and-file Fascists ‒ we 
attempt to reconstruct the world of the Fascist movement as it was shaped by its local 
exponents.  
 
       The Fascist Party was the main instrument through which the Fascist regime sought to 
‘fascistise’ Italians. This chapter will explore the extent to which the Fascist Party proved 
capable of nationalising itself, with the bureaucratic centralisation of its formal activities and 
responsibilities superseding the provincial origins of the movement. This chapter accepts that 
the Fascist regime had a totalitarian ideology with which the regime tried to build the ‘new 
Fascist man’ and nationalise a country that was organised largely on the basis of regional 
affiliations and structures. However, this work will argue that despite a process of 
organisation and propaganda, the regime failed in its central mission of educating Italians 
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(whether leaders or led) to be ‘good Fascists’. Despite the formal subordination of Party to 
State in the Fascist totalitarian framework, as already argued by Paul Corner, an endemic 
beghismo (infighting) diverted the totalitarian project of Mussolini and undermined the 
process of ‘making the Italians’, more specifically building the ‘new Fascist man’. In order to 
assess the failure of the regime’s ambitions, we will investigate the contest for local power, 
patronage and the struggles between old and new elites and the disputes and quarrels with 
competing actors, the State-appointed prefects and the federale.  
 
       The PNF managed to establish a new national centralised system to replace the old 
corrupt Liberal elites, but unlike Nazism, evidence shows that there was no homogeneous 
national image of Fascism; as the Venice case will demonstrate, in order to understand Italian 
fascism, one has to approach it through a particular local-provincial lens.  
 
       We will discuss how the policies implemented by Rome affected the province. Particular 
attention will be paid to the prominent role of the Venetian entrepreneurial bourgeoisie and 
big business led by the industrial captain Giuseppe Volpi. Volpi was a real source of the 
economic power that moulded the relationship with the political power exercised by the 
regime. We will highlight its political dimension, understanding Venetian big business as one 
of the major actors of the ‘authoritarian compromise’ that allowed Mussolini to consolidate 
Fascist power locally. In that sense, the Venetian business community appeared to have been 
an active counterpart in one of the several compromises reached by the Fascist regime in 
order to embrace a broader social base. In Italy, the Fascist regime supported a ‘financial 
oligarchy’ in which few selected groups monopolised Italian manufacturing and each of these 
groups was led by a man like Giovanni Agnelli, Giovanni Battista Pirelli, Guido Donegani, 
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Giorgio Enrico Falck, Vittorio Cini and Giuseppe Volpi. Giovanni Agnelli was the leader of 
the Turinese automotive group Fabbrica Italiana di Automobili Torino (FIAT);
131
 Giovanni 
Battista Pirelli was the founding father of Pirelli, a company that initially specialised 
in rubber and derivative processes. Thereafter, Pirelli’s activities were primarily focused on 
the production of tyres.
132
 Guido Donegani was an Italian engineer, businessman and 
politician who was CEO and President of the Italian chemical industrial giant Montecatini 
from 1910 to 1945;
133
 Giorgio Enrico Falck was the founding father of the Società anonima 
Acciaierie e Ferriere Lombarde in 1906, one of the oldest companies in the steel industry;
134
 
Vittorio Cini and Giuseppe Volpi made their fortune with the electricity company SADE 
(Società Adriatica di Elettricità), founded in 1905, and with the development of the industrial 
area of Marghera (Venice).
135
  The Venetian entrepreneurial class was able to monopolise 
political cadres and not least to promote its leader Giuseppe Volpi through a process of 
‘transformism’ (transformismo).
136
 Volpi had been a Liberal and former collaborator of 
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Giovanni Giolitti. However, he was able to guarantee himself a national role within 
government and a seat in the Fascist Grand Council.  
 
       The analysis will develop alongside an exploration of the evolution of the Fascist 
movement by discussing the interdependencies between what happened at the national and 
local level, exploring the balance of power between the centre and the periphery over time. 
Different phases of the evolution of Fascist support have been already analysed by De Felice. 
He identified two different stages in the development of the Italian Fascism: Fascism as a 
movement and Fascism as a regime. During the movement phase, consent in favour of 
Fascism came as a result of the successful mobilisation of certain social groups of the middle 
class, those who joined squadrismo (Fascist Armed Squads) to fight the advancement of 
leftist political groups (Socialist and Communist parties), with the aim to take power by 
replacing the failing and corrupt Liberal ruling class. By going back to the movement’s 
origins in 1919, we will highlight the weaknesses already prevalent before Mussolini’s 
‘March on Rome’ in October 1922 and the high level of violence which brought the 
movement to power. By contrast, the second phase (regime phase) saw support for Fascism 
as a consequence of accommodation and acceptance, based on the regime’s capacity to offer 




1.1 The Rise of Fascism: Periphery and Centre before 1924 
       This section will demonstrate that the victory in the Great War, despite constituting a 
great moment of national unity for Italy, did not put an end to the permanent state of crisis of 
the Liberal government and society. On the contrary, the divisions which had been partially 
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suppressed during the conflict now made themselves felt with full force. A shift to violence 
among the Italians was rooted in the horrors of the trenches and the dramatic economic 
challenges posed by war and its aftermath. There were many reasons which led to the violent 
involvement of various political groups during the post-war period: the sacrifices made 
during the war, without any form of material compensation; inflation which threatened many 
people’s standard of living; and a job market which had been radically altered by the war 
with an acceleration in industrialisation and a corresponding increase in the size of the 
working class.
138
 The end of the war had provoked, especially among the working classes, an 
expectation of radical social change, and the course of the war had increased resentment 
against the Liberal State on both the right and the left.
 139
 On the left, sections of the Socialist 
Party (massimalisti) aspired to change radically the distribution of wealth, looking at the 
Russian Revolution as an example of how the ‘Bourgeois State’ should be superseded by 
Socialism. At the other end of the political spectrum, the right became more strongly attracted 
by ideas of hierarchical restoration.
140
 The Italian Liberal State was unable to find an 
adequate political response to these challenges and popular resentment found expression in a 
massive and violent anti-State movement. 
 
        Historians such as Giulia Albanese emphasised that the militarisation of society and the 
brutalising aspects of the conflict had the inevitable consequence of the violent civil war that 
characterised post-war Italy and Germany. For Albanese, the war anticipated many of the 
most distinctive features of the totalitarian regimes and created the preconditions for their rise 
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 As Lorenzo Benadusi suggested, the war created space for antidemocratic ideas 
in Italy, France and Great Britain, even in countries which had not taken part such as Spain. 
While France and Great Britain underwent a gradual reform of the State and demilitarisation 
of society in order to avoid internal conflicts, in Italy, the situation of social, political and 
economic impasse immediately after the war, triggered a clash between different political 
groups. The consequences of the war were particularly severe in Italy as the Liberal State was 
not able to find adequate answers to the social and political demands. Italy had joined the war 
on the side of the Allies with the promise that Italy would receive specific territorial gains 
once the war had been won (Pact of London). The Pact of London was broken at the 
Versailles Conference in 1919 and Italy did not receive all other territories negotiated as the 
other nations and the great powers were worried about Italy’s imperial ambitions. The failure 
of the negotiations was greeted with disappointment by Italian public opinion and the 
nationalists and irredentists used the Allies’ volte-face to sow the idea that Italy had been 
betrayed. This feeling of discontent against the international community was exploited by the 
nationalist poet Gabriele D’Annunzio who coined the term vittoria mutilata (mutilated 
victory) leading to dissatisfaction with the democratic system. The crisis of Fiume in 1919 
triggered the perception of Italy’s weak Liberal government. Mussolini embraced the ideals 
of D’Annunzio’s mutilated war and capitalised on the Liberal State crisis forming the Fascio 
di Combattimento in 1919, an association devoted to violence, imperialism, and the 
repression of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI). It was precisely the incapacity of the Liberal 
elites to manage the memories of the war that delegitimised the rule of the Liberal State in the 
eyes of the population.
142
 The Liberal government’s inability to extrapolate from the war a 
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unifying symbolic message similar to the French union sacrée, exacerbated the old divisions 
between interventionists and neutralists and put the country in a state of permanent 
mobilisation with paramilitary squads mainly formed by arditi (First World War assault 
units) and Socialist massimalists continuing the war internally as a civil war. In this 
perspective, the crisis of the Liberal State triggered the birth of Fascism. To confirm this 
interpretation, after his rise to power in 1922, Mussolini would continue to refer to the 
Mutilated Victory in Fascist rhetoric.  
 
       As we have above mentioned, the crisis of the Bourgeois State led to the formation of 
Mussolini’s ultra-nationalist movement Fasci di combattimento, which were predominantly 
based on violent squadrismo. As already suggested by Mimmo Franzinelli, the roots of 
Fascist squadrismo are to be found in the so-called arditismo, “the spirit that had driven 
young men who had fought as volunteers in assaults units” during the First World War.
143
 
Yet, the social makeup of the backbone of the first Fascist squads was much more diverse 
than has been suggested by the traditional historiography.
144
 The first Venetian Fascist 
squadrismo it is a good example of this. While the first wave of Fascism born in Milan in 
March 1919 attracted a very disparate group of urban journalists, writers, artists, 
revolutionary syndicalists expelled from labour unions, students, and former soldiers, the first 
Venetian Fascism was born from Republicanism and Liberal Radicalism. The leadership of 
the Venetian interventionists’ front was held by the movement Democrazia Sociale, a 
political group characterised by Republican and Liberal Democratic elements of the Left. The 
first Fascio di Combattimento originated from a wing of the Democrazia. As to confirm this, 
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the same emerging leaders of Venetian Fascism, Pietro Marsich and Giovanni Giuriati, 
belonged to both the Democrazia and Fascio, holding a double membership.
145
 As it has been 
noted by Francesco Piva, throughout 1919, the Fascio did not engage in any significant 
political activities and it did not show any peculiarities which could distinguish them from 
those of the democratic interventionists Left groups.
146
 In addition, as it was reported by the 
local Fascist fiduciary to Mussolini, the Venetian Fascio was characterised by internal 
infighting, personal hatred and lack of means. In essence, the Venetian fascio represented a 
secondary appendix of the interventionist area hegemonised by Democrazia Sociale.
147
 
In parallel with the birth of the Fasci di Comabttimento, another important event for Italian 
politics was to happen in 1919, but this time with regards to the political parties of the Left. 
The Socialist Party held its national congress in Bologna. The meeting showed that the 
Socialists were divided into two factions: the reformists, led by Turati and Lazzari, willing to 
promote collaboration between classes; and the maximalists, led by Giacinto Menotti Serrati, 
willing to import the Russian brand of revolution in Italy. The result of the local congress was 
the victory of the maximalist faction in Venice, bringing the local party to an extreme 
position. The political situation was further complicated by the newly formed Italian Popular 
Party which could draw on the extensive associations of the Church for support.
148
 The 
Italian Popular Party’s ideological and inspirational sources were principally Catholic social 
teaching, the Christian democratic doctrines developed from the nineteenth century within the 
Church, and the political thought of Romolo Murri and Luigi Sturzo. Sturzo, a Sicilian 
Catholic priest, was the founder of the party in 1919 and the leader of the Christian 
Democratic doctrine which combined traditional Catholic beliefs and modern democratic 
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 Romolo Murri was the promoter of the Catholic University Group (FUCI) in 1894 
and of the political movement Democrazia Cristiana Italiana in 1901. His thought had been 
spread among Catholics thanks to his collaboration with numerous journals like Vita nova 
(1895), Cultura sociale (1898), Il domani d’Italia (1901), Rivista di cultura (1906), Il 
commento (1910).v
150
 In addition, the Italian Popular Party could also count on the support of 
Pope Benedict XV (and consequently of the majority of the Catholics) who backed the 




       Long before the Catholic party was founded, religion had played a vital role in 
influencing politics. In Venice province, Catholic political affiliation was polarised between 
those aligned with the conservative and anti-Socialist views of the Patriarch and the Opera 
Congressi (1874), and those more progressive forces which were predominant within the 
organisation Azione Cattolica (Catholic Action). Despite the papal decree non expedit (1868) 
instructing Italians not to participate in the electoral life of the nation, local politics had been 
always heavily influenced by the Venetian Catholics who formed electoral coalitions with the 
conservatives and won consecutive local elections between 1895 and 1920. Catholics’ 
support to the moderate Liberals was therefore targeted to prevent Venetian Socialists from 
governing councils in the province.  
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As suggested by Adrian Lyttelton, the crisis of parliament was accompanied by a crisis of the 
public order with a growth in violence between Fascists and Socialists.
152
 The squadristi 
proudly emphasised that they did not belong to the traditional political system, aiming at 
distancing themselves from the Liberal politics which they considered corrupt and 
ineffective. This was not a new complaint: it echoed criticism levelled at Giolitti’s 
government in the years preceding the Great War by adherents of the various currents of 
‘national radicalism’ and interventionism. As Emilio Gentile already suggested, squadrismo 
gave to Fascism its way of life and its ‘integralist’ political mentality, according to which 
Fascism required absolute power to re-model the entire Italian nation along the lines of the 
squadrista “apostle-warrior”.
153
 However, Fascists were not the only force willing to use 
violence. Other political actors contemplated the use of violence. As Albanese argued, “a 
significant part of the Socialist Party was convinced that a Soviet-style revolution was 
imminent. Events in Russia had incited the hope of the party’s most militant members, who 
often transformed violent words in deeds organizing strikes, riots and protests in the piazza 
(square)”.
154
 This phenomenon was visible also in the province of Venice. As remembered 
by the Venetian Socialist activist Li Causi, the name of Lenin started to circulate increasingly 
more frequently among the local Socialist sections and his name “became as the one of a 
Messiah who is announcing the advent of a new historical era for the humanity”.
155
 The most 
active and violent elements were to be found among the youngest in the party, who were 
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leading strikes and protests, whereas the oldest communists who had initiated the movement 
became progressively more cautious.
156
 
Until almost the end of the 1919, the activities of Fascist squads (arditi) remained sporadic 
and usually marginal in their political effect. It was Gabriele D’Annunzio in the Fiume 
adventure who succeeded in creating a new political style. Initially, the movement of fasci 
was heavily overshadowed by Gabriele D’Annunzio’s subversive occupation of Fiume in 
September 1919. The course of the Paris Peace Conference had been another important 
source of squadrismo’s mobilisation creating the so-called myth of the “mutilated victory”. In 
April 1915, Italy signed had a secret treaty (Treaty of London) with Britain, France and 
Russia and under this pact, Italy was to declare war on Austria and Germany and in the event 
of a victory would receive Trentino, the South Tyrol and Trieste, Istria, much of Dalmatia, 
the islands of the upper Adriatic, the Dodecanese islands (partially owned by Italy after the 
invasion of Libya in 1911), a protectorate over central Albania, the port of Valona, and Asian 
colonies. For Venetian nationalists, those territories were even more important as they had 
been part of the former domains of the Serenissima empire called Stato da Mar (State or 
Domains of the Sea). It was one of the three territorial subdivisions of the Republic of 
Venice‘s domains. The other two were the Dogado (that is Venice city and its coast), and the 
Domini di Terraferma (the mainland domains in northern Italy.) The Stato da Mar comprised 
the maritime and overseas possessions, including Istria, Dalmatia, Albania, Negroponte, the 
Morea, the Greek possessions of the Aegean islands of the Duchy of the Archipelago, and the 
islands of Crete (Candia) and Cyprus.
157
 The refusal of Clemenceau, Lloyd George and 
Wilson to concede the Adriatic littoral to Italy was outrageous to the Italian government and 
it was even more a blow to venezianità. Towards the end of the First World War, the French, 
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British and Americans had become annoyed by Italian imperialist claims about the 




       Promises were made in 1915; these could not be delivered in 1919. For Italy, the carrying 
out and the terms of the peace treaty and its ratification was humiliating. With the peace 
failing to feed the expectations, many senior army officers claimed thst there was a 
conspiracy against Italy and they followed the poet Gabriele D’Annunzio in the occupation of 
the contested city of Fiume and declared it Italian in September 1919. As Corner suggested, 
“the exploits of D’Annunzio during 1919 and 1920 did little to help Mussolini’s cause. For 
several months after September 1919 it was the poet to held centre stage, probably much to 
Mussolini’s annoyance”.
159
 D’Annunzio found his best allies among the ranks of the 
Venetian fascio. During the occupation, the Venetian ras Marsich often visited D’Annunzio 
in Fiume, and the other emerging leader of the Venetian movement, Giovanni Giuriati 
became the Head of D’Annunzio’s Presidential Cabinet. The Venetian fascio supported the 
military operations and Venice city functioned as a logistical base for D’Annunzio 
legionaries throughout the period of the occupation of the city.
160
 The close relationship 
between the poet and Venice was not a coincidence. D’Annunzio envisaged that Venice 
could be a model to which Italy should aspire.
161
 This aspiration had long been shared by 
Venetian intellectuals since the Liberal age and in particular by Pompeo Molmenti.
162
 
Molmenti was a Venetian art historian and literary critic who served in the parliament from 
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1890 to 1909 within the Liberal conservatives and he was made senator in 1909.  Molmenti, 
leading those opposing the modernisation and re-development of Venice city, was interested 
in fostering the Venetian model for the Italian nation. Venice’s superiority “to the rest of Italy 
was, therefore, premised in part both on its capacity to resist outside threats, most notably 
from the Turks, and on its dominance of the seas”.
163
 A look back to1910 throws light on the 
special relationship between Venice and D’Annunzio, when the poet’s play La Nave, 
dedicated to the city, was performed in Venice. The event was managed by the patrician 
Piero Foscari, one of the future leaders of Fascism and patron of the local nationalist 
movement (Associazione Nazionale Italiana). Despite criticism from Catholic circles, La 
Nave succeeded, as remarked by Margaret Plant, in repositioning Venice “in the Adriatic as 
powerfully as in the days of the first Republic (…) [with] a vision of historic energy with 
contemporary relevance”.
164
 La Nave was such a source of inspiration for nationalists to 
claim Italy’s control over the Adriatic that, before the First World War,  the Austrian naval 
minister used to keep a copy on his desk as a reminder of the potential ‘Italian threat’.
165
 The 
effect of D’Annunzio’s campaign for the resurgence of Venice’s political influence also 
stimulated a debate regarding the economic renovation of the city. The debate manifested 
itself in two different and parallel schools of thought. One more conservative strand led by 
the above mentioned historian Pompeo Molmenti, local patricians and old Liberals, focused 
on the urban preservation of the city; and another, more progressive line of the new 
imperialist and capitalist bourgeoisie was embodied by the future new ‘Doge’, Giuseppe 
Volpi. Volpi represented the new local ambitious industrialist bourgeois spirit which had 
proved its strenght in the development of the port and the new industrial area of Maghera 
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which, approved by the government in 1917, started to be developed in 1920.
166
 Volpi had 
made his fortune with the electrification of the Veneto and the creation of SADE (Società 
Adriatica Di Elettricita’) from 1905. Rather than being a Fascist ‘new man’, Volpi had begun 
his career in Liberal Italy through deals in the Balkans and the Middle East on behalf of the 
King, Giolitti and Banca Commerciale. He was already a powerful industrial and local figure 
in 1921 for having been assumed the governorship of Tripolitania. Volpi’s group was 
commonly known as the ‘Venetian Group’ (gruppo veneziano).
167
 The ‘Venetian group’ 
comprised Giuseppe Volpi, Vittorio Cini, Achille Gaggia and other leading businessmen who 
began to invest large amounts of capital in the development of the project of the renewal and 
industrialisation of Venice which found its final accomplishment in the development of the 
industrial area of Marghera. Cini started as a businessman in the field of transport and 
construction at the beginning of the 1900 and by mid-1920, he held positions in several 
societies like SADE, Credito Industriale, Società di Navigazione Interna and Società di 
Navigazione Libera Triestina (transport), Officine Meccaniche Italiane di Reggio Emilia 
(mechanical industry), and Alti Fomi e Acciaierie della Venezia-Giulia (steel industry).
168
 
Achille Gaggia became part of the Venetian group in 1905 when he was appointed General 
Director at SADE; and at the beginning of the 1930s, he was holding shares in 61 companies 
in the mechanical, construction and transport sectors.
169
 Volpi, Cini and Gaggia were the new 
elements of local economic life, embodying a wealthy elite that had invested in civic 
enterprises and industries since the end of the First World War, creating partnerships between 
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financiers, industrialists, and elderly members of the aristocracy like Antonio Revedin, 
Nicolò Papadopoli Aldobrandini, Alberto e Mario Treves de’ Bonfili, Piero Foscari, 
Giancarlo Stucky, Amedeo ed Edoardo Corinaldi, Nicola e Tito Braida, Carlo ed Enrico 




Volpi’s main goal was the penetration of the Adriatic, Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean. At 
the beginning of the twentieth century, the region of Veneto was ranked as the third most 
important industrial district in Italy after Piedmont and Lombardy with a particularly 
flourishing textile production based on foreign investments from financiers such as Neville, 
Stucky, Junghans, Layet and Rothschild.
171
 Volpi’s rise in prominence under the regime 
would be connected with the project to transform Venice into a modern and industrial 
productive area and develop the industry of cultural tourism in order to sustain the economies 
of the historical centre. This project would become clearer in the 1920s and the 1930s with 
the progressive development of Marghera, the construction of the bridge connecting Venice 




       Returning to the ‘question of Fiume’, Mussolini, despite supporting D’Annunzio, had 
little desire to join the poet in his adventure. He had reason to fear that his burgeoning 
leadership could be overshadowed by D’Annunzio.
173
 Mussolini’s support for Fiume was 
restricted to rhetoric rather than sacrificing the nascent movement for Fiume. Mussolini 
continued to campaign for Fiume, only because it involved a nationalism which favoured his 
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designs. In the Popolo d’Italia of 25 September he wrote: “Revolution is here. Begun in 
Fiume, it may be completed in Rome”, but in private he did his best to dissuade D’Annunzio 
from any such project.
174
 He would not have been prepared for D’Annunzio marching on 
Rome and establishing there, as at Fiume, his own dictatorship. However, someone among 
the Fascist ranks, especially those from the Venetian Fascio, dannunziani and directly 
involved in the Fiume operations, had considered the possibility of such a march. As reported 
by Rossi, on September 1919, Giuriati wrote to the Trieste fascio that “the exploit of Fiume 




       Rather than focusing on the issue of Fiume, Mussolini was directing his attention to the 
fast-approaching national elections in which he was standing as a candidate in Milan. The 
result of the November 1919 national elections humiliated Mussolini and clearly showed that 
the Fascist movement was still irrelevant in electoral terms, as it failed to send a single 
deputy to parliament. On the contrary, the first post-war election marked the victories of 
Catholics and Socialists. The Socialists secured 32 % (156 deputies), three times many as the 
previous elections, and the Popular Party gained 20 % (100 deputies). The Socialists became 
the prominent party in almost every region and especially in Emilia-Romagna, Piedmont, 
Lombardy, Tuscany and Umbria, while the Popular Party was the largest party in Veneto 
(42.6 %).
176
 As it is shown in Appendix 3 – Electoral Results (Table 1), in the province of 
Venice, the Socialist Party, led by the revolutionary wing, was the first party securing 43 % 
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 Support came from workers of the pre-industrial district of Mestre, the 
glass-blowing factories of Murano Island and the working class quarters of the greatest urban 
centres of the province like Venice and Chioggia. In addition, as shown in the Appendix 4 – 
Proportion of votes per area (Table 2), the Socialists secured an indisputable predominance in 
the rural district of Adige (Cavarzere and Cona), controlled by the ‘red-leagues’ of 
workers.
178
 The Popular Party was the second largest party (28 %) and could count on a solid 
base in the rural district of Brenta e Dese where the Catholic ‘white leagues’ of workers were 
predominant and Catholics had no challenge for the votes of the farming families and could 
corner an absolute majority of votes (51 %).
179
 In Venice city, the elections were a complete 
failure for the Democrazia which had been supported by the Venetian fascio and the veterans 
association (9,013 votes). The elections showed the weakness of the Venetian fascio which 
was essentially the expression of ex-combatants, the professional petite bourgeoisie and 
private and public clerks, without being able to challenge the Socialist organisations in the 
votes of the factory workers.
180
 The elections also highlighted the clear decline of the Italian 
governing coalition (8.940 votes) which managed to retain only 29 % of the overall votes. 
The bulk of their consent was gained in the rural Livenza e Tagliamento (57 %) and Piave 
(59 %), supported by the rural aristocracy and some groups of interests (See Appendix 4 – 
Proportion of votes per area (Table 3)). The Liberals had intended to contain popular 
discontent by reforming the electoral law and extending the vote to all who served at the front 
and to every man aged over twenty-one, raising the electorate to 11 million. In reality, the 
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new electoral law benefited the parties able to mobilise voters on a large scale – the 
Socialists, with their network of trade unions, cooperatives and chambers of labour, and the 
nascent Popular Party (PPI), which could count on large social base and the support of the 
Church. The Liberal governing coalition lost the absolute majority in the Chamber of 
Deputies. Liberals were characterised by fragmentation and a lack of an efficient organisation 
to compete with the modern mass parties. The ‘Liberal parties’ or rather the ‘bourgeois’ and 
‘interest-group parties’ had already been in decline from 1913, the year in which many 
Liberal candidates, signed a secret pact, also in Venice, with the Church, the so called Patto 




       In 1920, everywhere in Italy the situation was deteriorating and the intense revolutionary 
period, known as Biennio Rosso (1919-1920), was entering its most crucial moment as social 
conflicts were coming to the fore in a context of heavy economic crisis, with high 
unemployment and political instability.
182
 After an initial phase of post-electoral 
disbandment, the Fascists increased the level of violence in order to continue the ‘war’ 
against the Socialists. Between the end of the 1919 and the beginning of the 1920, the 
Venetian fascio and its leaders Marsich and Giuriati, dropped all contacts with the 
Democrazia Sociale which dissociated themselves from the occupation of Fiume.  
By 1919 Pietro Marsich, who had been granted the leadership of Venetian Fascism and held a 
seat on the National Committee of Fascism, acknowledged the failure of the electoral alliance 
with republican radicalism. Now convinced that the success of Fascism was achievable only 
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through action of the Fascist squads and by adopting an anti-party ideology, he decided that 
the local fascio had to act autonomously in order to put an end to the corrupt Liberal State 
and to the Socialist movement.  
In Venice province, Fascists were joined by irredentists, nationalists, war veterans and 
legionaries who had been supporting the occupation of Fiume. Mass strikes, worker 
demonstrations, factory occupations, and street conflicts between left-wing and Fascist 
blackshirts militias led by the Venetian Fascist ras (word use by Fascists for ‘provincial 
leader’), Pietro Marsich, with numerous dead and injured, became a daily occurrence.
183
 The 
physical demolition of the Socialist organisations was, for Marsich, an indispensable 
condition for establishing a new productive and social order. He and his supporters had long 
been fascinated by D’Annunzio. Marsich’s Fascism retained its original features such as 
being anti-bourgeois, anti-clerical, anti-Socialist, and anti-parliamentarian. Marsich 
considered Fascism to be a transitory revolutionary phenomenon that would translate into a 
new national democracy, based on D’Annunzio’s Carta del Carnaro. Thus, the first Venetian 




       The local elections of autumn 1920 became a turning point in the fight between Fascists 
and Socialists. Fearing another Socialist or Catholic victory, local Liberal elites throughout 
Italy (Liberals, moderates and conservatives) built alliances, blocchi nazionali (national 
coalitions), especially in those areas where the Socialists and Catholics had achieved their 
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greatest success in the previous national elections. Where Fascists had already created local 
groups, they were welcomed into these alliances and given financial support for their 
activities, although their role was limited to electoral propaganda and armed harassment. The 
blocchi won the local elections in 4,655 out of 8,327 councils and in 33 out of 69 districts, 
limiting the mass parties’ (partiti di massa) influence and in some case reversing their 
victories of 1919. In the whole Veneto region, Liberals gained 252 councils out of 797 (222 
Socialists and 333 PPI).  Venice itself was an example of skilful Fascist coalition building 
with the aim to dismantle the local Socialist predominance. The nationalist Giovanni Giuriati 
(future Secretary of the PNF) formed a list called Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance) 
which included Liberal, monarchic, nationalist, Fascist and democratic forces. Giuriati 
managed to come to an agreement with the Opera Nazionale Combattenti led by Iginio 
Magrini and the local Catholic Popular Party which entered the electoral coalition. The 
Fascist ras Marsich supported the Alleanza, presenting Fascist candidates for the list, 
engaging in armed harassment, destroying opponents’ electoral posters, verbally threatening 
opponents, and in some cases attacking Socialist candidates in their strongholds.
185
 The 
Alleanza won the elections with 13,180 votes against 11,263 of the Socialist Party, the list 
gained 48 seats out of 60 and the Liberal Davide Giordano was appointed mayor of Venice. 
Although the blocchi managed to contain the advancement of the main mass parties, the 
electoral results of the Socialists and the Catholic Popolari remained impressive. In 
particular, Socialists won the majority of the councils in Emilia (65.2 percent) and in Tuscany 
(52.1 percent) and the majority of the district in Piedmont, Lombardy, Emilia, Tuscany and 
Umbria, while the PPI scored major victories in the councils of Veneto (42.9 percent). In 
Venice province, although the administration of the city of Venice remained under anti-
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Socialist control, the results of the administrative elections in 1920 established Socialist 




       After the elections, the Fascists intensified the militarisation of their groups and 
developed the method of the “punitive expeditions”. As reported by Li Causi, the then 
secretary of the Venetian Socialist Party, the fight against the Fascist squads had become a 
permanent necessity as the Fascist “punitive expeditions” against local Socialist leaders and 
syndicalists had become more frequent.
187
 In Venice province, the punitive expeditions 
developed with particular intensity after the elections of the autumn of 1920, when the 
Fascists targeted the new Socialist council administrations. Cavarzere, Chioggia and Cona 
remained under Socialist control until they were attacked in summer 1920. In contrast to the 
main Fascist movements of the Po Valley, monopolised by the agrarians, the Venetian fascio 
was essentially an urban movement and therefore the movement had to expand to the 
countryside and the attack on the ‘red administrations’ was part of this plan. As reported by 
the local Socialist newspaper Era Nuova of Chioggia in November 1920, the “Fascist group 
who had ‘terrorised’ St. Mark’s Square a few months before, had now reached Chioggia, 
where they attacked Socialist militants inside bars, fighting them violently and firing revolver 
shots”.
188
 The Fascists’ main targets were the Socialists, but the squads also attacked other 
political groups like Catholic Popolari, Democrats and occasionally Liberals.
189
 The Fascist 
expeditions were often carried out by squadristi with the implicit or explicit support of the 
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police as well as sectors of the local ruling classes, like the agrarians who financed them.
190
 
Because it happened widely across the Po valley, municipalities of the province were forced 
to resign either due to the threat of the Fascist violence or under the pressure exerted by the 
local prefect. The prefect would then select a commissioner to preside until the local climate 
allowed new elections. This process was in evidence when the Socialist mayors of Chioggia, 
Cavarzere and Cona were obliged to succumb due to constant attacks and thus the ‘red 
administrations’ were replaced by ‘demo-Fascist administrations’.
191
 Consequently, the effect 
of the Venetian Biennio Rosso was a gradual shift of allegiance from ‘red’ to ‘black’, as 
Fascist squadristi were progressively winning ground and councils from Socialists. Although 
the Italian government issued repeated orders to the prefects to ensure the law was impartially 
respected, local police and army units tended to sympathise with the squadristi, sometimes 
providing them with the necessary weaponry to assault the Socialists. The Venetian fascio 




       Whereas the question of D’Annunzio and Fiume was to be one of the rallying points of 
the opposition to Mussolini from within the Fascist ranks, the failure to obtain positive 
negotiations for Italy at the Peace Conference of Paris, provoked the resignation of the Italian 
Prime Minister Vittorio Emanuele Orlando. His successor Francesco Saverio Nitti, feeding 
the anger of interventionists and nationalists, conceded Dalmatia to Yugoslavia and agreed 
that Fiume should become an independent Free State (Reggenza del Carnaro) under the 
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control of the recently formed League of Nations.
193
 During this phase, Mussolini failed to 
stamp his authority on a movement which was still undisciplined and which still depended on 
the provincial ras. A national opposition to Mussolini’s political line came to the fore from 
those ras who were closer to the idea of Fascism of San Sepolcro (sansepolcristi). Among the 
critics we could predominantly find arditi and Dannunzians who were blaming Mussolini for 
having opportunistically changed the original position of Fascism. They not only criticised 
Mussolini for his attempt to make peace with the Socialists, but also for his lukewarm support 
of the occupation of Fiume. This wave of internal opposition was led by Dino Grandi and 
Pietro Marsich who described themselves as ‘followers’ of D’Annunzio and refused to 
recognise Mussolini as the unquestioned leader of Fascism. In fact, Grandi and Marsich 
believed that ‘true’ Fascism was in the provinces and not in the centralised headquarters of 
the movement in Milan. Ideologically, they thought that Fascism should have been a 
continuation of movement of Fiume.
194
 Marsich held that all the principles of Fascism had 
found their full application in the experience of Fiume through the application of the Carta 
del Carnaro and in accordance to D’Annunzio, he wanted Fiume to be recognised as a 
State.
195
 Marsich believed in Fascism as a transitory revolutionary phenomenon which would 
give life to a new national democracy, designed by D’Annunzio’s Carta del Carnaro
196
. In 
contrast, Mussolini held the view that Fascism could not achieve power only through 
violence; he needed alliances in order for Fascism to become a credible political force. As a 
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consequence, alliances were formed, especially in the north of Italy, with agrarians or with 
patriotic or nationalist associations. In Venice, the compromise found expression in the 
establishment of a mutually beneficial working relationship with Volpi’s group. As Mussolini 
himself explained to De Begnac: 
 
It was Piero Marsich, noble companion in the initial battle of the Fascist movement against an Italian 
leadership proud of the stagnation in the country’s history, who first introduced me to Count Volpi, 
the brilliant Italian plenipotentiary who had led Turks and Italians to peace many years earlier in 
1912. The same Count Volpi who, then simply known as Commendatore Volpi, was hesitant about 
the 1919 Fascist programme. He told me it was necessary to soften a dozen or so anathemas, in order 




The advice of Volpi substantially reflected the plan of the moderate forces to prevent a 
radical drift of Venetian Fascism. On one side, the dismissal of Marsich would have 
encouraged Volpi to continue his project of Venice’s renewal and redevelopment; on the 
other side, it would have consolidated Mussolini’s leadership at the head of the Fascist 
movement by depriving his opponents of a charismatic element. In addition, Volpi’s 
seductive imperialistic and modernising vision would have placed Venice firmly within the 
framework of the nationalist agenda under Fascism.
198
 Volpi’s group was supportive of the 
Venetian nationalists in their view of the cultural and historical links of the Adriatic 
territories with the Serenissima. The political pursuit of the Adriatic coasts as an expression 
of the Serenissima, helped Mussolini to stress not only the powerful inheritance of the 
venezianità in the region, but also the essential italianità of the Yugoslavian coasts. However, 
the patterns of development of Fascism greatly differed from province to province. The 
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Venetian example (but also Ferrara and Bologna), served to demonstrate the degree to which 
the early provincial movement became quickly linked to already established centres of local 
power. In Venice, Volpi’s intervention meant the strengthening of a ‘normalised’ Fascism, 
which remained predominantly an urban movement. In other areas of Italy, like Ferrara and 
Bologna, the agrarians definitely launched the local fasci. As Corner explained, “sometimes 
the proprietors would hide behind a veil of anonymity, trying to give the impression that the 
Fascists were operating autonomously, albeit admittedly in a direction favourable to the 
proprietors themselves. It was very rare that these local businessmen controlled the fasci 
directly”.
199
 Ironically, Volpi, as many of the other financiers of the fasci, belonged to the 
same Giolittean class of industrialists that the ‘first hour Fascists’ (those Fascists who joined 
the movement in 1919 and attended the meeting of San Sepolcro from which Fascism 
originated in 1919) had firmly denounced as profiteers in 1919. The management of the 
“question of Fiume” demostrates well the level of influence Volpi possessed at local level 
and made it even clearer how the future new “Doge” was going to manage the development 
of the Fascist movement, standing initially outside the party. Although Marsich was followed 
by the majority of the local movement, Volpi was manoeuvring successfully to isolate 
Marsich and expel the intransigents and therefore prevent them holding leadership roles in 
the future. At the end of the 1920s, there were some signs that showed the movement was 
moving towards Volpi. In November 1920, the prefect requested his appointment as Count 
(Conte) for being a “good citizen”, a “good patriot” and for his influence over the nationalist 
and the young Fascists.
200
 Also, the increasingly ambiguous position taken by the other key 
leader of Fascism, Giovanni Giuriati, helped Volpi’s standing. Giuriati had already distanced 
himself from the Fiume movement in December 1919, when D’Annunzio, pressured by the 
most intransigent wing of legionnaires, refused to compromise with the Italian government. 
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Giuriati resigned from the role of Head of D’Annunzio’s cabinet and since then he 
consistently opposed a revolutionary movement against the Monarchy.
201
 The decline of 
Marsich coincided with Giuriati building an alliance with Iginio Maria Magrini, secretary of 
the Arditi Society and Commissioner of the National Association of Combatants. Magrini 
became popular by establishing a wide range of clients and interests thanks to his partnership 
with Davide Giordano, who later became Mayor of Venice (1920-23) and royal 
commissioner at the Venice Business School of Ca’ Foscari (1927-30) before being 
appointed Senator.
202
 In combination, these regional developments pointed strongly towards 
Volpi’s strengthening position as the rising star in regional political affairs.  
 
      The circumstances within the Venetian movement were reinforced by the signing of the 
Treaty of Rapallo between the Kingdom of Italy and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes (renamed Yugoslavia in 1929), designed to solve the dispute over some territories 
in the former Austrian Littoral in the upper Adriatic, and in Dalmatia. According to the treaty, 
the city of Fiume would become the independent Free State of Fiume, thus ending the 
military occupation of D’Annunzio’s troops known as the Italian Regency of Carnaro. This 
part of the treaty was revoked in 1924, when Italy and Yugoslavia signed the Treaty of Rome, 
which gave Fiume to Italy and the adjacent port of Sušak to Yugoslavia. Volpi was part of the 
Italian delegation who accompanied Giolitti’s negotiations. The successful conclusion of the 
treaty revealed that Volpi was playing a double game. While financing the local Fascists to 
defend his local interests from the risk of Bolshevism, he was also manoeuvring to support 
his keen interest in the expansion of his business in the Balkans. At the same time, Marsich 
radicalised his position, increasing the number of violent actions, – frequently against 
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Socialist leaders – further failing to generate Volpi’s enthusiasm for the Fascist cause.
203
 
According to the local secretary of the Venetian fascio, Giuseppe Lanfranchi, former 
Socialist and Mussolinian, the role played by Volpi in the negotiation of the Treaty of 
Rapallo worsened the relationship between Volpi and the Fascists of Marsich. The 
commercial deals achieved by Volpi and the Serbian government during the negotiations at 
Rapallo and the continued volatility of Volpi’s position in an increasingly volatile regional 
setting was evident in the plan of the local Direttorio to assassinate Volpi, which was avoided 




       After the ‘Bloody Christmas’ of 1920 (Natale di sangue), a series of clashes in Fiume 
between the legionnaires and the Italian army which led to the conclusion of the Fiume 
campaign carried out by D’Annunzio, the situation of the Venetian movement became 
critical. Marsich criticised Mussolini and the Monarchy for their attitude towards the question 
of Fiume. The same local secretary Lanfranchi was aware that “the crisis experienced by 
Fascism, once resolved, will reinforce it (Fascism)”. But as he reported in January 1921, 
Venetian Fascism was ‘set out for ruin’, with Marsich becoming the major national opponent 
to Mussolini’s line of normalisation of the movement.
205
 Marsich’s criticism led to a division 
within the Venetian movement and to a creation of an alternative Fascio, independent from 
the main movement. Neither the majority of the local Fascists, nor the vast majority of the 
public opinion, approved Marsich’s radical opposition to Mussolini’s leadership and to the 
main national course chosen by the Fascist movement. In order to bring order within the 
                                                 
203
 R. Camurri, ‘La classe politica nazionalfascistà, L'ottocento e il novecento 2 - La societa veneziana, Storia di 
Venezia (2002), http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/l-ottocento-e-il-novecento-2-la-societa-veneziana-la-classe-
politica-nazionalfascista_(Storia-di-Venezia)/ (Accessed: 19 September 2016). 
204
 Romano, Giuseppe Volpi, 122. 
205
 Piva, Lotte contadine, 159. 
83 
 
movement, Mussolini had to address the question of Fiume which was politically damaging 
his leadership. 
 
       A major source of Volpi’s influence was his financial clout, making him both less 
dependent on political success as a power base, while at the same time providing him with a 
platform to use as a regional as well as ultimately national political power base. Within the 
regional power struggle over the direction of Fascism, his independent means were similarly 
essential. After the Treaty of Rapallo, Marsich found it difficult to generate income from the 
Venetian group, as Volpi was not disposed to finance a radical Fascism as he was aware that 
that his project of Venice’s renovation required political stability.
206
 The financial problems 
of the movement caused by the drop-in financing from Volpi’s group were made clear by 
Marsich to the Central Committee of Fascism: 
 
The Venetian fascio thought it could count on a large financing from the local industrial group. But, 
as all the industries and banks are monopolised by Volpi, the fascio now excludes that it will be 
possible to count on this help which would represent a political and moral tragic compromise. Other 




Mussolini’s support of a normalised Fascism was most evident in places where economic 
power was highly concentrated, such as in Turin (with Agnelli’s familiy) or in Venice 
(Volpi). The regime granted local business elites significant autonomy in their relations with 
the local community, gaining the support of important segments of the old ruling classes. 
However, Marsich had his own momentary victory by managing to exclude the Mussolinian 
secretary Lanfranchi and replacing him with a trusted man, Vincenzo Bucca.  The question 
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for Mussolini was one of discipline and the problem would become immediately apparent in 
the summer of 1921 when Mussolini proposed a pact of pacification with the Socialists. 
Mussolini surprised the internal opposition by signing a peace deal with moderate Socialists 
and the main trade union organisation, the General Confederation of Workers 
(Confederazione Generale del Lavoro, or CGL). This deal was part of Mussolini’s attempt to 
make the Fascist movement more respectable and tackle local independent activities of the 
ras. The deal was rejected by several ras like Marsich (Venice), Dino Grandi (Bologna) and 
Italo Balbo (Ferrara) who went to urge D’Annunzio to replace Mussolini. The fasci of 
Venice, Bologna, Ferrara, Cremona, Modena, Piacenza, Rovigo, and Forlỉ declared they 
completely opposed to the peace treaty. As Marsich himself argued: 
 
We have come to the turning point of Fascism. Mussolini realises it, but he appears to me to have lost 
his way. In effect there are two solutions, one national, and the other parliamentary. We are for the 




A split within the movement was avoided only when Mussolini abandoned the pact. He then 
resigned from the Fascist Central Committee in an attempt to outmanoeuvre the ras. 
Mussolini’s strategy was successful and, in October 1921, he persuaded the majority of the 
members of the Fasci di Combattimento to re-form the organisation into a political party, the 
Partito Nazionale Fascista (PNF). Following this victory, Mussolini persuaded the Fascist 
National Congress to elect him as leader in November 1921. In return, he agreed to end the 
fight with the Socialists, re-organising all the local Fascist squads. Although the local ras still 
had considerable influence and some autonomy, Mussolini could now present himself as the 
clear and undisputed leader of an organised and united political party. 
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The foundation of the Partito Nazionale Fascista in November, 1921 marked a crucial 
turning point for the Venetian movement. Mussolini’s process of disciplining the squadristi 
into a national organisation provoked the protest of the most radical elements at provincial 
level.
209
  Between autumn 1921 and February 1922, Marsich reinforced his anti-Liberal 
campaign, but he started losing the support of the petty bourgeoisie which was unhappy with 
the climate of terror provoked by the Fascist squads in Venice.
210
 In the period 1919-1922, 
200 clashes between Socialists-communists and Fascists were recorded with 11 people dead. 
The same Fascist journal “Italia Nuova” took the responsibility for the violence.
211
 While 
pursuing violence, Marsich was embracing the idea of a schism from Fascism, creating a 
movement with D’Annunzio as its head. A letter addressed to the national secretary by 
Marsich was published at the beginning of February in the journal of the Fiume legionnaires 
“La Riscossa dei Legionari Fiumani”. In this letter, Marsich revived the theme of the 
divergence between parliamentary and national interests, and blamed Mussolini for 
advocating a coalition government led by Giolitti.
212
 
 Marsich also proclaimed that D’Annunzio was the “only great man” who could oppose “the 
iniquitous hegemony of a man” (Mussolini) who was forcing his politician’s tricks on to the 
party.
213
 Yet, the idea of a split was rejected by Balbo and Grandi in a meeting with Marsich 
in Venice in the same month. As Balbo would declare later, he regarded Marsich as a 
dreamer with his head in the clouds, evident in his anti-parliamentarian attitudes.
214
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While the radical positions of Marsich were progressively isolated within the national 
movement, the same happened at local level where the front against Marsich broadened 
thanks to the work of Giovanni Giuriati and Iginio Magrini. Marsich accused Giuriati of 
being two-faced: close to the squadristi when in Venice, while searching to collaborate with 
the conservative right in Parliament.
215
Although having been one of the protagonists of the 
Fiume revolution alongside D’Annunzio, Giuriati was aware the occupation of Fiume had 
come to an end and it urged Fascism to negotiate with the other political forces in order to 
create political opportunities for the movement (Giuriati was the only Venetian Fascist MP 
elected to Parliament). In addition, Giuriati did not approve Marsich’s radical positions and 
he joined the negotiations led by the prefect Agostino D’Adamo to pacify the factions in 




        Abandoned by Grandi and Balbo and contested by local supporters, Marsich decided to 
quit the party in June 1922 and his followers were expelled by the PNF. Marsich, with Cesco 
Bonaldi, Pio Leoni, Ippolito Radaelli, Mario Stoppoloni and Camillo Favero, founded an 
autonomous fascio which was short-lived as Marsich had definitively lost any capacity to 
attract local support. The autonomi were re-admitted to the party, but they argued that 
Giuriati and Magrini had manoeuvred with the ‘big bourgeoisie’ (Volpi) in order to 
marginalise those who had joined the movement from its origins (first hour Fascists). In 
January 1923, Giorgio Suppiej would be appointed federale and this choice would reflect the 
new internal balance within Venetian Fascism, with Giuriati and Magrini leading the 
movement and Volpi taking advantage of it. It was Volpi and his increasing interest in the 
Fascist project which created the conditions for Marsich’s fall. Firstly, he deprived Marsich 
of any possible source of support from the Venetian bourgeoisie. Secondly, he represented 
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himself as the most suitable alternative to Marsich in Venice. In addition, Volpi’s brand of 
fascism ‘won the day’ as Marsich’s positions were irreconcilable with those of Mussolini, 
and Mussolini himself thought that Volpi could be that moderate man who could re-build the 
local party and along the lines of his project of Venice’s renewal, Volpi would have re-
established the relationship between the party and the local economic elite.
217
 However, 
although the Venetian ‘lagoon Fascism’ had lost his charismatic leader Marsich, as the 
Venetian squadrista Raffaele Vicentini argued, it never lost his fascination for D’Annunzio 
and for the renewal of the supremacy of Venice over the Adriatic sea.
218
 However, as we will 
see in the following paragraphs, the expectations of Venetian Fascism to re-establish 
Venice’s importance would be met by Volpi and his group’s project of industrialisation of the 
lagoon through the developing of Marghera.  
 
1.2 The Elections of 1924 
        Despite the generally limited progress made by the Fascist Party in the Province of 
Venice after 1922, the PNF managed to establish a number of centres of activity. In July 
1923, the process led to the creation of an increasingly dense network of Fascist branches, 
which meant that the party was present in 46 out of 50 councils, even though most of the 
branches were relatively small in terms of membership.
219
 Yet in the same period the Fascist 
Party underwent a profound reorganisation, beginning with its fusion with the Nationalists in 
1923. The Fascist Party expanded beyond the historical bases of support, opening to those 
who joined Fascism because it was the political party in power. The construction of the 
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regime’s institutional structure thus went hand in hand with the incorporation of the Fascist 
fiancheggiatori (the moderate and conservative state leadership classes: high bureaucracy and 
the political class of the old liberal regime, the social forces which continued to hold 
effectively political and economic power) into the dictatorship. The Fascist Party’s 
compromise with big business became evident at the 1924 elections. Mussolini’s adoption of 
a more conciliatory posture attracted moderates, rightists, entrepreneurs, industrialists, and 
members of the upper class, who felt it more appropriate to choose Fascism as an alternative 
to Socialism. After 1923, various groups that formerly belonged to nationalist, conservative, 
or Liberal parties joined Fascist circles. Giuseppe Volpi officially joined the PNF in 1924. By 
that time Venetian Fascism had consolidated its image as an acceptable form of political 
expression for members of the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie.  
 
       In order to pursue the normalisation of the party, in January 1923, Mussolini had decided 
to reform the Fascist squads and put them under the authority of the newly formed Volunteer 
Militia for National Security. The foundation of the militia was seen as an important act of 
‘normalisation’, providing, as it did, the legal framework for their operations in as much as it 
provided a structure to the operations of the mass of blackshirts participating in the March on 
Rome. The Fascist squads were incorporated into a national paramilitary and revolutionary 
army that was expected to act in a disciplined way.  Yet the mystique of the Fascist squads 
survived the formation of the official militia.
220
 Many blackshirts resisted the discipline of the 
MVSN.
221
 The spirit of the squads, strongly based on volunteerism, group solidarity and 
feelings of camaraderie was difficult to reconcile with the new requirements of discipline.
222
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Conversely, the generals of the regular army looked at the creation of the MVSN with some 
suspicion. They appreciated the function of public order control of the militia but they were 
aware of the possible dangers connected with the existence of a paramilitary force recruited 
on a political and ideological basis, outside their control.
223
 The opposition of the generals, in 
alliance with the Nationalists, to the creation of the militia was evident in the positions of the 
nationalist Luigi Federzoni and the General Maurizio Gonzaga. Federzoni, together with 
Gonzaga, hoped to transform the militia into a military force integrated into the Army.
224
 In 
addition, Mussolini’s immediate aim was to go towards a kind of “normalised 
authoritarianism” and the creation of the MVSN was part of the revisionists’ attempt to return 
to politics rather than carry on with violence. Mussolini did not want to renounce Fascist 
supremacy in order to compromise with the local establishment, but he aimed at weakening 
the role of the local squads in the development of the movement. The period until January 
1925 is marked by the transition from the Liberal parliamentary system to the Fascist State, 
and the ‘normalisation’ of the movement, as Morgan argued, was “an untidy and complicated 
process, a hybrid of elements of the old and new political order as one overlapped with and 
superseded the other”.
225
 The tensions were between the various forms of ‘normalisation’ 
wanted by the conservatives within and outside the party and the ‘radicalisation’ demanded 
by the squadristi. It was the dualism between Party and State, and confusion about the role of 
the ras which created ambiguities within the movement.
226
 
The ambiguities of the Fascist movement became evident in the Acerbo electoral law in the 
run up at the 1924 national elections. The legislation, which resulted in a single-majority 
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first-past-the-post system, had a great impact on the relative strength of the different parties. 
Few doubted that Fascism benefitted from this change. Although Mussolini insisted on a 
system in which the MPs list was compiled by the party in order to contain the election of the 
local ras, the law allowed single member constituencies. However, the Grand Council 
managed to approve an ‘incompatibility clause’ that would force the provincial leader to 
resign from their local role once elected, so preventing them from accumulating further 
power. In the 1924 elections the PPI still held 28 % of the vote. In the rural districts, 
Catholics and the position of the PPI’s local dignitaries and control of local politics were 
practically unassailable before the rise of Fascism. Religiosity in the province was high and 
this translated into political affiliations.
227
 Despite the troubled relationship between the 
Vatican and the Liberal State, the Papacy continued to fulfil its age-old role of moral 
authority, impacting upon families, education, welfare and social assistance.  
 
       The effect of the law was to transfer choice of the candidates from the electorate to the 
governmental list.
228
 The results were that the listone (National List) of Fascism gained 60% 
of the votes providing Mussolini with a solid majority. The enormous success of Mussolini’s 
listone was largely due to the inclusion of the old ruling class. Fascism gained support from 
many new voters and converts from the Liberal bourgeois parties. Most convert to Fascism 
had been won not through their belief in the “Fascist Revolution”, but through the 
expectations that their self-interests would be best served by a Fascist regime.  
The results achieved by Fascists in the various councils of the Venice province are illustrated 
in the tables in the Appendix section. The first electoral success of Fascist in the election of 
1924 bore the character of a coercive victory. The Fascist movement gained its main electoral 
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benefit through the use of violence and threats during the elections.
229
 As in the rest of Italy, 
Fascists prevented the PPI and Left parties’ candidates and voters from campaigning or 
voting. After that voter support plummeted. Support from agrarians and other interest groups 
collapsed, and was swallowed up by the Fascist Party in 1924.  As the table in the Appendix 
3 – Electoral Results (Table 3) clearly shows, the Fascist Party gained its main electoral 
benefit from the demise of the interest group parties. Differently from what happened at the 
national level, Fascists in Venice were much less successful in penetrating the other two 
electoral blocks of the Left and the political Catholicism.  
 
       Although the nationalists led by the Minister of Interior Federzoni had attempted to 
contain the violence of the squads during the election campaign, the general climate had been 
characterised by the general climate of violence directed predominantly against local 
Socialist and Catholic candidates. In Venice, the violence predominantly involved the 
countryside where the Catholics and the Socialists still had a strong following. For example, a 
few days before the elections, the house of the President of the Catholic circle of Civè was 
surrounded by a Fascist squad from the neighbouring village of Cona.
230
 In the days 
following the elections, the Socialist MP Angelo Galeno, consecutively elected in the 
parliament in the 1904, 1909, 1913, 1919, 1921 and 1924 elections and operating in Venice 
province, denounced the Fascist violence of the squads and drew the attention of the minister 
of the interior to the crimes in Chioggia (Sottomarina and S. Anna) and in some villages near 
the Brenta river (Codevigo and more).
231
 In particular, Angelo Galeno wanted to draw 
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attention to “the beatings, injured, bans, devastations of houses and cafes”.
232
 He was 
complaining on behalf of two Socialists, Giovanni Groppo and Vittorio Renuncini, who had 
been murdered by Fascists and whose bodies had been found in the river Brenta by 
carabinieri.
233
 Despite violence and coercion perpetrated by the Fascist squads during the 
1924 elections, taken together, the parties of the left were still able to hold onto a significant 
proportion of votes within the province. Leftist parties were the largest coalition in the Brenta 
e Dese area, by securing 39 % of the votes, as shown in the table in the Appendix 4 – 
Proportion of votes per area (Table 4). The predominantly rural and moderate character of the 
province, the limited industrial development, the prevalence of small businesses, and not least 
the widespread anti-Bolshevism, all mitigated against the worker parties and confined the 
Left to lasting opposition.  Most converts to Fascism had been won not through their belief in 
the “Fascist Revolution”, but through the expectations that their self-interests would be best 
served by a Fascist regime. As we will see in the following chapters, this was so for 
politicians and businessmen. 
 
1.3 The Establishment of Fascism during the Secretariats of Farinacci and 
Turati 
       This section will explore the ups and downs of Fascism during the secretariats of Roberto 
Farinacci (1925-1926) and Augusto Turati (March 1926-October 1930). The sub-chapter will 
explain the local and regional developments of the movement and the relationship between 
centre and periphery and between different forces shaping the development of Fascism 
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nationally and in the region. This chapter will show the failed attempt made by Farinacci to 
mould Fascism as a squadrist-like movement. Furthermore, we will demonstrate that his 
successor, Turati, failed to reform the State and the Fascist Party in a way that would 
supersede completely its provincial origins and tackle the ‘plague’ of intra-party infighting.   
   
        After the March on Rome, Mussolini’s project to widen his political base by appealing 
to moderate elements with the aim of a ‘normalisation’ of the Fascist movement and 
distancing himself from the violence of the Fascist squads, generated a more general hostility 
among his local ras, who reacted to Mussolini’s moderation with more violent actions such 
as the murder of the Socialist deputy Giacomo Matteotti in June 1924. 
 
       On 30 May 1924, the Socialist MP Matteotti had denounced in the Chamber of Deputies 
the Fascist use of the violence in the parliamentary election of April 1924. Matteotti was 
kidnapped and murdered on 10 June 1924. When the news of his kidnapping spread, Italian 
public opinion had no doubt that the Fascists were implicated in the crime. In reaction to 
Matteotti’s murder and to protest against Mussolini, the anti-Fascist opposition withdrew 
from the Chamber, in an action later known as the ‘Aventine secession’ (Secessione 
dell’Aventino). The anti-Fascist action proved ineffective in triggering public opinion against 
Mussolini who decided to take full responsibility of the murder on 3 January 1925 during a 
speech to the Chamber of Deputies. The responsibility for the murder remained uncertain, 
although five fascists, Amerigo Dumini – a prominent member of the Ceka (the Fascist secret 
police), Giuseppe Viola, Albino Volpi, Augusto Malacria and Amleto Poveromo were 
arrested a few days after the kidnapping. Only Dumini, Volpi and Poveromo were sentenced, 





 As Corner suggested, “although the murder of Matteotti was not itself the 
work of provincial squadristi, it sprang nonetheless from very much the same kind of 




        The Matteotti crisis marked a turning point in the history of Italian Fascism. The 
‘Matteotti affair’ was exploited by the intransigent wing of Fascism to boost the process 
towards the establishment of a totalitarian Fascist regime, forcing Mussolini to abandon any 
plan of working within parliament legality that had marked the first two years of Fascist 
government (1922–24). The murder of Matteotti obliged Mussolini to take the necessary 
steps towards the creation of a totalitarian State based on suppression of the opposition press, 
exclusion of non-Fascist parties, and formation of a secret police. 
 
       The Matteotti crisis highlighted the tensions between leaders and led and served to show 
that the Fascist victory was only incomplete. Having learnt the lesson from the Matteotti 
affair and knowing the implications of his own policies, Mussolini decided that it was 
necessary to react against a wave of criticism towards his political line. 
For Mussolini, the Matteotti crisis became, first and foremost, a problem of legitimacy. At 
this time, both the direction of the Party and Mussolini’s authority within it were far from 
being uncontested. The intransigent squadristi still claimed their legitimacy which arose out 
of their defeat of Bolshevism. As explored above, the foundation of the Partito Nazionale 
Fascista in 1921 had, among others, been a move towards controlling the independent actions 
of the local ras. But this had not been entirely successful and ‘normalisation’ as a political 
direction remained contested with the agitation of squadristi intensifying after the election of 
April 1924.  
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Other dictators faced similar issues and they were able to defeat the opposition. Hitler 
pursued the physical elimination of uncontrollable and potentially threatening companions 
during the Night of the Long Knives; and Stalin purged the dissident comrades with the full 
force at his disposal throughout his rule. Mussolini’s approach was more measured as he had 
no SS to turn against dissidents. Furthermore, he was well aware of the fact that he needed a 
forceful and if necessary violent wing to pursue his dictatorial project and to secure 
permanence in power. Therefore, his approach to the more radical elements of the Fascist 
movement was to “ride the tiger, convinced that he could dominate the beast, but equally sure 




       The years 1925-1926 marked another important and distinct phase in the establishment 
of the Fascist movement – a movement that was still characterised by ‘disparate alliances’ 
and that was ‘internally divided over both ends and methods.
237
 The appointment of the 
intransigent ras of Cremona, Roberto Farinacci, as party secretary in February 1925 
apparently showed that the more radical force had gained the upper hand in the battle to rule 
Fascism.  
 
       Yet, Farinacci’s appointment was an ambiguous move from Mussolini that provided 
evidence of his skills as an intelligent and skillful operator. On one hand he gave the 
archetypal Fascist ras the job to control the other provincial ras; on the other hand, he was 
trying to regain legitimacy among the squadristi. Farinacci, for his part, was conscious of the 
fact that his brand of Fascism depended on the continuing activity of the squads, and he 
carefully constructed his base within the provincial movements and with the intransigent 
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Fascism of the squadristi.
238
 The aim of Farinacci was to insert the Fascist Revolution into 
the State with the Party pursuing an autonomous role in order to realise the Fascist 
Revolution.  
With Farinacci’s appointment Mussolini attempted to construct a situation in which he would 
provide the political leadership of the movement, whereas the Party Secretary would take 
charge of and control the more radical elements of the movements through the armed wing of 
the Party. Farinacci’s course immediately reaffirmed the supreme role of the Party in the 
attempt to regain its autonomy and authority where Fascists attempted to accommodate local 
elites and group of interests. This resulted in a ‘renewal of the rhetoric of new versus old, 
with fiery denunciations of commercial and professional middle classes accused of thinking 
that, with socialism defeated, they could move back into the driving seat as if nothing had 
happened’.
239
                   
At the provincial level this campaign for Fascist supremacy presented once again many of the 
questions that had been posed during the first years of the movement. In some respects, 
Fascism was still well placed in its search for support. Many among the local bourgeoisie 
continued to look to Fascism essentially as the lesser evil; it was better than the revolutionary 
socialism they had faced in 1919 and 1920. Although Socialist leagues and unions had now 
disappeared in most areas, and had been replaced by Fascist syndicates and the ‘red 
administrations’ had been dissolved and defeated by the Fascist squads, during the Matteotti 
Crisis there had been signs of criticism from the press. In Venice, the Gazzettino di Venezia 
had publicly criticised the squadristi by repeatedly publishing the names of the murderers of 
the Socialist leader.
240
 For Venice, the question of the press deserves a mention. The only 
Fascist newspaper, the Italia Nuova, closed with the departure of Marsich from the 
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movement in 1922. The federation never felt the need to possess an official newspaper as the 
major local newspapers, including Il Gazzettino, had been aligned with the Party since the 
beginning of the movement. The main problem with Il Gazzettino, owned by the Talamini 
family, was that the newspaper remained semi-independent because of the personal 
protection of the federale Giorgio Suppiej who had married Agnese Sartorelli, granddaughter 
of Gianpietro Talamini. Suppiej had been a front-line soldier during the First World War and 
he was awarded with two crosses for valour and one for merit and two solemn tributes. 




       The political protection of Suppiej allowed the newspaper to follow a non-orthodox line 
during his time as the head of the federation. In reality, the line of Il Gazzettino mainly 
reflected the moderate political line of the federation in 1925 and the ‘normalising’ project of 
Mussolini. It was not just a question of protecting his “family”; the federale Suppiej also 
worked to substantiate a normalising image of Fascism against the intransigence of the 
provincial squadrism. Suppiej was a moderate ‘first hour Fascist’ elevated to the role of 
federale in order to lead the transition of the party from the purge of Marsich’s intransigents 
to the compromise between Giovanni Giuriati, Iginio Magrini and Giuseppe Volpi. As we 
will see later in this chapter, Suppiej found himself managing a difficult period of the Party in 
which he was called upon to deal with the difficult balance between Giuriati and Volpi and 
their increasing will to control the party and consequently the local press, attempting the 
acquisition of the Il Gazzettino. Suppiej’s return to lead the federation in 1929 would be 
linked to the fight to control the ownership of Il Gazzettino. Thus, the issue of Il Gazzettino 
was a question of power which involved all the factions contending the local power. Thus the 
federation never felt the issue of the press a to be a serious one and only started the 
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The Matteotti crisis and the appointment of Farinacci radicalised the national positions of the 
Party and the policies to be implemented at local level. From Farinacci’s point of view, the 
issue was not so much dealing with traditional elites and big business (with whom he had 
good business connections), but providing Fascism with the space to manoeuvre that would 
allow the movement to negotiate with the other players from a favourable position.   
This period saw a significant shift in political alignments. Thirty-two federali were removed 
in the first months of Farinacci’s secretariat and many of these federations were put under the 
control of special commissioners sent from Rome to impose the party line. Suppiej himself 
suffered this fate, being removed from his office in March 1925 and replaced by a 
‘pentarchy” led by the commissioner Talete Barbieri, a first hour Fascist and war veteran. 
However, Suppiej’s removal was not caused by new national radicalised framework of the 
party, but the result of the conflict between the MP Iginio Maria Magrini, leader of the 
veterans, and Giovanni Giuriati. Volpi made the best use of the opportunity to gain control of 
the federation. In Venice, as in Ferrara and Genoa, important economic interests had been 
central to the development of the movement. The presence of financial, commercial, 
industrial or agrarian interests had produced tensions and competition for ultimate control 
since 1921. Internal rivalries within the fasci were triggered by the re-affirmation of the 
supremacy of the Party under Farinacci. As was to be expected, Suppiej did not go quietly, 
claiming, without ever naming Volpi, that the latter had been the cause of the internal crisis 
of the fascio, as “Venetian Fascists were divided between those inclined to support the 
projects of the financier and therefore accepting his manipulation of the party, and those not 
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willing to accept his intrusion in political affairs”.
243
 Suppiej reported to the prefect that 
Volpi’s industrial group “tended to grab every economic and governing position in order to 
monopolise the party”.
244
 In order to execute his plan, Volpi was willing to reduce Venetian 
Fascism to a patriotic society with a marked Liberal frame. Although Venetian local Fascists 
wanted to play a more decisive role within the movement, they were not in the position to 
seriously damage Volpi’s leadership. Giuriati, interrogated by Suppiej on how the Party could 
rescind the relationship with Volpi’s interest group, was not able to provide an effective 
solution. Giuriati himself had been involved in the compromise with Volpi which determined 
the departure of Marsich from the party in 1922.
245
 Despite his moderate attitudes Suppiej 
tended towards the preservation of the original qualities of the Fascist project. He explained 
that:  
 
the ‘good old elements’, (…) have to be approached, supervised with love and care due to their 
qualities of first hour Fascist fighters. They have to be given to their place for their value and for what 
they deserve, remembering that if fascism has sometimes created criminals, those who are deserving 
have to be put in a position to redeem themselves. In this way we will obtain the fusion of spirits.
246 
 
As in many other provinces, Farinacci called for the squadristi to re-establish a radical brand 
of Fascism. To this end, he pursued a fight against autonomous centres of power like 
freemasonry. The documents of the Carabinieri of Chioggia in 1925 provide a good clear 
example of fascists thought that freemasons were infiltrated into the state structures. An 
example is the document, written by a squadrista, following a clash between radical Fascists 
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and the Carabinieri. The Carabinieri had arrested several fascist militiamen who complained 
with Giuriati that one of them was “still cockily and provocatively working in the city, with 
the support of the brotherhood, because notoriously a freemason”.
247
 The feeling of the 
squadristi was that the life of “the fasci of the province is undermined by the State 
functionaries subjugated to anti-Fascist masonry”.
248
 Fascists reported to Giuriati that the 
State was working against the Fascists and there was a lack of the necessary cohesion 
between state authority and the Party. By appealing to Giuriati, squadristi argued that the 
“radical solution to this anomalous situation that shakes the foundations of our strong Fascist 




       Farinacci’s approach had a limited effect and it was characterised by evident 
contradictions. His course resulted in the reorganisation of the Venetian federation along the 
line of a “pentarchy” that was led by a ‘first hour Fascist’, Talete Barbieri, who had been a 
Fascist before the March on Rome. However, the overall composition of the committee was 
far from reflecting Farinacci’s radicalism and intransigence. The moderate forces affiliated to 
Volpi prevailed within the new directorate. Alongside Barbieri, the Party appointed three pro-
Volpi members: Carlo Brandolini D’Adda, Vilfredo Casellati and Giuseppe Toffano. Carlo 
Brandolini D’Adda and Vilfredo Casellati, who had been recruited from the Venetian 
aristocracy, belonged to Volpi’s personal network.
250
 Vilfredo Casellati was Volpi’s local 
plenipotentiary in political affairs, while Carlo Brandolini d’Adda was an emergent figure of 
patrician origins and Liberal background operating in the world of sports clubs. Brandolini 
D’Adda was president of the Venetian section of the National Federation of Gymnastic and 
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president of the important gymnastics society Costantino Reyer.
251
 The presence of a young 
Liberal in the Fascist committee meant that Volpi was not only able to manipulate the local 
Party, but he could clearly inject emergent figures into the Party, even if they were not 
necessarily from a Fascist background. Giuseppe Toffano was a First World War veteran 
decorated with a silver medal for having served on the battle of the Carso. A nationalist and 
journalist for the newspapers Dovere Nazionale founded by the nationalist Alfredo Rocco in 
1915 and then contributor for Idea Nazionale, Giornale Veneto and Arena di Verona, Toffano 
had recently become close to Volpi. Towards the end of the 1920s, he would be elevated by 
the Volpi group to the role of co-editor of Il Gazzettino di Venezia, before eventually 
completing his career with the appointment as Prefect of Siena in March 1930.
252
   
 
       Another controversial point which marked a failure for Farinacci was the resolution of 
the many internal struggles that plagued the Party after its affirmation and even more so after 
the Matteotti affair. It was understood by the local elites, old and new, that Fascism was there 
to stay. Local power bases had to be fought for and local elites manoeuvred in order to 
influence and become a key part of the new political order. An analysis of the province of 
Venice confirmed that the intensification of the power struggle at national level was mirrored 
locally. The struggle for control intensified and was triggered by the new radicalised course 
with regional and national policies overlapping. The struggle involved Giuriati and Volpi. 
The internal contest for power started with Giuriati’s appointment as Minister of the Public 
Works in January 1925 and further evolved in the following months with Volpi’s 
appointment as Minister of Finance in July 1925. His personal power was further extended 
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with the appointment of Casellati to control the federation in May 1926. These very 
significant national elevations did, indeed, signal a change of political fortune of the Venetian 
moderates, and this enhanced status made itself felt in the Veneto region, too.  
 
       Farinacci’s idea of continuing revolution was discredited when it became clear that 
violence with discipline proved difficult to achieve. Violence at this particular juncture 
appeared to be counterproductive in broadening the political base of Fascism, especially in 
the north of Italy, where powerful industrialists, including Volpi, were asking for the end of 
the violence. Farinacci was dismissed in early 1926, after the ‘events of Florence’ where 
intransigent squadristi and their leader, Tullio Tamburini, murdered several people and many 
more were injured. The Grand Council decided finally to dismiss squadrismo, opting to 
accommodate the more moderate forces, and this found expression, in the choice of the new 
Party Secretary. 
 
       On a national scale, the dismissal of Farinacci and the persecution of the intransigents 
meant an increased and intensified control of the centre over the provincial federations. This 
was in order to tackle any possible action taken by the local squadristi. The last months of 
Farinacci’s rule as party secretary had seen a purge of federali and who were considered 
excessively independent.  
 
       Farinacci’s successor in the role of national secretary, Augusto Turati, was well-known 
for his activity in the syndicalist wing of the Party. The change at the top of the Party meant a 
radical shift in the political line of the PNF that went beyond a change of style and instead 
gave his preoccupation with discipline, obedience and stability a different ideological 
103 
 
meaning to his predecessor.
253
 Mussolini chose Turati as someone who would be able to 
unite, rather than divide, as Farinacci did. For Mussolini, Farinacci was a provincial leader 
unable to prevent local intra-party fighting between opposed factions. As we have previously 
argued, Farinacci was the man of the ‘continuing revolution’ and dynamism.  
 
       Turati re-shaped the role of the party within the Fascist system. For Turati, the difficulty 
of the Party in implementing a real change was not only due to the opposition of the radical 
Fascists. The Fascist system had significant malfunctions that needed to be addressed in order 
to pursue real change. Turati pragmatically focused on extinguishing local Fascist leaders’ 





       Turati looked to the Party as the means to convert Italians to Fascism and regarded this 
as a long-term process of societal transformation. He accepted the idea that the Party would 
have been to be purged drastically in order to widen the structure of the new Fascist State, 
and to do so the Party had to recruit more suitable, but, above all, more moderate people. 
Turati knew that squadristi, who used to refer to themselves as uomini nuovi (new men), 
were ‘remnants’ of the First World War. A corollary of this was that the ‘new Italians’ had 
yet to be born.  For Turati, the bureaucratisation of Party and society was the way to 
transform the Italian character. As Corner puts it, 
Such people would not be exactly the mirror-image of many of the first squadristi, usually anything 
but silent and educated. It was logical, therefore, that the squadristi should be relegated to that of 
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glorious memory, as the new Fascist guard of voiceless, determined, confident men gradually took 
their place. Turati’s project for the PNF was designed to realise the objective and in this sense it cut 





       At local level, in Venice province, it was logical that this idea of a highly bureaucratic 
party, led by educated men able to deal with business management, meant the gradual 
takeover of Volpi’s entourage. Volpi’s men were people who had been involved in local 
organisations and businesses. The dismissal of the party commissioner Talete Barbieri, one of 
the early Fascists, was a first inevitable step, with the role taken over in December 1925 by 
Vilfredo Casellati who was to be, from 1925 onwards, Volpi’s plenipotentiary in local affairs. 
The convention for the election of the new federale was held at the Theatre Rossini in Venice 
in April 1926. After the speech of the Senator Giordano, the Party proceeded with the Party 
consultation. Casellati was elected with 1,868 votes out of 1,885 voters. Despite the landslide 
victory of the person who clearly embodied Volpi’s brand of moderate Fascism, internal 
discussions continued and Volpi was accused of monopolising the party. The meeting was an 
opportunity for the squadristi to criticise Volpi’s progressive monopolisation of the party. 
Canizzo, a Venetian squadrista, believed that Fascism had lost its way and it had to return to 
a movement of a few intransigents: “the Fascist Party has been diverted from its origins of 
purity and intransigence because it has welcomed in its bosom people coming from other 
parties”.
256
 Since the dismissal of Suppiej in early 1925, the man able to sustain the 
compromise between Volpi and Giuriati, the federation was plagued by increasing infighting. 
For the squadristi and especially for the early party members and ideologues, Turati’s 
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political line was difficult to understand. Turati’s course triggered a season of beghismo 
(infighting),
257
 the factional feuding that hampered local administration. Groupings contested 
power, sometimes being forced into opposition. From the peripheral view, this crisis could 
also be related to the impact of Turati’s new thinking. As the prefect of Venice reported, “The 
spirits are agitated as rumours and serious accusations have spread towards the person of 





       Turati imposed discipline on the provincial federations and local fascio, through the 
appointment of commissioners. However, discipline was also imposed through a process of a 
revision of membership and many contesters were expelled from the party between 1926 and 
1930. On 29 January 1928, during the annual Party conference, in the presence of the party 
secretary Augusto Turati, federale Casellati declared that after a tormented period of internal 
infighting the party had found its equilibrium. But he announced that the PNF memberships 
registered were only 4,240, in comparison with the 5,160 of 1922. The internal struggle had 




       Under Turati, the press was also subjected to scrutiny, with many local and semi-
independent newspapers being suppressed in favour of a fascistised press. The example of 
Venice not only shows that local newspapers were progressively more strongly controlled by 
the regime. But it also demonstrates that the control of local media exacerbated the local 
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infighting. Under Turati, the ownership of Il Gazzettino again became the terrain of 
confrontation for the factions contending the leadership of the federation, Volpians and 
Giuriatians. Between December 1925 and February 1926, during Casellati’s period at the 
helm, the newspaper was subjected to a number of requisitions and strong censorship. As the 
documents of the Segreteria Particolare del Duce demonstrate, there was a precise project of 
the federale Casellati (in agreement with Volpi) and the prefect Iginio Coffari to take control 
of the newspaper.
260
 Requisitions and intimidations lasted until October 1926 when Casellati 
decided to close Il Gazzettino. In order to re-open the newspaper, the editor Gianpietro 
Talamini had to accept to be flanked by Giuseppe Toffano as co-editor. Toffano was the 
Venetian Fascist vice-federale and a man of Volpi’s entourage. The newspaper re-started its 
activity in mid-November 1926 with a line clearly favourable to Volpi’s group.  
 
       However, while Gianpietro Talamini accepted co-direction of the newspaper, his son 
Ennio Talamini was reluctant to give in to Volpi’s group and he established a secret alliance 
with Giuriati’s. Developments surrounding the leadership of the Il Gazzettino demonstrate 
not only the significance of the press for the Fascist notables, but also indicate factionalism 
between the two dominant groups around Volpi and Giuriati. Furthermore, as will become 
apparent, it was an accurate reflection – at least at the regional level – of the balance of power 
between the factions. In fact, Ennio Talamini’s appeal to Giuriati provoked the irritation of 
the other group. The Volpi-Casellati-Toffano group, with the approval of the national 
secretary Augusto Turati, tried to gain the complete control of Il Gazzettino. Turati invited 
Gianpietro Talamini in Rome and in the presence of Casellati, Toffano and the prefect 
Coffari, they managed to make Talamini sign an agreement to sell the majority of the 
newspaper’s shares to Volpi’s group. However, the operation was blocked at the very last 
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minute thanks to the intervention of Ennio Talamini and Giuriati who appealed directly to 
Mussolini in order to safeguard Talamini’s ownership of Il Gazzettino. 
 
       The unsuccessful coup coincided with the almost simultaneous dismissal of Volpi from 
the role of Minister of Finance and Casellati’s replacement as federale. This change meant 
the return of Giorgio Suppiej in December 1928 and the elevation of Giovanni Giuriati at the 
role of President of the Chamber of Deputies. As we can see, up until the end of 1929, the 
prevalence of a faction over the other, meant the related dismissal of officeholders belonging 
to the losing faction. But what is also clear is that Mussolini, as a capable game player, was 
able to play with the delicate local balance by alternating promotions and dismissals and 
rotating Volpi and Giuriati in national cadres by following the sequence and the result of the 
local battle for the power which involved their local lieutenants Casellati and Suppiej. 
Casellati and Suppiej alternated four times in power between 1923 and 1929.  Therefore, 
Mussolini was able to adjust the national balance of power according to what was happening 
in the periphery. Although the Duce was able to impose his authority and the authority of the 
Party from a centralised point of view, it was always events in the periphery that led to 
decisions taken in Rome.  
 
       The news of Casellati’s resignation did not have any dramatic repercussions among the 
Venetian Fascists, But Suppiej’s appointment was welcomed “with aversion from the 
industrial circles which depended on Volpi, as they remember his hostility towards their 
group”.
261
 Again the sequence of the events related to the Il Gazzettino was linked to those of 
the federation. The appointment of Suppiej was unlocked by the resolution of the question of 
Il Gazzettino. As Michele Bianchi reported to Mussolini in December 1928, Suppiej 
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apologised for his late response to the Duce’s call to lead the Venetian Federation again; he 




1.4 Party and State: the Organisation of Power in the Province (1926) 
       This section of the chapter will deal with power at local level following the 
reorganisation of the local administration under the regime in 1926. We will discuss the 
figure of the podestà, who was to replace the elective major, the role of the federale and the 
position of the prefect at provincial level. This part of the chapter will focus on the conflict 
between State and Party authorities and the attempt of the central State to control the 
periphery. 
 
       The delicate balance between federale and prefect had been at the centre of the Fascist 
reorganisation which started in 1926. The government’s enhancement of the prefect as the 
senior administrator of the province (1927) and the creation of the podestà (1926) helped 
Mussolini to pursue the aims of creating a disciplined party, depersonalising local politics, 
and controlling the personal ambitions of local Fascists.   
In general terms, the resolution of the dualism between federale and prefect was largely 
resolved at the expense of the federale and the party and in favour of the prefect in 1926. 
Mussolini found himself in a position to pursue centralisation while limiting the spectrum of 
action of the local Fascists. The laws and decrees concerning provincial and communal 
administration issued after 1926 strengthened central control over the periphery, decreasing 
the power of the party federale. The podestarile reform was enacted in 1926, was legislated 
in order to eliminate any democratic form of political election. The Liberal elected sindaco 
(mayor) was replaced by a podestà. The mayoral reform of November 1926 placed the 
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municipal administration under the direct control of the Ministry of Interior by making the 
podestà a direct appointment of the provincial prefect.
263
 The podestà was responsible for the 
entire administration of the local council. Financial administration and public welfare funds 
were delegated to the podestà. By royal decree, the prefect had to recommend the 
appointment to the Ministry of Interior. The Party federale had merely a consultative role. 
The podestà was dependent on the prefect and his administrative decisions were subject to 
the approval of the prefect. In this way the local ruling class was always co-opted by the 
centre. A centralised selection of the local officials allowed the appointment of talented 
people to local roles of crucial importance. The elimination of electoral contest and local 
factionalism for the local councils in 1926 was also pursued with the aim of enabling the 
podestà to operate with impartiality and so benefit the community with strong modernization 
action.
264
 The aim of the regime was to deconstruct the client networks of consent at the local 
level and promote a new ruling class which completely fascistised. In this respect, the 
government’s enhancement of the prefect as the senior administrative figure in the province 
(1927) had not been unusual. Between 1923 and 1926 Mussolini’s plan for centralisation had 
taken a decisive step, especially in local municipalities which were distinguished by non-
governability or bad administration, and the mayor had been removed and replaced by 
ministerial commissari prefettizi. This was the case in the province of Venice, where in 1924 
the conflict between Giuriati and Volpi had provoked the resignation of the elected mayor, 
Davide Giordano. Giordano was replaced by the royal commissioner Bruno Fornaciari, who 
remained in charge from August 1924 until September 1926 when the mayoral reform was 
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completed by the government.
265
 The party infighting played a crucial role in the resignation 
of Giordano. This time it was the deteriorating relationship between Giuriati and Magrini that 
caused instability within the party. The commissioners were intended to express neutrality in 
local conflicts but also to discipline Fascist groups which had become ungovernable. They 
were particularly important as they were directly appointed by the prefect in order to 
guarantee the control of the central State over local conflicts. Frequently, they were local 
people and therefore not capable of resisting local pressure or breaking the hold of the local 
elites. The function of the commissioner was to re-establish order in the Venetian Business 
School of Ca’ Foscari, affected by a series of protests against the director Ferruccio Truffi. In 
June 1927 Truffi sent an account to the then Minister of Finance Giuseppe Volpi about his 
experience: 
 
When I entered the school I was received with uproars and whistles by a group of 50 students. (…) 
They protested about the publication of the new exams calendar and they said that they could not 
accept it. (…) Students walked away carrying on shouting, and then I knew that at the moment to 
leave the building, some of them removed the calendar and they burnt it
266
.   
 
The protest was carried out by members of the Fascist university group. Truffi explained that 
the discontent was led by a group of students of the university Fascist group who were asking 
him to violate official procedures in their favour, extending to them the concessions made by 
the Ministry in favour of First World War veterans. The political instigator of the disorders 
was the secretary of the Fascist university group, Pio Leoni, a former close collaborator of 
Marsich, expelled and then re-admitted into the party, who was acting independently to 
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pressure Truffi to concede privileges to the Fascist students.
267
 This was a typical example of 
the clash between the State institutions and the local structures of the Fascist power, where 
the local Fascist Party tried to impose its authority over the representatives of the State.  
 
       Truffi complained about Leoni’s behaviour but the Party confirmed him in the position 
of political secretary of the university group.
268
 Truffi resigned and Senator Davide Giordano 
was appointed commissioner for the period between 1927 and 1930. Following Turati’s 
national guidelines, during his first speech at the inauguration of the new academic year, 
Giordano’s intentions were to restore the authority of the State over the local Party, the new 
Turatian approach needed obedience to the regime from the periphery. Youth were expected 
to represent a new, self-confident Italy and, as Giordano argued, “no more a derided country 




1.5 ‘Poor Personnel’: the Inadequacies of the Ruling Elite 
       How significant a problem of the lack of good administrators and politicians within the 
Fascist movement and Party was, became apparent in the local struggle for power, which 
disrupted local politics and local government. On a national level, the educational 
requirements for office excluded a surprising number of the people linked with the origins of 
the movement. Venice province is a good example of the prefect’s need to rely upon former 
Liberals or eminent local personalities to hold the office of podestà . The podestarile reform 
presented the traditional local ruling class with the opportunity of utilising Fascism to retain 
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local political control. The riforma podestarile was characterised by similar political 
continuity with the Liberal period.  The biography of the first podestà of Venice, Count 
Pietro Orsi, appointed in 1926 and in charge until 1929, confirmed the preference of the Party 
for a man of the traditional establishment rather than a radical change within Fascist 
institutions. 65 years old, Pietro Orsi was a member of a prominent Venetian family. Son of 
Count Alessandro Orsi, a scholar of electricity, Orsi was a fervent early nationalist and an 
eminent historian. First, he taught as a free lecturer in Modern History at the University of 
Padua, then he became lecturer in Diplomacy (1901-1934), Political History (1934-1936) and 
Corporatist Law (1936-1938) at the Royal Business School of Ca’ Foscari in Venice. He 
briefly served as MP in 1912 and in 1934 was appointed Senator.
270
 As the director of Royal 
Business School of Ca’ Foscari asserted in 1927, Orsi had already demonstrated in many 
ways, through his political experience, that he knew what the expectations of a great city like 




       The tenures of Orsi and later Alvera suggested that, ‘for the best people, Fascism’s rule 
in Venice was largely changing things so that they could remain the same’.
272
 This is borne 
out by the fact that the subsequent office-holders, Ettore Zorzi (1929) and Mario Alverà 
(1930-1938) were both members of patrician families and also claimed to have had 
Serenissima ancestry.
273
 Moreover, they had already been elected politicians during the 
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Liberal period. Alvera’, Volpi’s client, held the podesteria for an unprecedented length of 
two full terms, which perpetuated the hegemonic control of Volpi over the political, 
industrial, commercial, and cultural affairs of Venice. The trend was similar for other parts of 
the province. In San Dona’, the eastern part of the province with a predominantly agrarian 
Fascism, the hold of the traditional elite was personified in the figure of Costante Bortolotto. 
Bortolotto graduated in Agrarian Science, and was a member of a prominent family of the 
town. Elected mayor of San Dona’ in 1923 and appointed vice-commissioner of the Venetian 
federation in 1926, Bortolotto returned to manage the comune of San Dona’ as podestà in 




       The significant role played by the agrarians in the eastern province is also confirmed by 
the political influence of Count Camillo Valle in Portogruaro. Valle was a estate owner, 
President of the Agrarian Union, partner of the Perifosfati factory, President of the Land 
Reclamation Authority of Lugugnana, Director of the Cooperative Land Reclamation 
Authority of Portogruaro, deputy president of the Land Reclamation Authority of Venice and 
Mantua, and member of the Supreme Council of Public Works. Valle was an elected mayor 
of Portogruaro in 1913, and then he became a prominent exponent of Social Democracy, a 
local Liberal with republican tendencies. In 1928, he became Fascist podestà of Portogruaro 
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The intention behind the creation of the podestà was to avoid the divisions and the excessive 
influence of local lobbies and the divisions they caused. The podestà was intended to be an 
impartial administrator, but in reality, for several years after the appointment of the first 
podestà in 1926, the office became a further cause of conflict between prefect and federale. 
As Corner has already argued, “the prefects looked for the ability and political fidelity in the 
people they appointed, but when they found, as they often did, that the two did not always go 
together, they looked for the first rather than the second”.
276
 In Venice province, the same 
issue affected also the appointment of the federali. Some prefecturals choices either offended 
Fascists who considered themselves candidates for the office or local leaders that would have 
preferred a federale more favourable towards their factions. The prefect’s choice of relying 
upon an ‘first-hour’ Fascist meant a clear lack of new suitable people, even after almost a 
decade of the regime’s life.  As the prefect Bianchetti argued in 1929, Venice needed a 
competent Fascist for the task and the efficient collaboration of political and economic forces 
in order to solve the conflict among local factions. When Bianchetti became prefect of the 
province, he attempted a rapprochement between Giuriati and Volpi. However, the mediation 
between the different local factions could only be achieved through the incisive collaboration 




       This contest was not simply a question of accumulating personal influence. Prefect and 
federale would be likely to have different criteria for appointments, the first looking primarily 
for administrative and technical competence, the second to loyalty to the party. The two 
office holders also had very different interests and objectives. While the PNF federale was 
concerned with the affirmation of the Party at local level, and was therefore usually ready to 
stand by his supporters, even when unruly and undisciplined, the prefect’s main interest was 
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the assertion of the dominant position of central government and the maintenance of public 
order.  
 
       The lack of suitable Fascists at provincial level was to become a problem that would last 
throughout the entire regime. The difficulties experienced by the regime reflected the 
incapacity of the movement to develop. As we shall see in the subsequent analysis, the 
Fascists of the first hour remained victims of the local battle for power that would see the 
prevalence of moderate and compromising positions over the radical positions. A further 
factor in limiting the pool of the personnel available was represented by both the 
requirements and the strategies of Rome. The most popular politicians at regional level were 
called to serve the government in Rome and worked in the centre on behalf of the region and 
to strengthen the interest of their particular base. For Venice province, the most prominent 
examples were Giovanni Giuriati and Giuseppe Volpi, who were promoted to the role of 
minister in 1925. The simultaneous call to serve in Rome of the two leaders of the major local 
factions in Venice, each of them wanting to be the city boss and thus to strengthen the 
periphery at the expense of the centre, was also determined by exclusively functional 
considerations. Mussolini preferred them to pursue a career in Rome rather than becoming 
too prominent at local level, provoking local destabilisation. However, although Mussolini 
tried to control the leaders of Fascism from Rome, he could not prevent them from using their 
influence to achieve control of the province. Mussolini’s strategy was particularly ineffective 
with Volpi. Mussolini himself admitted that he “could not picture him in the role of beggar of 
fortune. Even without property, Count Volpi would still embody the supreme dignity of the 
doge of Venice”.
278
 Even more telling was his remark that “Count Volpi willingly accepts, 
almost with a smile, the epithet of ‘the last doge’, which the people’s voice of Venice has 
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unanimously awarded him. (...) I surprise myself by calling him ‘Most Serene Doge’”
279
 
When Mussolini was asked why he released Volpi from his office of Minister of Finance, he 
made clear that Volpi preferred to focus on his local interests rather than pursuing his role in 
Rome. . As the Duce reported to De Begnac: 
 
I did not dismiss him, my eminent friend begged me to release him from direct responsibility. He 
explained to me that he would have been more incisive if liberated from governmental responsibility. 





With Fascism in power, Volpi came to embody the classic example of a fellow-traveller who 
joined the regime aiming to protect his own interests and manage all cultural and economic 
activities of Venice and the province, rather than implementing the regime’s ideology. 
According to De Begnac, Mussolini described Volpi more as a pragmatic business leader 
rather than a man imbued with ideology. Volpi would have been pleased to have seen 
Fascism liberated from the yoke of its ideology and removed from sterile disputes. Fascism, 
in his view, had to embrace a more pragmatic attitude and solid economic policies. Volpi 
continued to remain loyal to Fascism in public, which was a logical stance to take for a 
pragmatist industrialist aiming to maximise business opportunities such as those that came 





       The resolution of the battle between prefect and party in the period 1923-1929 ended in 
favour of the prefetto. In the local battle for the power, there was a third actor, the Questore 








 As cited in Distefano-Paladini, Storia di Venezia, 101. 
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(Police Chief) who crucially addressed the battle in favour of the prefect at the expenses of 
the federale. If the party had been able to get the control of the Questore, the federale could 
have gained much more power at local level. The Fascist Party had its own political police, 
the Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale (MVSN). The effect of the formation of the 
MVSN was certainly that of slowly but progressively drawing the sting of squadrismo. The 
foundation of the militia was seen as an important part of the project of ‘normalisation’. The 
private armed forces of Fascism became legal. Unilke the German Nazi SS, local blackshirts 
had few formal and autonomous repressive powers. Any arrests made locally would be 
followed up at Fascist headquarters and, in case of formal action being taken, the case would 
enter the administrative channels linked to the Questura (local police headquarters) and the 
Ministry of the Interior
282
  
The use of the Questura was central for Federzoni’s effort to suppress the terrorism of the 
squads. The Ministry of Interior made extensive use of the Carabinieri to countervail the 
local Fascist intransigents. For example, the Carabinieri of Chioggia had arrested seven 
Fascists for the illegal violence perpetrated against the Socialist Deputy Angelo Galeno 
during a political meeting in late 1924. During the violence the blackshirts assaulted the 
Carabinieri. The leader of this attack was the Secretary of the Fascist Unions, Dario 
Galimberti. The documents present the evidence of both sides involved in the accident. On 
one side, the arrest of the local Fascists provoked a strong reaction from the provincial 
Consul of the MVSN, Iginio Maria Magrini, who denounced the Vice-Questore (deputy-
police chief) Francesco Morelli for referring to the local squadristi as criminals and 
“Bolsheviks paid to create troubles”. On the other side, the Vice-Questore Morelli replied that 
the Fascists were arrogant and accused the police of having caused the incident. During his 
deposition, Morelli made clear that he had merely reminded the Fascists, especially their 
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leader Galimberti, to respect the authority of the Carabinieri and refused all the accusations 
put forward by the squadristi.
283
 As it is clear from this local case, the Questura did not act in 
the interest of the Party and the police chief also made clear that Carabinieri were the greater 
authority in the field regardless of the people they were going to repress, whether they were 
Fascists or not.  
 
       The reversal of fortune for the local Fascists of Chioggia was described to Giuriati by the 
same local leader of the squadristi, Dario Gallimberti in March 1925: 
 
We all welcome you [Giuriati] and we all congratulate you, but we speak to you as a friend and 
master of our strong faith and we hope you to manage to save the fascism of Chioggia. (…) Fascists 
cannot move any more in any sense, just now that is due a quiet, but efficient activity to organise the 
party, without having on the way an anti-Fascist authority hidden by mantle of the honourable 
uniform [of Carbinieri] or protected by their authority of being a State officer.
284 
 
This document clearly shows that the contest between party and prefect was a contest that, in 
many areas, seriously affected the efficient working of the Party machine. Formally, the 
prefect was confirmed to be the ultimate authority of the State in the province by royal decree 
in 1927. But local Fascists were reluctant to accept the situation, precisely because of their 
belief that Fascist control of the State meant, very logically, their control of the locality.   
 
       The powers of the prefettura were further increased by new laws on public order 
introduced in 1926 which restored many of the discretional repressive powers the prefect 
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enjoyed during the First World War.
285
 For example, only the prefect could decide whether 
someone was eligible to be sent to confino (domestic exile) after having consulted the 
Ministry of Interior. The typical phrase employed by the prefect, as used, for instance in local 
Venice documents for Venice, was that the prefect responsibility to “propose to the Ministry 
of the Interior for [somebody] to be sent to confino”.
286
 In addition to the “extraordinary 
powers” granted to the prefect, the Circular of the 1927 also made clear that the prefettura 




       The federale’s power to intervene directly in the administration of the province and the 
municipalities had been severely undermined during the period 1925-1927. However, the 
federale still had a considerable authority and power. He was the provincial head of the PNF, 
and consequently the head of the fascio of the capital city, with the power to appoint the 
segretari of the fasci of the other municipalities (comuni). The federale had the power to 
appoint the leaders of the university groups (GUF – Gruppi Universitari Fascisti) and after 
1931 those of the newly created Fasci Giovanili di Combattimento (FGC). In addition, he 
was responsible for the disciplinary issues involving local Fascists, including members of 
MVSN, youth groups and Fascist syndicates, and he could determine expulsions from the 
party, which could hamper or destroy an individual’s political life.
288
 Another crucial role 
which the federale could play from 1927 until 1937 was the presidency of the Comitato 
intersindacale of the province, which was meant to hold negotiations between employers and 
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workers and develop the regime’s corporative strategy of class collaboration. The federale 
was in the position to influence industrialists, syndicalists, agrarians and workers in 
negotiations for labour agreements. His role became increasingly important during the period 
of the Great Depression which affected Italy between 1929 and 1934. The Party had to face 
the task of controlling employment, especially with regard to employment of local Fascists in 
local administrations. The failure to satisfy the hunger of local Fascists for jobs frequently 
meant the departure of the federale. This happened to Casellati in Venice in 1928, when he 
had to leave the post. During his last speech before the election of the new Party federale, 
Casellati admitted that “despite having pushed hard to find jobs for the local Fascists, the goal 
was not achieved because not all people who presided over the public authority felt obliged to 
help the party in this mission”.
289
 Evidently, failing to supervise labour relations internally 
and externally to the Party meant the incapacity to efficiently govern the province. Given the 
way that the Party was progressively extending its influence into many areas of everyday life, 
the federale became an extremely bureaucratic and organisational role. Federale and podestà 
were to become functionaries of the Party who were to deliver the party’s directives. Under 
Turati, they were no longer representing the driving force of a revolution, but an established 
mechanism which had to respect the prevalence of the State authority over the Party. At a 
local level, in this perspective, the replacement of Casellati with Suppiej meant the shift from 
someone representing particular interests (Volpi’s group) to someone who had proved to be a 
competent implementer of orders (Suppiej). Suppiej was a thirty-year old man with an 
irreprehensible moral conduct and economic independence. According to the prefect, he was 
well-educated, a person with energy, capacity and assessed moral rectitude and could benefit 
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from admiration of the Fascists, having efficiently managed the inter-syndicate committee 




1.6 Provincial Battle for Power 
       As we have seen, even in the late 1920s the Fascist federations faced considerable 
problems on a national scale. The Fascist Revolution which had to represent a radical change 
with Italy’s previous political tradition, in contrast, replicated the same parochial mechanism 
which had characterised the Liberal age. The Venetian federation, despite its individual and 
distinct local character which was played out locally, in essence confirmed the nationwide 
trend that saw the battle focused on the confrontation between old and new elites. The 
explanation for the continuing infighting which had characterised the first decade of the 
regime’s life was inherent in the institutional problem we have previously examined— the 
relationship between prefect, federale, and, to a lesser extent, podestà, and their struggles to 
make an impact at local level. Volpi himself, towards the end of the 1920s, warned Mussolini 
about the architecture the Duce himself had created for the Fascist State. According to De 
Begnac, the “most serene doge” (Il Doge Serenissimo) was concerned that Mussolini would 
become a prisoner of the system he had created. Yet, Mussolini was confident that have 
demolished pointless blockages between administration of the State and the working 
masses.
291
 However, the “institutional struggle” was not the only reason for the intra-party 
conflict at local level. Whereas the victory against the radicals had already been achieved in 
1922 when Marsich left the party, the conflict between Volpians and Giuriatians was about 
differing visions of what Fascism was meant to achieve at a local level. Political rivalries 
masked deeper divisions between interest groups and lobbies within the province and to a 
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higher extent, in Venice city. Volpi and Giuriati conflicted over the future development of 
Venice city and the clash reached its peak over the question of approving the project of the 
bridge to connect Venice city to the mainland. As Giuriati himself reported, the journey 
towards the approval of the project accelerated in 1928 when the local lobbies led by Volpi 
put pressure on Mussolini who, until then, had not taken sides, the one against the 
construction of the bridge, the Giuriatians, and the other in favour of the project, the 
Volpians. Mussolini, perceiving that public opinion was predominantly favourable to the 
bridge, and therefore to Volpi, decided to delegate to the Venetian party the decision on its 
construction. In October 1928, the meeting of the Venetian Direttorio decided to proceed 
with the approval of the project. As Giuriati reported, he found himself in clear minority in a 
‘lion’s den’ of people in favour of the bridge.
292
 The project of the bridge was slowed down 
by the same Giuriati as he was to hold the role of Minister of Public Works until 1929. 
Giuriati’s removal from the Public Works and his consequent appointment to the President of 
the Chamber of Deputies in 1930, allowed the municipality to start with construction in 
1931.
293
 This is a case of national interference at provincial level because of the strength of 
popular and public opinion. This confirms that Mussolini was capable of reading the local 
situation, supporting the construction of the bridge and profoundly changing the mechanisms 
at work.  
 
       The question of the bridge demonstrates the clash between the internal factions within 
the party regarding the strategic urban and industrial development of the city. While Giurati 
was focusing on proposing a conservative and monolithic view of Venice which had to re-
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discover its maritime traditions, Volpi supported the idea of a modern and dynamic Venice, 
far from the tradition of the troppo languida regina (too languid queen), in which Venice had 
to combine industry and cultural tourism. In this respect, Volpi had a non-Fascist, merely 
local agenda, but he was able to better understand the change and the time in which this 
change was to take place. The resolution of the question of the bridge reflected the profound 
difference between the two characters, Giuriati and Volpi. As Mussolini reported to De 
Begnac, Giuriati could be catalogued among the “Venetian people who were (…) desperate 
for the fall of the republic (of Venice) and tried to oppose the results of the Campoformio 
treaty”.
294
 On the other side, Volpi “does not limit himself to venerate the history, to 
revitalise its memories. He wants Venice to live its new time (…). He does not want the 




       In this context of the disagreement between Volpi and Giuriati, the relations Party-State 
were not directly affected. However, Mussolini continued to monouvre the equilibrium of the 
local-national relations from Rome, mainly be concerned with the health of the party at local 
level, and was therefore usually prepared to stand by the predominant side. On the other side, 





       As we have already seen, if in the early days infighting was often about the kind of 
Fascism that should be implemented and the revolt against centralisation, by the mid-1920s 
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the contest was about local power and the struggle between interest groups. After 1925, a 
closer look at the local battles can provide a clear portrait of the varying fortunes of 
provincial federali, but more in general about local leaders. Fascism often reproduced a clash 
between group interests and the prefect had to act as a negotiator. One problem for the prefect 
was that, even if he was able to come to terms with local factions, the local party balance was 
rarely stable. The complexity of local interests, the unpredictability of local allegiances over 
different issues and the fluctuation of individuals in important positions led to great fluidity 
and difficulty in predicting outcomes. As one observer remarked, ‘positions could be reversed 
with great speed if necessary, as people transferred from one group or one leader to 
another”.
297
 That this kind of situation was not unusual was made even clearer by the report 
sent by the prefect Bianchetti to Mussolini in 1930. As Bianchetti reported about Suppiej, 
“his dismissal in 1925 had been determined by the dissent between Giuriati and Iginio Maria 
Magrini, dissent which altered the political group Suppiej was part of, and his return in 1928 
has been the natural consequence of the new order given to the party by the rapprochement of 
the two above mentioned personalities”.
298
 This confirms that the Party was influenced by the 
internal dynamics and the consequences of this dynamism could determine the fortunes of the 
federale. However, if ambitious, the Fascist fallen into disfavour, rarely walked away from 
the movement. The Party was the only means for a political career and leaving the office on 
good terms with the Party was the only way to hope to regain the position. Suppiej was 
nominated by Michele Bianchi in 1923, and had to leave under the leadership of Farinacci. 
But it would be Bianchi who would push for his return, as confirmed by a letter to the 
personal secretary of the Duce, Alessandro Chiavolini, in December 1928.
299
 A few months 
earlier, Suppiej had sent a letter to Mussolini asking to be re-inserted into the political life of 
                                                 
297
 Corner, The Fascist Party, 101. 
298
 ACS, SPD, b. 49, Venice, The prefect Giovanni Battista Bianchetti to Benito Mussolini, n.d. 
299
 ACS, DGPS, b.49, Alessandro Chiavolini to Giorgio Suppiej, 16 December 1928. 
125 
 
the movement. In his letter he made clear that after he had to resign from the role of federale 
in 1925 due to the difficult situation that developed in Venice, “it was suggested to me to 




Suppiej’s case mirrored a national phenomenon: a change in the national party secretary, or 
the arrival of a new prefect could completely reverse the situation at local level. Here, the 
appointment of Suppiej was facilitated by the arrival of the new prefect Giovanni Battista 
Bianchetti and the dismissal of Iginio Coffari, who had supported Volpi in his pricy of 
monopolisation of the party. Leaving the position, Coffari was to take the role of prefect in 
Florence in 1929 and then he became senator in 1931.
301
 If the previous two prefects were 
from the South of Italy and reflected the party to appoint a “foreigner” to resolve the local 
battle for the power, the appointment of Bianchetti, who was born in Castelfranco (Treviso – 
Veneto Region) meant the role of managing the province was given to a local bureaucrat of 
the State who did know very well the local situation. As the intervention of the previous 
prefects brought relatively more confusion to the local scene and intensified the local battle 
for power, with Coffari taking the side of Volpi in pursuing the interests of the industrialist 
group (see the above mentioned case of the Il Gazzettino), the appointment of Bianchetti was 
a national escamotage orchestrated by Mussolini and Michele Bianchi to bring more stability 
at local level. The intervention of Michele Bianchi was meant to contain Volpi’s ascent to the 
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top of the local party. Mussolini mentioned that Volpi “hated Michelino Bianchi whose 
Socialist revolutionary origins he condemned”.
302
 If Bianchi played a crucial role in the 
return of Suppiej, the substantial correspondence between Giuriati and Bianchetti held at the 
Archive of the Chamber of Deputies for the period 1929-1933, demonstrates that Bianchi was 
manoeuvring with Volpi’s most enemy (Giuriati) to bring the operation to a good end.
303
 
The decision to re-appoint Suppiej to the federation confirmed the impression that the centre 
of power of Fascism had gravitated towards the province. As the prefect Coffari confirmed to 
the Minister of Interior, although Suppiej was offered the nomination to be an MP, “he 
prefers to return to the role of segretario federale”.
304
 Suppiej was not the only Venetian 
Fascist who wanted to play his cards in Venice. As we have already seen, Volpi, after being 
appointed Ministry of Finance in 1925, decided to return to Venice in 1928 to play a 
consistent role at provincial level.  
 
1.7 The secretariat of Giuriati (1930-1931) 
       The return of Suppiej might be seen as a striking victory for Fascist centralisation of 
authority, but, in reality, it was not quite as impressive as it might seem. Certainly Rome was 
able to manoeuvre and influence the political balance at local level, but the effects of the 
struggles of the 1920s would continue to impact on relations between the centre and the 
periphery as well as between the moderates and radicals well into the following decade in 
fairly similar fashion. After the appointment of Suppiej, the prefect Bianchetti reported to 
Mussolini that, according to his assessment, the local equilibrium could change anytime. In 
1930, after one year of Suppiej being in charge again as party federale, he still believed that 
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“any reason, even small, even a simple misunderstanding, could alter the balance, reached 
with hard work, but still not stable”.
305
 The main problem was that the solutions were far 
from being definitive. As soon as the federale was removed and a new federale was 
appointed, ambition would be rekindled and resentment remembered. In Venice, the return of 
Suppiej to lead the Party in the province was greeted with suspicion by the circles of 
industrialists led by Volpi, because they remembered Suppiej’s earlier hostility to their 
group.
306
 The significant failure of the regime to make an impact at local level both in terms 
of finding good people for the local administration and to resolve the provincial disputes was 
already confirmed by a report of Suppiej to Mussolini in January 1930 who confirmed that 
the Party “lacked in managing to depersonalise (local politics)”, but also “lacked good people 
and the Liberals have been able to retain all the positions”.
307
 Suppej was blaming Giuriati 




       Mussolini, ignoring the federale’s advice about organisational inadequacy, appointed 
Giuriati national secretary of the PNF. Giuriati’s secretariat (October 1930-December 1931) 
was a period of transition towards a mass-mobilising system and membership which would 
develop further under his successor, Achille Starace. First and foremost, Giuriati’s task was 
to mediate with his predecessors, Farinacci and Turati. On one side, Farinacci, as we have 
already seen, had launched a “continuing revolution” with the aim of strengthening and 
perpetuating squadrismo and the Party’s control over Italian Society. On the other side, 
Turati’s campaign against the intransigents aimed to dismantle Farinacci’s radical idea of 
permanent revolution and violence to perpetuate Fascism, and to centralise the PNF’s 
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functions in order to subordinate the Party to the Fascist State. Turati abolished the 
acclamatory election of the federale by the local followers and the appointment made by to 
the centre through the mediating figure of the prefect who, in addition, was to become the 
senior figure of the province at the federale’s expense.  
 
      Although described as a transitional figure for his short tenure, Giuriati was well known 
for having been alongside D’Annunzio during the experience of Fiume, but also for his 
dedication to the fascist movement and the monarchy. Mussolini thought that “only Giovanni 
Giuriati could calm down the storm which hit the party under Turati”.
309
 One of the 
characteristics that set Giuriati apart from his predecessors was that he was not a provincial 
ras or at the least the kind of leader with a large following. As we have seen, the clash within 
the Venetian party was based on personal interests and on the vision for Venice, which Volpi 
and Giuriati wanted to develop, rather than ideological. Giuriati’s supposed non-partisanship 
indicated to Mussolini that would not trigger factional struggles within the provincial party, 
as the Farinacci and Turati tenures had done, and that instead the party would be governed in 




       Giuriati’s appointment aimed at removing ‘the trash who are obstacles in our way’, 
targeting the anti-Fascists, former-Liberals and freemasons who had found their way into the 
party under Turati.
311
 Turati had extended the influence of the party over a wide range of 
sectors of Italian life, and now Giuriati had the task of purifying the Party of alien elements 
and realise a model of a ‘new civilisation’. As Mussolini argued, Farinacci fought against 
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those that he used to call “enemies”. Turati built the walls around the castle of the party. 
Giuriati had only one fear: the prevalence of the wing of the unenthusiastic inside and in front 
of the Party.
312
 For Mussolini, ‘unenthusiastic’ was synonymous with being ‘not sincerely 
converted’ to Fascism.  
 
       During his brief tenure, like to Farinacci, Giuriati aspired to being about the fusion of the 
party and nation and therefore he worked towards reasserting the position of the party against 
the State. He also extended the range of the party’s totalitarian organisations, introducing a 
new body the Fasci Giovanili di Combattimento, a new youth group which was designed to 
recruit young men between 18 and 21 years of age passing out from the Avanguardisti of the 
Opera Nazionale Balilla (ONB). The Fasci Giovanili were to be an alternative to the GUF 
(University Group), with the aim of attracting skilled or semi-skilled young workers who 
were already in jobs or who were training for work. This policy of empowering of the youth 
groups brought the Party and the regime into open conflict with the Catholic Church, 
triggering the battle for the monopoly of youth education. As we will see in the following 
chapters, the battle was particularly harsh in Venice, where Giuriati himself led the offensive 
against the Catholic youth groups, with the whole province involved in the battle. Giuriati 
earned the ire of the Patriarch La Fontaine because of the closure of 238 catholic youth 
circles in 3 June 1931.
313
 However, the most significant initiative of Giuriati was the purge of 
party membership. Giuriati demanded that federali and prefects purge the party of the 
corrupt, inactive and opportunist. Venice could boast one of the more illustrious examples of 
this. Giuriati took the opportunity to record the unrestrained behaviour of his old enemy from 
the Cavalieri della Morte (Knights of Death), Gino Covre, who was found renting a flat on 
the lido with his lover, while his legitimate wife was found living as the concubine of a 
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 The purge also involved a thorough check on dates of membership 
in order to correct any fraudulent backdating of membership, which was a common 
phenomenon under Turati. In Venice province, the Party inspection revealed that Volpi was 
among those who falsely backdated his membership of the Fascist Party in order to progress 
within the regime.
315
 One of the effects of the purge was that it facilitated the return of 
extremist ex-squadrists into the ranks of the Party. Although the last two versions of the 
Statute of the Party in 1926 and 1929 did not allow re-admissions, many of those sidelined or 
expelled from the party under Turati, especially Farinaccians, returned under the secretariat 
of Giovanni Giuriati. For example, the Venetian squadrista Raffaele Bordignon and the 
leader of the Fascist students, Pio Leoni, close collaborators of the former ras Marsich, were 
expelled and then re-admitted under Giuriati. Giuriati’s revision came to represent the last 
breath of life for intransigent Fascists, and attempted to remould the Party before the 
membership would reopen more widely to everybody in 1932. The process of infighting 
would restart and alongside the battle for the leadership, the fight would involve the large 
number of jobs made largely available for the party with the expansion of the parastato 
(organisations) under the regime. Members of the party were aware of these opportunities 
which could potentially be open to them. Those excluded were to complain about their 
exclusion. In the early 1930s, for example, the prefect of Venice wrote that in recent days 
there had been protests of discontent among the Old Blackshirts, who complained that they 
were neglected and unemployed, and that, in preference to them, jobs and positions in the 
Party were given to people of recent and doubtful Fascist faith.
316
   
Morgan suggested that: 
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… in some provinces, extremist Fascism found a temporary coherence and self-awareness, generated 
by the opportunities offered by the Giuriati revision to reverse the trends of the Turati Secretaryship. 
The extremist campaign never, however, became a coordinated regional or national movement, 




This was played out in Venice where Giuriati’s secretariat brought significant changes to the 
local balance in Venice. Suppiej and Giuriati could work together against Volpi in order to 
stabilise power at local level. Giuriati’s appointment seemed to give his coalition the chance 
of a total victory. However, it was again the fight for control of Il Gazzettino that showed that 
the local battle was a persistent one and the duo of Suppiej-Giuriati was not a certain winner 
of the contest. As Ennio Talamini stated to Galeazzo Ciano, Suppiej had repeatedly tried to 
force Gianpietro Talamini from the editorship of the newspaper. The reason for Talamini to 
contact Ciano was obvious. Ciano was one of the most influential personalities of Mussolini’s 
entourage. He became a key figure of the Fascist regime after his marriage to Mussolini’s 
daughter Edda (1930) and therefore he could have talked to Mussolini in order to resolve the 
situation. In addition, Ciano became Minister of Population Culture (MINCULPOP) in 1935. 
The MINCULPOP was competent for Press and Propaganda and it was intended to be the 
Italian analogue of the German Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda. 
This office controlled not only press, but literature, art, theatre, music and tourism as well.  
Despite Talamini’s attempt to block the climb to his newspaper by contacting the most 
influential personalities of Mussolini’s circle, Suppiej was able to persuade the director 
(Gianpietro Talamini) to release a letter addressed to Giovanni Giuriati in which Talamini 
proposed Suppiej for the co-direction. In addition, in his first act as federale, he appointed 
trusted people to the editorial staff. Suppiej went even further, threatening him with the worst 
                                                 
317
 Morgan, ‘“The Trash Who Are Obstacles in Our Way”’, 335.  
132 
 
of consequences if he was not to accept the agreement.
318
 Giuriati was never directly 
mentioned by Ennio Talamini in his long letter to Mussolini. However, it is clear that the 
renewed impulse given by Suppiej to the attempt to monopolise the activity of the newspaper, 
was the direct consequence of the new role played by Giuriati. The progressive intrusion of 
Suppiej into activities which did not directly involve the Party was also confirmed by the 
report of the Prefect Bianchetti in the mid-1930:  
 
There is no shortage of critics of the action of Suppiej: some people accuse him (…) of an excess of 
action, for the intrusion in activities in which the party should not be involved, for his exorbitant 




The repeated attacks on the Il Gazzettino, were another incident of Party-State, over control 
of the levers of opinions in the province, which, however, did not have an outcome until the 
late 1930s, when the intervention of Mussolini made it clear that the Talamini family could 
still own and edit it while Gianpietro Talamini was alive. The failed bid for the control of the 
newspaper was also the cause of the progressive detachment between Giuriati and Suppiej. 
The intervention of Gabriele D’Annunzio temporarily prevented Ennio Talamini, son of 
Gianpietro, from being excluded from the direction of Il Gazzettino. However, it was only a 




Giuriati mentioned in his diary that around 120,000 members were expelled from the party in 
the period 1930-31.
321
 The actual figure was probably even higher, around 200,000.
322
  While 
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some degree of purging may well have been in Mussolini’s interest as a means of purifying 
Fascism and fascistising Italy, the extent of the purge proved to be excessive. Giutiati was 
dismissed from the role of Party Secretary and replaced by Achille Starace—a strong 
defender of the Party’s function in a totalitarian system and a man known for his fierce, 
almost fanatical, loyalty to Mussolini.  
 
       Many would later attribute to Starace the responsibility for having transformed the PNF. 
But many of the organisational changes within the party were instigated and partially 
implemented by Turati and Giuriati. The transformation of the PNF, which occurred in 
parallel with its juridical integration into the new Fascist regime, was accomplished between 
1926 and 1932. The internal situation of the Party had been greatly altered by the purges 
ordered by the Secretary, Augusto Turati and by his successor, Giovanni Giuriati. Many 
squadristi who were resistant to discipline were expelled and a good number of opportunists 
had been transferred into the social body of the party and this considerably altered its 
composition. Given the development of the PNF in the Fascist regime after 1926, reference to 
its social composition becomes less relevant for the functioning of the party. Mussolini had 
decided to reduce the party’s political autonomy as much as possible. As Emilio Gentile 
already argued, “one has to take into account the important differences in the ideas and 
policies of Turati and Giuriati as secretaries of the PNF, but one must also recognize that 
their work was decisive for the transformation of the PNF in a way consistent with the new 
function it was gradually assuming in the totalitarian Fascist system”.
323
 The Party owed to 
Turati, who was secretary of the PNF from March 1926 to October 1930, the liquidation of 
the Farinaccians and the PNF’s adaptation to its new position as subordinate to the state. With 
Turati, the PNF assumed an eminently educative role both towards the masses and, above all, 
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the younger generations. From this point of view, the period 1926-32 may be considered a 
distinct phase in the history of the PNF, a phase characterised by its transformation into a 
popular institution of the Fascist State. 
 
1.8 Starace and the Party During the 1930s 
       The importance of the brief tenure of Giuriati lay in what happened after his dismissal. 
The appointment of Starace was followed by the announcement that PNF membership, closed 
since 1926 to anybody other than the graduates of the Fascist youth organisations, would be 
opened up to new requests for membership from October 1932. At the provincial level, 
Starace’s removal of the ban on new members brought an apparent end to almost six years of 
party reorganisation aimed at locating the PNF firmly within the totalitarian State. Starace 
was convinced that he could form the new character of the Italians by the imposition of 
rituals which would make them more permeable to the myths of fascism. Starace’s Party 
extended the boundaries of its power in the society. Starace, as PNF Secretary between 
December 1931 and October 1939 perfected, with manic attention to detail, the capillarity of 
the PNF. Under the orders of Mussolini and with fanatical personal zeal, Starace developed 
the totalitarian party machine with the aim of involving millions of men and women of every 
age in a system of collective life. For example, the Venetian Party was able to extend its 
influence to over 179,852 people involved in the various organisations of the regime by 1934. 




       During the years of Starace, the regime’s organisations extended their area of influence 
to school, work and leisure time. In this respect, popular mobilisation reached levels never 
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seen before in Italy and people joined in mass the events organised by the Party. As Corner 
argued, “by March 1940 the PNF had more than 3.5 million enrolled and around 20 million 
Italians—little short of half the total population—were involved in the various capillary 
organisations, unions included.”
325
 At least on paper, Italy was achieving so-called 
‘fascistisation’. The change of the regime’s relationship with Italians, was described in a 
circular sent by the prefect Francesco Benigni, who had been appointed to lead the prefecture 
of Venice in 1934, to all the podestà and commissioners of the province. The prefect was 
condemining the practice of establishing patronati and committees of honour during official 
Fascist events. The committes of honour or patronati were very popular in the liberal age. 
They were set up to highlight the prestige of events organised at local level and they were 
composed of personalities, also institutional, of major importance. Adherence to a committee 
of honour was therefore an expression of local institutional support to the initiative. They 
were a symbol of a politics based on personalism and patronage, a system where the MPs 
had the direct relationship and control of his collegio (electoral district), and politics was 
extremely regional. The regime believed that this represented a practice of old times which 
had to be stopped altogether to allow control of the State over the periphery. The ‘new times’ 
required discipline during public events and this discipline had to correspond to the Fascist 
discipline.
326
 This was a clear example of how the regime and Starace were pursuing the 
regimentation and fascistisation of the society at local level, namely through elimination of 
any possible alternative and providing people with clear rules on how to behave with regards 
to the regime.  
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As Emilio Gentile suggested, “Starace was the high priest of the ‘cult of the Duce’ and the 
key figure in staging the liturgical ceremonies of Fascism”.
327
 Consequently, the PNF became 
his “armed wing” in implementing mussolinismo at local level. An example was the letter 
sent by the Provincial Head of the Opera Nazionale Balilla, Angelo Meloni, to the podestà  
of Chioggia on occasion of the beginning of the Italian invasion of Ethipia in October 1935: 
 
In every office there must be exhibited the clear and the sculpted words of our Boss that in this 
memorable time for our patria, needs the spontaneous and passionate collaboration of the all Italian 





The Gioventù italiana del Littorio (GIL) claimed a membership of over 8 million in October 
1940 which was larger than that of the Hitler Youth at the same time.
329
 As the Fascist 
newspaper of the local fascio of Chioggia, the Foglio d’Ordini declared: 
 
The continuity [of Fascism] is today represented by the Gioventừ Italiana del Littorio. (…) like to the 
“Civis romanus” who received a virile education rom a young age, nowadays - under the Mussolinian 
regime – the Fascist learns and put into practice marvellous spiritual and warrior virtues. The G.I.L is 





During the 1930s, Storace gave much attention to numbers. During his period of office, 
federali were requested monthly (sometimes bimonthly) reports on the situation and the 
activities of the Party.  
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As Lauren E. Forcucci argued “women's organizations of the regime were not excluded from 
this count. While the regime exalted Italian women as child bear-ers, men assumed their 
traditional role as “bread-winners””.
331
 Mussolini emphasised the importance of motherhood 
for women. This gave Italian women a public purpose. The Italian family was not merely 
encouraged to be prolific but was viewed as being linked with the state, of which it was 
meant to become a fully functioning component. There was a definite connection between the 
fascist ideology and increasing the birth rate, mothers had to grow the future worriors of the 
regime. The battle for births took place during the inter-war years of 1925 to 1938. The 
regime associated the demographic campaign and therefore motherhood, children, family, 
and virility with maintaining national greatness. The regime promoted mass propaganda, 
mobilisation, and state incentives to increase the birthrate, especially within the working 
class, by increasing welfare benefits, legislating tax breaks, making available better health 
care.  
 
       In order to enhance the success of the demographic campaign, the regime announced the 
creation of the Opera Nazionale per la Maternitá ed Infanzia (ONMI: The National 
Organisation for Mothers and Infants) in 1925. The scope of ONMI was to cooperate with 
Italian communities in the effort to protect women, care for mothers, and provide aid to 
children up to the age of five. The leaders (patroni or patronesse) were generally chosen 
among the local elites. These were important personalities, ofter chosen by the podestá, 
among those who had already gained significant experience in the field of assistance to 
population in difficulty. Through the development of ONMI, the regime offered care and 
                                                 
331
 L. E. Forcucci, ‘Battle for Births: The Fascist Pronatalist Campaign in Italy 1925 to 1938’, in Journal of the 
Society for the Antrophology of Europe 10:1 (2010), 4-13. 
138 
 
protection to mothers and their children. Women were thought by female instructors in 
children care and were trained to be educated mothers and develop the fascist youth culture.  
 
       At the beginning of 1933, Mussolini established 24 December of each year to be set as 
Giornata della Madre e del Fanciullo (Mother’s and Children’s Day) to honor Italian 
mothers and their children. Mussolini purposely decided upon this date in order to include the 
Catholic Church and to associate the event with Mary the Mother of Christ and Jesus’ birth.  
 
       The “Day of Mother and Son” was created by Fascism to awarding highly public medals 
or certificates and recognition to those women who produced more than the state’s target of 
five children per family or they had their children fallen in war for the national cause. Prizes 
were awardd by the president of each provincial section of ONMI. In Chioggia, for example, 
the prefetto commissario
332
 proudly reported the result achieved by ONMI, during the 
“Mother’s and Children’s Day” in 1936. The commissario listed the benefits for the poor: 
 
During the “Giornata della Madre e del Fanciullo”, we have baptised those poor kids born in 
December, distributed as below:  
Chioggia n. 14 
Sottomarina n. 6 
S. Anna n. 3 
Ca’ Bianca n. 2 
Cavanella d’Adige n. 2 
Mothers and young Fascist women were godmothers.  
During the ceremony, we have distributed 24 prizes for the good upbringing (20 of £50 and 4 of 
£100) and a wedding prize of 500 lire; we have also distributed 18 certificates of “Good Mother” and 
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8 certificates for “Demographic merit” (to the mothers with more than 10 sons still alive) and two 





ONMI was a parastate body and the party involvement on his activities was crucial. As we 
have seen in this document, the fascio femminile donated clothes to ONMI to be distributed to 
children during the “Mother’s and Children’s Day”. The grip of the Party on this organisation 
became tighter starting from April 1933, when the regime progressively replaced the 
volunteer workers with professional social workers (visitatrici fasciste). Fascist women 
belonging to the local fascio who visited the families in need for moral and material help, 
with special care for maternity and infancy, reporting periodically to the Secretary of the 
fascio from whom they were dependent.Similar to the ONMI movement, La Massaie Rurali 
wanted to affect the thinking and behavior of peasant women. La Sezione Massaie Rurali dei 
Fasci Femminili created in 1933, also attempted to reach the peasant masses. Although their 
declared goal was its declared goal was promoting knowledge of small-scale farming 
methods, domestic techniques, childcare, and moral, social, and technical assistance to 
women in rural areas, the real mission was political mobilisation. Women used these 
organizations for mobilisation and expression. La Massaie Rurali eventually developed into a 
massive association amounting to over one million members on the eve of World War II.
334
 
Considering that women were excluded from other active duties, these organisations provided 
a sense of belonging and support to the establishment of a fascist society.  
 
The above report is really interesting as it provides us with a flavour of what Starace was 
effectively requesting of the local party. However, welfare was undoubtedly one of the most 
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effective instruments of the regime. Especially during the Great Depression, some families 
could not do without the help of the ONMI. In addition to a welfare organisation, another 
strong card played by the regime was the organisation of the Italians’ leisure time through the 
Ente Sportivo and the Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro.
335
 
The OND, founded in 1925, greatly expanded its activities under Starace. As the federale 
Michele Pascolato and the provincial secretary of the OND Piero Calderazzo informed all the 
podestà and the local inspectors of the OND in October 1935, it was time for the OND to 
contribute to the greatness of the country. The Venetian OND offered the medals won by the 
Venetians in the various national OND competitions to be melted doen in order to support the 
African Campaign. The document wanted to “testimony the full adherence of the 




       At the provincial level the party became less political and more an administrative and 
bureaucratic centre of power. Participation became more important than the ‘Fascist faith’. In 
this respect, the regime was successful in involving a large part of the population in activities 
that were apparently non-political, but that inculcated a “way of life” based on physical 
virility and paramilitarism. The activities of these agencies represented a real penetration into 
people’s life. These organisations made extensive use of local festivals and regional folklore 
in the effort to involve people. In Chioggia, the NUF (Nucleo Universitario Fascista) was 
responsible for the organisation1 of a national “Fish Festival” (Sagra del Pesce). This event 
was established for the first time in 1934 to support the regime’s autarchy propaganda. The 
Festival was chaired by the Duke of Genoa and the Minister Edmondo Rossoni. In August 
1939, the same NUF was able to organise a magnificent regatta of 400 characteristic boats 
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(bragozzi) from Chioggia to Venice. The yacht of Giuseppe Volpi and his guests, the Italian 
and the German Ministers of Popular Culture, Dino Alfieri and Joseph Goebbels, attended 
this event.
337
 These activities demonstrated the great care that the Fascist centre took in 
enlisting the periphery for the purpose of nation-building. What at first sight might have 
seemed like a counter-intuitive strategy of strengthening local feeling and this working 
against the centre, proved an important mechanism in winning over the regions for the 
national course. For the construction of the national identity, was crucial the binomial 
relationship piccola patria-grande patria (small fatherland-great fatherland). The young 
people of the university group were moved by the intention to make people love the piccola 
patria, but as a daughter of the grande patria, the patria fascista. The main investment of the 
fascist government in local rituals and festivals in which people could largely identify 
happened with the aim to end the contrast between ‘local’ and ‘national’ identity. It is not 
coincidence that there are illustrious representatives of the Fascist government to chair these 
events. In the case of Chioggia were invited Alfieri and Volpi, and even prestigious 
representatives of international politics such as Goebbels have been invited to attend these 
local events, so that he could see how the small and the great Italian homelands were united 
under the fascist effigy.  Fascism attempted to integrate the small homeland into the national 
homeland, harmonising the two apparently conflicting feelings. In accentuating “regional and 
provincial peculiarities, … Fascist organizers were sufficiently astute to realise that cultural 
manifestations of regional or specific communal identity were very different from 
affirmations of political separateness and could be used to strengthen a sense of national 
belonging”.
338
 As Stefano Cavazza has demonstrated, the use of the concept of the piccola 
patria and of the traditional popular festivals—sometimes taken over by the Fascist 
organisations, represented a clever way of combining popular participation and enjoyment 
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with indoctrination, in which the national and regional were fused with Fascism in an effort 
to create a single entity.
339
 The regime disrupted the various local identities and placed them 
within national dynamics and situations that responded to stimulations coming from the 
centre. For the case of Chioggia, the ‘Fish Festival’ had to respond to the major national 
impulse given to the campaign of autarchy and the myth of Italy’s self-sufficientness. 
The concept of the piccola patria, was not new for Venice city. It was D’Annunzio who first 
suggested that the Grande Venezia (Great Venice) could again find its importance and its 
place within the nation. This project had found a leader and developer in Volpi. However, 
Volpi’s Venice was not prisoner of its past. Venice had to regenerate itself through its 
modernisation (Porto Marghera) and providing the tourism industry with a new impulse. 
Volpi acted as mediator between the world of the national politics and Venice’s own 
aspirations of economic revival. In this way, the Venetian manufacturing of cultural 
entertainment was the product of an ambitious programme of economic reform moulded by 
the city’s traditional tourist interests imposed through the directives of the central 
government.
340
 As Longo argued,  
 
the main aim of the ‘Grand Strategy’ was to separate industrial production from the historic city, in 
order to defend its artistic heritage. In more practical terms, the development of a commercial port on 
the one hand and a tourist infrastructure on the other, would serve the economic interests of both 
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Volpi was not only was shareholder of many industrial and financial organisations, among 
the most important being the Società Adriatica di Elettricità (SADE) and the Compagnia 
Italiana dei Grandi Alberghi, a group operating on a global luxury hotels business. He was 
also appointed President of Confindustria (Italian Industrialists Association) in 1934, the year 
which confirmed Volpi as the greater authority in Venice. 1934 was a real turning point for 
Venetian Fascism. Giuriati was dismissed from the role of President of the Chamber of 
Deputies and appointed senator and he left his seat at the Direttorio del Fascismo, and with it 
his role of provincial Fascist. In addition, Suppiej was dismissed the role of federale and 
Volpi facilitated the appointment of his protégé, Michele Pascolato, from who was already 
leader of the OND. Pascolato was a lawyer related to Maria Pezze’ Pascolato, professor and 
pedagogist who had been head of the Venetian fasci femminili and head of the OMNI (Opera 
Nazionale Maternità e Infanzia) in 1927.  
 
       The mid-1930s demonstrated that Fascism was not an impediment to the continuation of 
Volpi’s successful career and project of restructuring Venice. By the 1930s, Volpi had 
established himself as the greater authority in Venice and he was able to assume the credit for 
the successful promotion of the economic interests of the city. This allowed him to access the 
heart of the regime and control all the most important local organisations of the regime: the 
federation with Pascolato, and the comune with Alverà who started his second mandate in 
1935 alongside his deputy Casellati, political plenipotentiary of Volpi’s group. Volpi did not 
stop with the control of the federale and podestà. Since the beginning of the 1930s, he had 
extended his influence over the regime’s agencies, like the Ente Sportivo, managed by 
Alessandro Brass, the OND led by the same federale Pascolato; and the Ente Provinciale per 
il Turismo di Venezia, presided by Ludovico Foscari. These were all people destined to play a 
crucial role in the following years of the regime. Foscari would replace Pascolato in the role 
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of federale in 1937, while Brass would be appointed deputy podestà in 1938, providing 
Volpi’s hegemony with political continuity. Meanwhile, the new generation of Fascist 
notables, protected and favoured by Volpi to lead the major posts of the Fascist parastato, 
was to monopolise all the major positions of the party. Volpi accomplished the final act of his 
hegemony with the acquisition of the Il Gazzettino which started in 1934 and was finalised in 
1939.
342
 It was Farinacci in a letter to Galeazzo Ciano, Minister of the Propaganda, who 





       In the late-1930s, while Volpi was monopolising the economic, cultural and political life 
of Venice, his old opponents were progressively forgotten by the regime. Suppiej, after being 
temporarily appointed deputy national secretary of the PNF in 1939, was dismissed; and he 
regretted to observe to Mussolini that Fascism had “put me aside and defamed me, even 
though I served you and I would like to serve you with all my strenght”.
344
 Suppiej, as well as 
Giuriati, would not play any further decisive role in Venice. Giuriati would end his career as 
senator, while Suppiej, after being considered for the Senate, would conclude his political 





       Volpi’s declaration many years later to the Biennale of Arts committee meeting of 12 
May 1941 was significant. He made this point: 
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 ACS, SPD, b.49, Giorgio Suppiej to Benito Mussolini, 6 December 1939. 
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You know well how my one and only goal was always that of reviving my native town. In the period 
of time between Caporetto and Vittorio Veneto I brought to life the project of Porto Marghera. At 
present, Marghera counts 107 industries, with a capital investment of about 4-5,000 million lire; it 
employs 20,000 workers, and given that for any worker there is a family of three, as a consequence 




The coincidence of political and industrial interests, well represented by Volpi, were essential 
to the development of Marghera. The project of Marghera was seen, firstly by the Liberal 
government, and then by the regime, to serve national interests of industrialisation and 
modernisation of the country. For his part, Volpi’s primary interest had been his own 
business and Volpi knew how to relate national politics to local circumstances. The ‘question 
of Marghera’ and the industrialisation of Venice city will be discussed in the next chapter; 
suffice it to say here that Volpi had found political support for his entrepreneurial aspirations 
in the Fascist regime, regardless of the depths of his ideological commitment. The regime, on 
the other hand, had found a man capable of expanding Fascism’s business and international 
exposure. Volpi reportedly declared: “It is not my fault if my interests happen to meet those 
of the State”.
 347
 This raises the question whether he had been ever committed to Fascism’s 
ideology or whether his alignment with Fascism was first and foremost opportunistic, focused 
on promoting his business interests – a question we will return to below.  
 
       This chapter has argued that the regime made strong efforts to organise, through the 
PNF, an unprecedented numbers of people; yet, it proved incapable of becoming a 
nationalising force. As demonstrated by the role of Volpi, Fascism did not manage to create a 
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new fascistised elite of politician and had to rely upon members of the old elite to ensure the 
control of the periphery. The Venetian case history also demonstrated that the Fascist 
movement achieved a bureaucratic centralisation of its activities, but it never really managed 
to resolve the issue of the contest for local power (beghismo). Patronage and prestige were 
what mattered to provincial Fascist Party leaders, especially for those like Volpi who were 
deeply involved in the economic life of the country. The outcome of the Fascist project was a 
continuing struggle not only between old and new elites, but also between competing actors 
such as the prefect and the federale, and the conclusion is that the provincial based power of 
the local Fascism proved to be stronger than any kind of regime’s totalitarian attempt of 


















2. Protest and repression: the Regime and the Workers’ during 




       This chapter deals with the destruction of the anti-Fascist organisations and clandestine 
propaganda between 1925 and 1934 and highlights the degree to which the political police 
and the other organisations of the state played a crucial role in their repression. This section 
looks at the regime’s strategy to control local anti-Fascism during a period of economic 
challenges such as the Great Depression (1929-1934). The chapter will examine how the 
regime dealt with the negative economic conjuncture and show that Mussolini tried to tackle 
the growing popular dissatisfaction by launching the colonial campaign of Abyssinia in 
October 1935. By extending our discussion to the year 1937 (the year after the victory in 
Abyssinia), it will be demonstrated that the victorious military campaign of Abyssinia did not 
manage to attract significant popular support. In fact, the majority of Venetian people were 
disappointed with the regime as they could not see any significant material improvements to 
their everyday lives. 
 
       Much of this chapter draws its evidence from the files of the Fascist regime’s political 
police. These files include material from prefects, Interior Ministry officials, police and Party 
officials, and secret informers, but also ‘ordinary’ people, private individuals acting as the 
regime’s spies. These sources offer broad temporal, geographical, and social perspectives. 
Documents reveal how political repression evolved over time in Venice province and how it 
adjusted its targets in response to the development of local anti-Fascism and dissent. This 
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chapter will demonstrate how the regime managed to maintain stability through repression 
and a constant surveillance which was accompanied by manufactured propaganda. In 
addition, this part of the research will show that people were often not consenting, but had 
only limited opportunities to express dissatisfaction given the tight control of the regime. 
What the documents show is that large-scale organised dissent was hampered by the regime’s 
policies of control, repression and, where deemed necessary, violence, which were in this 
period pursued by the state rather than by the Fascist squads. 
 
2.1 Breaking the anti-Fascist network: towards the Fascist State (1925–
1931)  
       This section describes the regime’s campaign to suppress anti-Fascist resistance, that of 
the Italian Communist Party in particular, and the consequences suffered by whose 
communities. This chapter will focus on the second half of the 1920s until almost the end of 
the Great Depression in 1932, and will offer an analysis of the evolution of public security 
legislation.  
 
       As we have seen in the previous chapter, between 1925 and 1926, the violence of the 
Fascist squads still represented a big problem for Mussolini. With Farinacci as Party 
Secretary in 1925-1926, Mussolini issued laws and created institutions, under the control of 
the state, able to politically repress any kind of anti-Fascist opposition, wheter from 
Socialists, Communists or Catholics. The repressive activity of the state received a great 
boost after Mussolini escaped an assassination attempt by the young anarchist Anteo 
Zamboni in Bologna in October 1926. The government approved a series of ‘extraordinary 





  The new legislation dissolved all political parties and other anti-
Fascist organisations, introduced a new police code and created the Special Tribunal in 1927 
which strengthened the police’s power to control people, including the use of political 
confinement and censorship of newspapers. With the reform of public security, Fascist 
violence had visibly been incorporated into the state machinery. The consequence of the new 
legislation was that violence remained a central tool in the attempt to spread Fascism as an 
ideology and political practice, but it continued in different forms under the legitimisation of 
the state law. Although Mussolini opposed the radicalisation of the movement between 1925 
and 1926, he continued to rely upon violence, which remained central to Fascist style, 
transforming it into ‘violence of the State’, but with the PNF and MVSN still to playing a 
critical role. As Michael R. Ebner argued, “the Mussolinian economy of violence that 
emerged out of the seizure of power represented a synthesis between the dictator’s strategy of 
carefully calibrated state repression and the squadrist ethos for spontaneous punishment of 
‘internal enemies’”.
349
   
 
       The task of implementing emergency legislation and reorganising the police apparatus 
was largely carried out by Arturo Bocchini. A career Interior Ministry official, Bocchini had 
served as a prefect of Brescia, Bologna and Genoa between 1922 and 1926. He distinguished 
himself in the suppression of the left-wing and Catholic organisations in Brescia (1924) and 
in the breaking of the maritime workers’ union in Genoa (1925). Noticed and then 
recommended by Farinacci and Turati to the Minister of Interior Federzoni for his 
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intelligence, energy and administrative ability, Mussolini appointed Bocchini Chief of Police 
in September 1926.
350
 Bocchini introduced strict directives in order to repress opposition and 
dissent. The two main divisions charged for political repression were the Division of Political 
Police (Divisione polizia politica) and the Division of General and Confidential Affairs 
(Divisione affari generali e riservati). With the total reorganisation of the police under 
Bocchini and the provincial prefectures through the leggi Fascistissime in 1926, the regime 
institutionalised surveillance of and information gathering on its opponents, with the polizia 
politica gathering information on anti-Fascist movements, PNF members, and public opinion. 
The regime developed a vast network of spies on citizens’ activity, which infiltrated anti-
Fascist organisations to watch opponents.
351
  Informers and denouncers were an integral part 
of the repressive apparatus. New research, including that of Mauro Canali and Mimmo 
Franzinelli, has provided concrete evidence of the structure and inner workings of the OVRA, 
the Polpol (polizia politica), and the political policing offices of the questure. Their works 
reveal the ruthlessness of the police under Fascism, but also that the police relied on the 
widespread complicity of spies, informers, and ‘ordinary Italians’ who spontaneously 
denounced their fellow citizens to police authorities. In particular, this research has provided 
considerable archival research and a systematic reconstruction of the Fascist political police 
administration and its network of spies that has been indispensable for historians of Fascism 
to understand how opponents were watched and to find evidence of the complicity of some 
anti-Fascists in the system of informing and political repression.
352
 In addition, In 1927, 
Bocchini set up a secret police organisation called OVRA (Organizzazione per la Vigilanza e 
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la Repressione dell’AntiFascismo). OVRA was assigned to control and stop any anti-Fascist 
activity.  The OVRA became an important tool for Mussolini and his police chief. Not only 
did it allow them to circumvent the authority of the state and party in the provinces, it also 
functioned as a secret and elite corps with a cross-functional team provided by the questure, 
polizia politica and carabinieri which were all collaborating with OVRA and sharing 
informants and territorial resources.
353
 Collaborating with embassies and consulates, OVRA 
and political police were also active in the major centres of anti-Fascist immigration like 
Paris, London and Geneva, monitoring anti-Fascist activity abroad and preventing the re-
building of local cells of anti-Fascism with the return of Communist and socialist leaders to 
Italy. Neighbouring countries like France and Switzerland were monitored at an early stage 
(mid–1920s) of the regime due to the large number of exiles and anti–Fascist organisations 
such as Giustizia e Libertà (Justice and Freedom). OVRA recruited their informants from a 
variety of sectors, but two kinds of informants were largely recruited. Firstly, there were old 
Socialists and Communists who had been sentenced, to whom the OVRA could offer a plea 
bargain and amend mosto of their charges or money in exchange for information. Secondly, 
they could recruit people from people managing public shops such as bars, pubs and taverns. 
Most of the bar owners or shop holders received their business permits from the police, but 
they often had to serve as police informants in exchange.
354
   
 
       The information required by the police was not only related to the potential anti-Fascist 
tendencies or activities of the individual monitored. For the chief of police, prefects, and all 
the hierarchies involved, it was essential to get a complete biography of the person 
investigated, criminal records, details about the style of life, personality, any friendship with 
anti-Fascists or the family situation, because these factors often determined the nature of the 
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punishment. For example, an individual with no previous record, but described to be with 
‘good moral character’ could be treated less harshly than a recalcitrant sovversivo with ‘bad 
moral character’.
355
 The worst case scenario available for an anti-Fascist was the confino di 
polizia (police confinement), a sentence which was usually passed by a provincial 
commission headed by the prefect in the presence of the police chief, senior officers from 
carabinieri and MVSN and a magistrate (procuratore del re). Only occasionally, the federale 
would join the commission.
356
 This would happen when the denunciation came from the 
Party or the Party itself was involved with any of its members. The commission met when, 
following an arrest, the police chief presented the request of confino supported by the result 
of the questura’s investigation. The prefect would sentence someone to confino when the 
individual was involved in collective anti-Fascist activity (nuclei di officina or nuclei di 
strada). Although the measures were applied widely in the first years, Mussolini was 
concerned that foreign governments and domestic forces would perceive the Fascist style of 
rule as exceedingly authoritarian. Moreover, Mussolini was mindful not to make anti-Fascism 
appear to be a mass phenomenon by deporting thousands of Italians.
357
 To reinforce this 
impression of clemency, individual and general amnesties, far more common were the 
individual acts of clemency and the general amnesties were granted by Mussolini on Fascist 
anniversaries or on the occasion of important events. This was a more long-term practice 
which fitted well with Mussolini’s strategy to deliver a conciliatory image of Fascism with 
examples well into the 1930s, such as the amnesty conceded on 25 September 1934 for more 
than 10,000 prisoners. The occasion was the birth of the eldest daughter of Umberto II of 
Italy and Marie-José of Belgium on 24 September 1934. In Venice Province, the amnesty was 
welcomed with pleasure by those detained for political crimes. As the police reported, 
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someone was found singing on the street “long life to the princess, long life to the prince who 
has provided us with a great thing by releasing prisoners like me”.
358
 More pragmatically, the 
worker Antonio Nascimben, employed at the shipyard Breda in Marghera, was hoping that 





       The role of the PNF and the MVSN in repressing dissent and anti-Fascism has been 
controversial. Unlike the Nazi regime, where the state was progressively ‘Nazified’, 
Mussolini normalised the Party and put it under the control of the state. The normalisation of 
the squads proceeded with their integration into a formal military structure which reported 
directly to Mussolini, with the aim to control the autonomy and the violence of the squadristi. 
Mussolini “was unable to renounce the militia as a tangible and living sign of the permanence 
of the Fascist revolution and its attributes of bellicose virility.”
360
  Despite some examples of 
activity against the regime’s opponents, the MVSN never developed into a Fascist political 
police like the Nazi SS. Most of the MVSN reserve force was inactive, its members living as 
simple civilians. In addition, militiamen benefited from their membership with regards to 
discounted rail travel, free public transportation, and free admission to public facilities.
361
 
Curtailed by the late 1920s, the MVSN continued to conduct its own political monitoring 
through provincial investigative offices (UPI) responsible for recruiting informers and 
pursuing investigations into people, but the UPIs reported to the police chief in order to 
formally imprison and charge a suspect. In extraordinary cases, the MVSN were authorised to 
use force and take the suspect to the militia command in a form of pre-detention. The PNF 
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also conducted monitoring and intelligence activities. The surveillance from the Party 
increased in the 1930s alongside Storace’s project to fascistise Italy. Starting from 1935 the 
PNF could count on the Capillary Investigative Units (Organizzazioni capillare 
investigativa), which operated at a local level with the intent to monitor suspects (inside and 
outside the Party) and receive denunciations and complaints from citizens. While the PNF 
and MVSN had an ambiguous and collateral role within this repressive state apparatus, 
Mussolini invested the Interior Ministry and its political police with enormous power. This 
meant that, after Mussolini’s normalisation of the Party, Italians who had experienced the 
violence of the Fascist squads were now subjected to even more powerful terrorism coming 
directly from the state. 
 
2.2 The Destruction of the Anti-Fascist Communities 
       This section will deal with the situation of daily surveillance and intimidation of 
opponents created by the state police after Mussolini’s speech of 3 January 1925 in which he 
took responsibility for the murder of the socialist MP Giacomo Matteotti. This part of the 
research will show how Fascists destroyed the dense anti-Fascist socio-cultural network of 
the province of Venice and how the members of the anti-Fascist parties (predominantly the 
workers’ parties) initially repulsed this attack. In fact, in Venice, as well as in the rest of Italy, 
the anti-Fascists tried to keep the fight alive by entering the world of underground resistance. 
In addition, we will demonstrate how the development of restrictive police measures was also 
beneficial to the regime’s implementation of the Fascist corporatist system.  
 
       After the promulgation of the new legislation on public security, the most important anti-
Fascist leaders were arrested. The experiences of the leaders and militants of the Italian 
Communist Party (PCI) during the years from 1926 to 1934 reveal the difficulties of 
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organising an effective resistance to the regime. Well before 1926, the Fascist squads and 
police had dismantled most of the major anti-Fascist parties and movements – Socialists, 
Republicans, Catholics, Liberal democrats. The exceptional decrees then enabled the regime 
to complete the task by repressing the remnants of such groups within a few months. In some 
provinces of Italy like Venice, the anti-Fascist movement proved to be more resistant. 
Differently from other areas of Italy, where the anti-Fascist movement was completely 
disabled before 1926, in Venice province, the major workers’ organisations such as the 
Communist Party (PCI), the Socialist Party (PSI), the Republican Party, Italia Libera society, 
and the Italian Federation of Workers (FILIL) were still active in September 1925 even if 




       The situation worsened immediately after fifteen-year-old Anteo Zamboni’s failed 
assassination attempt on Mussolini in October 1926.
363
 Among the anti-Fascists, only the 
Communists would manage to survive and rebuild in subsequent years, although PCI leaders, 
cadres, and militants were arrested and prosecuted. The Ministry of the Interior had already 
been informed in December 1925 by the MVSN High Command that the “new Communist 
systems of organisation … [were] corresponding to the lines and directives drawn in the last 
V Congress of the Third International held in Moscow in March of the current year”.
364
 The 
prefect of Venice Iginio Coffari reported that although the local Communist Party was being 
dissolved at the behest of the Questura and with the prefecture decree of 15 January 1925,  it 
was to be believed that the Venetian section was still in existence but without having stable 
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headquarters and without organising official meetings.
365
 The prefect’s note was not limited 
to a general observation of what was happening. He was also able to inform the Minister 
about the names of the major Venetian Communist leaders like Ignio Borin. Borin was sent to 
confinement to Favignana island (near Sicily) in 1926 and then to Ponza island and 
Ventotene after 1937. Borin would remain in Ventotene until 1943, and when released, he 
would join the resistance in Venice, being the partisan leader of the ‘First Brigade Gramsci’ 
against the Germans in the area of Chioggia and Riviera del Brenta.
366
 The repression of the 
anti-Fascist organisations was pursued by the fascistissimo prefect Iginio Coffari who was 
appointed in 1925 under Farinacci in order to replace Angelo Pesce, the Neapolitan prefect 
who had been accused in 1922, as prefect of Naples, of being an ‘anti-Fascist’ and still 




       The Venetian prefecture was a fundamental element of the fascist system of repression at 
local level. Thanks to the prefecture, the Fascist government came to know that the workers’ 
parties, in particular the Communist Party, had abandoned the territorial movement based on 
public propaganda. Given that the regime put the Communists outside the law, they replaced 
the traditional system with one based on clandestine propaganda relying upon cells based in 
factories (cellule di officina) and shops (cellule di strada) in order to safeguard the 
movement.
368
 Therefore, in Venice province, most of these activities were not conducted in 
permanent headquarters, but instead, major socialists’ and Communists’ meetings took place 
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on militants’ boats at sea, and occasionally inside shops of local supporters.
369
 As a secret 
informer’s note reported, the Communist re-organisation of the cells was promoted by 
Moscow and it included a structure based on a triangular figure. This meant the cell had to be 
built on a minimum number of three people with a cell leader (secretary). Each member of 
the trianglular cell was oblidged to find two other people to create another cell to be linked to 
the main one (see the picture attached). Each secretary of the cell was responsible for the 
functioning of the cell itself. The cell (triangle) which was the seed of subsidiary ones, had 
more political responsibility than those that originated from it. In addition, the system had to 
satisfy the following conditions: secrecy, proliferation and the prevention of identification by 
the police. According to the informer, the system was effective in the Balkans, but it 
possessed notorious deficiencies due to the over-exaggerated hierarchical reporting line. In 
Italy, this system proved to be efficient and met the requirements requested by Lev Kamenev 
for the worldwide organisation of the Communist movement.
370
 As confirmed by the prefect 
in September 1925, the Venetian Communist Party had embraced a Russian brand of 
Communism by clandestinely establishing permanent subversive Communist cells within the 
metallurgical factories of the City of Venice. Therefore, Communist fiduciaries could still 
propagandise “among the mass of workers with the scope of proselytising and raising funds 
for ‘red assistance’ and Communist newspapers”.
371
 The new Venetian clandestine 
Communist sections merged with the youth group called Karl Marx and in some cases, took 
over leadership. This was not unusual. With each wave of arrests, new, often younger 
militants stepped up to take the place of jailed comrades. Between 1925 and 1926 the 
Venetian Communist opposition was deprived of its major leaders: Elia Musatti, Giacinto 
Serratti and Girolamo Li Causi fled the province, while Riccardo Ravagnan and Iginio Perini 
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escaped to France, and Iginio Borin was sent to confinement. The left-wing parties were 
greatly thinned not only by the departure of the major Communist leaders, but also by the 
confinement of the major revolutionary socialist leaders, like Angelo Galeno who was very 
active among farmers and metal workers. Galeno had managed to establish socialist cells in 
the metallurgical factories of Giudecca and Marghera (Breda), which meant that the socialist 
fiduciaries of FIOM (the left-wing trade union of metal workers) could still spread 
propaganda to convince the workers to leave the national Fascist Trade Unions and return to 




       As the left-wing British newspaper The New Leader reported in the article ‘Party of 
Matteotti rallies against Fascism’, “the cavalry of [the Italian] working-classes is more than 
ever the painful reality which agonizes the world and which no political party which claims 
to be Socialist, can ever forget”.
373
 From 1926, the patterns of repression established during 
six years of squad violence continued under the police state, especially directed at the 
destruction of the working-class. The police activity of monitoring anti-Fascist organisations 
was even more intense as Venice was located near the border with the Yugoslavia, with the 





       The emergency decrees of 1926 marked the definitive institutional rupture between the 
Liberal constitutional order and the new Fascist police state. The public security code 
curtailed individual rights and subordinated them to the interests of the state. The new law 
gave the state authorities the right to intervene in an unlimited series of public and private 
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situations in order to align people with the Fascist ideology. This means that police could 
aggressively control vast sectors of people’s lives such as popular opinion, economic 
activities, employment, and other areas of national life. Documents related to the file 
Associazioni per provincia 1926-1934 for the Venice province provide us with an interesting 
insight of the wide activity in which the police apparatus was involved. The political police 
monitored a large number of associazioni (associations), charities and ex-combatants’ groups 
possessing local political influence or deeply involved in Venetian politics. With regards to 
Venice, the personnel of the questure censored mail, recruited informants, performed 
interrogations, made arrests, monitored the Fascist Party and labour syndicates, conducted 
surveillance on suspects and ex-political detainees. Yet, the prefect and questore needed 
approval from Rome to sentence an individual to confinement; police could arrest, detain, 
and assign political probation without any authorisation from a court or the Interior Ministry 
in Rome. The new legislation increased the control over the press and therefore it was not 
unusual that even the Venetian Circolo della Stampa (Press Club), led by Gino Damerini, the 
filofascist director of La Gazzetta di Venezia, was subjected to meticulous control of the 
prefect after 1927.
375
 The deputy president of this circle was Giuseppe Toffano, a first hour 
Fascist, and most of the members were pro-Fascist; but this seems not to have been enough to 
avoid monitoring by the police. An even clearer example that the new regime had no 
inhibitions in prosecuting even high-raking officials and Fascists with considerable 
credentials was that the newly appointed Minister of Finance, Giuseppe Volpi, was under 
investigation as President of the Venetian section of the Rotary Club. The prefecture could 
rely upon the full list of members who were described by the prefect as notable members of 
the Fascist Party (with the exception of the American consul James Barclay Young and the 
English man Alan Napier). As reported by the document, the Venetian rotarini,  (members of 
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the Rotary Club) used to meet at the Hotel Danieli every Tuesday in order to discuss local 
and national industrial and commercial affairs as they predominantly belonged to the 
economic elite which owned interests in the most important commercial and maritime 
industries of Venice and Italy.
376
 The shadow of the regime not only covered the anti-Fascist 
organisations and eminent personalities, but also a variety of crucial sectors of the Venetian 
life such as irredentism and culture. To confirm this, the documents clearly show that the 
regime was following all the local major organisations formed by former veterans and 
irredentists like the association of War volunteers
377
 and the local Pro-Dalmatia association 
which had been joined by former veterans, Libyan volunteers, arditi and Fascist students.
378
 
Culture was not to avoid the monitoring of the regime and groups of intellectuals such as the 
Circolo della Fiamma managed by the Fascist student Francesco Pasinetti, who would be 





       The breaking of the anti-Fascist organisations and communities was not purely pursued 
for political reason. It also supported the Fascist reform of the labour market initiated in 
October 1925 with the Pact of the Vidoni Palace which was signed between Fascist workers 
syndicates and the regime. The pact completely changed the perspective of the anti-Fascist 
resistance. According to the new laws the only legal way of representing workers was 
through the Fascist trade unions.  Although there was no legal obligation on the part of the 
workers to join them, the reality was that they were still obliged to pay union fees and agree 
with the unions’ decisions, despite the fact that the leaders did not represent the workers, but 
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instead were often members of the upper class and ideologically aligned to Fascism.
380
 In 
addition, as we will see in the following section of this chapter, the political significance of 
the workers’ movement was further curtailed by the abolition of the right to strike and a 
restrictive Fascist-enforced wage policy.  
 
       The purpose of this legislation was to further weaken the working class, but also to 
launch off the ground the Fascist corporative system. The 1926 syndical legislation was not 
crucial in launching off the Fascist system which fervent corporatists such as Giuseppe 
Bottai, Junior  Minister of the Corporations, had conceived as a unitary body able to manage 
and coordinate all the partied involved in production, from the employers to the workers  and 
the managerial staff.
381
 In fact, the corporatist system was greatly developed only in response 
to the Great Depression in the late 1920s and early 1930s as the non-Communist alternative 
to the state of crisis. The regime implemented the plan initiated in 1926 with the creation of 
the National Council of Corporations in 1930. The Council of Corporations grouped 
employers and workers’ representativeness in order to discuss the main areas of the economy 
and had them represented on an executive Central Corporative Committee.  
The Fascist syndicate certainly contributed to the monitoring of workers and to the 
denunciation of all those workers who were members of the subversive network. However, 
the campaign to break the anti-Fascist network was made very difficult in those areas of Italy 
where numbers of ordinary people hostile to Fascism were offering support to opposition 
activities. Resistance was common in areas which had been involved in defending their 
communities with the Arditi del popolo and setting up barricades and taking arms against the 
Fascist squads during the Biennio Rosso (1919-1920). The establishment of the dictatorship 
                                                 
380
 C. Giordano, G. Piga, G. Trovato, ‘Fascist price and wage policies, and Italy’s industrial Great Depression’ 
in Macroeconomics Dynamics (2004), 689-720. 
381
 Morgan, ‘“The Party is Everywhere”’, 86. 
162 
 
meant the persecution of those communities where a general subversive tradition persisted. In 
Venice city, for example, the Fascist efforts were directed at controlling the quarters of S. 
Polo, S. Croce, Castello and Giudecca, in which the families had been sympathetic to 
Socialism and had formed an invaluable stronghold for the socialist resistance during the 
Biennio Rosso. These communities continued to help the anti-Fascist movement in secret, 
providing Communists and socialists with support (soccorso rosso). It was in these quarters 
of Venice that red flags and anti-Fascist slogans like ‘Abbasso Mussolini’ (Down with 
Mussolini!), ‘Viva il Comunismo’ (Hurrah for Communism!) and ‘Viva la Russia’ (Hurrah 




        The regime focused also on destroying all those workers’ organisations which 
represented a source of economic financing and fund-raising for the anti-Fascists, in 
particular for the Communist Party. For instance, the prefect of Venice reported that the well-
known Communist Arturo Brustolon, administrator of the syndicate of wood workers, was 
jailed because he financed a strike in Verona in 1926 with the funds of the syndicate.
383
 
Another example is the syndicate for construction workers which had to support its members 
during periods of unemployment and sickness. The syndicate was formed of: 
 
… people belonging to the ranks of Communists and maximalist socialists. … [The syndicate] counts 
on 350 members and the president, a Communist propagandist, frequently meets the members and he 
delivers, in defiance of the questura, Communist propaganda which is really harmful for the workers, 
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In certain quarters of Venice city, the subversive tradition was never completely eradicated, 
but only destroyed in its official forms like the workers’ unions. As Ebner argued, the 
‘breaking of the anti-Fascist communities’ sometimes had to pass through an urban 
redevelopment of the workers’ quarters in order to destroy bonds of class solidarity.
385
 
Venice represented one of the most significant examples of this strategy. The occasion was 
presented by the development of the new industrial district of Marghera. Between 1920 and 
1945 the port of Marghera experienced large-scale industrialisation within a short time that 
established a populous factory proletariat in an area where none had existed earlier. Although 
the plans had been set up during the Liberal era, the above-mentioned transformation indeed 
occurred during the period of the Fascist regime. According to the original plans, the scheme 
for Marghera would have meant drawing on Venetian skilled workers employed in the major 
factories of the city centre, those situated in the popular red quarters of Castello and 
Giudecca. Most had taken part in the Biennio Rosso. Under the clever direction of Giuseppe 
Volpi, the industrialists manoeuvred to recruit the overwhelming majority of their workforce 
among members of the Venetian peasantry as they wanted to hire people with no experience 
of class struggle whatsoever. As a result, only the fertiliser plants of Breda and Montecatini 
employed workers coming from the city centre, but the most combative elements, the former 
Arsenalotti (workers of the Arsenale) were very much a minority of the work force working 
in Marghera during the period 1924-1945. Industrialists, alongside the Fascist minister of 
Finance Volpi, did not provide strongholds of what was perceived to be ‘old subversives’ 
with any opportunities to preserve their communities and continue their ideological 
resistance.
386
 Although repression was the main means to disrupt workers’ networks, in 
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Marghera, the government adopted the alternative method of the physical separation of the 
working-class community and the recruitment of a new working class. Industrialists and 
government took great care to ensure to employ adaptable, consistent, and disciplined people 
by hiring peasant men and women from the rural hinterland. Peasants commuted between 
factories and fields. This meant that they remained closely tied with the land, lived in 
essentially rural settings, and retained a moderately rural mentality and culture.
387
 In addition, 
the production system of the new factories in Marghera was based on the division between 
skilled and unskilled labour, which exposed workers to a high turnover and did not allow 
them to form a homogeneous and cohesive mass of workers.
388
 The new system implemented 
in Marghera isolated the old subversives, causing ideological disorientation within the local 
working class, and above all, it also triggered a feeling of resignation among them. Red flags, 
graffiti, and other symbols still occasionally appeared in Venice, but the police and local 
Fascists were quickly able to identify the authors and repress such behaviour.
389
 
Consequently, the working class was temporarily neutralised as a political force. Some 
members of the older generation attempted to keep the fight alive, but the overwhelming 
majority of the workers, especially those ones of the ‘new generation’, had become largely 
immune to the influence of the Biennio Rosso.
390
 Reconstituting the PCI network after 1931 
became difficult, as the social cohesion of Venice disintegrated and ordinary people, who 
disliked the regime and sympathised with the PCI (even if they were not formally affiliated 
with it), felt constantly harassed and controlled. However, after operating as an underground 
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organisation for several years, the Communist Party had managed to develop a robust 
clandestine network. Approximately 1,000 Communists were in captivity, however the 
Central Committee calculated that, as of May 1927, about 5,000 militants were still operating 




2.3 The Effectiveness of Fascist Policy from the Great Depression to the 
End of the Abyssinian War (1929-1937) 
       So far we have concentrated primarily on working class repression. The second part of 
this chapter will be devoted to the analysis of the reactions of the population to the economic 
and social policies the regime was implementing. The period we have been looking at here — 
from broadly 1929–30 until 1937, the year that followed the victory of the war of Abyssinia 
in May 1936 — corresponds to the period that Renzo De Felice defined as the ‘years of 
consensus’. For De Felice the regime was not facing consistent problems which could 
undermine its existence.
392
 We can generally agree with De Felice’s statement. However, this 
interpretation requires a great deal of qualification which clearly involves an understanding of 
the nature of this supposed consensus. We have chosen this time frame to check how the 
Great Depression affected Italians, what the government did to help, how the regime 
controlled people, and to verify if the victorious Abyssinian campaign constituted a mean of  
propaganda to convey mass support at local level.  
 
       The main problem faced by historians when looking at a dictatorial regime is to know 
how many voluntarily accepted the legitimacy of the regime itself. In a dictatorship opinions 
are never freely expressed, free discussion is restricted and power is achieved and maintained 
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through violence. Therefore, it was crucial that the regime should indoctrinate Italians 
through propaganda about the positive results achieved by the dictatorship and make sure that 
the population reacted positively to it. Mandatory involvement in the regime’s activity could 
not be avoided and people were obliged to cooperate with the regime. If necessary, they had 
to behave as ‘true believers’. But what kind of feeling was the secret police able to capture at 
local level? The main mood of the population was a general apathy and tiredness provoked 
by the regime’s protocols of regimentation, rather than a popular consensus that would imply 
a favourable attitude towards the local Party. It is possible to see an initial sense of growing 
disjunction around 1929-30. Despite Mussolini’s apparent success and the elaborate 
propaganda machinery portraying him in heroic terms, the experiences of the population at 
the time were far removed from the images of Italy’s greatness and success. Discontent was 
linked to the Party and often to the economic crisis (Great Depression) which was gripping 
Italy as well as most parts of Europe. The crisis developed in Italy after the revaluation of the 
lira in 1926–7 and worsened the Italian economy until the Wall Street crisis of 1929, reaching 
its peak in 1931. Living standards of the working class started declining only in the middle of 
the Great Depression, but they had been deteriorating since the imposition of the new 
exchange rate Quota Novanta in 1927.
393
 With the establishment of the new currency rate the 
Fascist economy needed the systematic support of banks to supply defaulting companies and 
factories with financial backup.
394
 The new exchange rate Quota 90 meant adjustments in 
national wages and the inflation increased.
395
 Workers were compelled to accept a significant 
decline in real wages in 1927 and 1930. The regime’s measures to cut salaries particularly 
affected women’s salaries, to which the government imposed a drastic 50 % reduction in 
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 Reductions in wages, high cost of living, and unemployment provoked a pearl 
workers’ strike in Venice in 1927;
397
 and in the spring of the same year the attempt from a 
group of unemployed women of Chioggia to occupy the headquarters of the local council.
398
 
Female employment was often portrayed negatively in Fascist propaganda and was singled 
out as one of the main causes of men’s poor employment prospects.
399
 According to 
Mussolini, work was essentially for men and he considered it as the root cause of women 
becoming sterile.
400
 The regime’s attempt to ban women from work was in order to restrict 
middle class women’s access to intellectual and public employment – with the specific aim of 
re-establishing the gender hierarchies broken down during the First World War.
401
 These 
policies were also motivated by the perceived necessity to increase the Italian birth rate. 
While boys would be educated to become Fascist warriors, girls would grow up to be Fascist 
mothers. With this aim, Mussolini introduced the ‘Battle for Births’ alongside all the other 
similar ‘economic battles’. As Carl Ipsen stated, the Battle for Births had to demonstrate  
 
to the world Italy’s relative youth and virility, its demographic advantage relative to France, 
Britain, and Germany. The examples of rapidly-growing Slavic and US populations instead 
posed a double threat and source of concern. Evidently Mussolini’s policy had come just in time 
to arrest a process of demographic decline (first as a result of emigration and then lower 
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In fact, the regime’s birth rate campaign did not produce the expected results.
403
 Unlike the 
Battle for Grain or the Land Reclamation Campaign (bonifiche), which were considered to be 
moderately successful, the Campaign for Births was a failure. Marriage rates remained 
constant during Mussolini’s regime, and birth rates decreased until 1936, after which there 
was a modest increase.
404
 In addition, while women were expected to stay at home, raising 
large numbers of children as part of a ‘patriotic mission’, Fascism could not prevent them 
from finding employment as they had done in Liberal Italy. Women were found in a wide 
range of occupations, but predominantly in domestic work. In Venice, women were 
employed in domestic service, but also in industry such the pearl manufacturing, the clothing 
industry and artisanal shops.
405
 During the interwar period female employment saw only a 
partial decline, clearly ascribable to the economic crisis and the high number of dismissals 
that hit the female workforce.
406
 It is also surprising to record strikes promoted by women
407
 
in a province where employed women had been committed to Catholic and conservative 
organisations, totally adverse to class struggle.
408
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       The Great Depression led also to the collapse of the Italian bank system and the crisis 
involved those major banks which were extensively involved in rescuing Italian industry. 
Between 1930 and 1931, the two major Italian banks, the Credito Italiano the Banca 
Commerciale, were declared insolvent. There was a substantial degree of tension inside the 
government as the regime saw the Banca Commerciale as the major source of investments for 
the country.
409
  The crisis also involved the Venetian local banking system which was 
predominantly based on member-owned financial cooperatives (Catholic and not), controlled 
by its members which operated for the purpose of promoting savings and providing credit at 
competitive rates and other financial services such as health insurance or pensions. The idea 
behind the cooperative banks was not only to provide credit, but also to promote the 
development of the local community. For this reason, there was a high degree of cooperation 
between these institutions and their members. The Venetian case is interesting as the general 
crisis of the national bank system almost led to the collapse of some important Venetian 
cooperative banks. For example, the debt of the Opera Nazionale Combattenti (ONC) was 
restructured by the regime.
410
 The safeguarding of the ONC’s credit was particularly 
important for the regime as many of its ex-combatant members had joined Fascism in its 
early days. The organisation was principally focused on the re-placement of the army 
veterans into the labour market, providing them with mortgages and insurances at favourable 
prices. For instance, the ONC was able to provide training to army veterans, and various 
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With regard to the major local credit institutes, the situation was problematic. The Banca 
Popolare Cooperativa of Chioggia opted for a merger with the large national bank institute 
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro. The decision was taken as with the progressing of the crisis and 
the spreading news of a possible collapse of the bank, the account holders were withdrawing 
their money, closing their accounts.
412
 In 1930, the Venetian Cassa di Risparmio had to 
refund the account holders for an overall amount of 12,895.000 lire, closing 981 accounts and 
experiencing a total loss of 18 million lire. Rumours about the potential collapse of the 
Credito Veneto e Polesano convinced the fishermen of Chioggia to close all their accounts.
413
 
By December 1930 the Credito Veneto had already sold its investments portfolio and 
converted its debt to promissory notes.
414
 The wide local Catholic financial network was not 
immune from the crisis and most of the local Catholic credit cooperatives were close to 
collapse. Only the direct intervention of the government prevented the default of the Catholic 
Banca delle Tre Venezie, as its collapse would have brought “incalculable consequences to 
the economy of the city”.
415
 In addition to the rescue of the Italian banks, the regime was 
involved in several industrial recovery operations. The most important for the province of 
Venice was that one which led the telecommunications company Telve to be acquired by the 
national Banca Commerciale, traditionally affiliated to Volpi’s group.
416
 After the experience 
of the Great Depression, which involved the government in numerous industrial recovery 
activities, the regime decided to create the Institute for Industrial Reconstruction (IRI), an 
Italian public holding established in 1933 in order to rescue, restructure, and fund defaulting 
banks and companies.
417
 The regime’s response to the Great Depression and the collapse of 
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the Italian banking system was interesting for a series of reasons. Firstly, Italy was one of the 
countries most committed to the Gold Standard, even in the presence of a chronic balance of 
payments deficit. Secondly, industrial relations were governed by a corporatist system 
controlled by the regime. Thirdly, the corporative system and the systematic intervention of 
the state, favoured the positive management of the panics and bank runs that characterised the 




       The Great Depression represented both an opportunity and a test for the regime; and 
within the Italian scenario, the Venice Province presents an interesting case history. Although 
the regime was relatively successful in bank salvages, providing a distinctively original 
response to the crisis, conversely it was rather inefficient in tackling unemployment. The 
unemployment rate doubled between April 1930 and April 1931. In 1931, the number of 
people unemployed reached a peak of 23,000. The city of Venice contributed with an overall 
number of 14,000 unemployed workers which amounted to 60.8 percent of the total number 
for the province. Unemployment became so severe during the Great Depression that it 
required extensive security measures such as detaining workers in temporary camps in 
Marghera.
419
 As Fabrizio Mattesini argued, “the intense deflationary process …. was not 
followed by a complete adjustment of nominal variables. This was true especially for wages 
…. This nominal rigidity was partially responsible for the output contraction”.
420
 Research on 
the Great Depression suggests “that increasing barriers to trade, together with real wage 
rigidities, can explain a large proportion of the economic downturn experienced by Italy at 
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       During the period of the Great Depression the regime was unable to tackle 
unemployment consistently and the crisis could potentially trigger the re-formation of 
Communist cells in the industrial factories. The period of the most robust clandestine anti-
Fascist activity in Italy was from 1930 to 1933 when the effects of the Great Depression 
provoked widespread social unrest. In this period there were a number of trials of anti-Fascist 
individuals and groups, including those in Venice. On a number of occasions, the old 
generation of sovversivi, the small ‘nucleo’ (nucleus) at the Breda factory in Marghera, which 
had led the workers’ movement during the ‘Biennio Rosso’, tried to prompt the younger 
generation to demonstrate. An example can be found in December 1930, when an ‘old 
subversive’ (words of the writer) led 300 unemployed industrial workers of Marghera to 





       Although agricultural production was not affected as significantly as industrial 
production by the Great Depression, agricultural labourers also displayed similar discontent 
towards the regime’s policies and this involved specific criticism of the Fascist syndicates. A 
clear example of criticism towards the Fascist syndicates was provided by a document which 
recounted the attempt made by the Venetian fiduciary of the Fascist Agrarian Syndicate, 
Vincenzo Bortoluzzi, to avoid the land expropriation of a local tenant, Edmondo Bodi in the 
island of Cavallino in June 1930. The expropriation was announced after Bodi was found 
guilty of having broken contractual conditions by not paying the rent for the land. Local 
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syndicates had previously denounced the high rate of the contracts that the Società Agricola 
del Cavallino had imposed on its local tenants; and the local community of tenants consisting 
of around 500 tenants had repeatedly protested in order to adjust their agreement with the 
company. When Bortoluzzi arrived at the place to support the instances of the local tenants, 
he found them openly expressing their hostility towards the police and the Societa’ Agricola 
del Cavallino. Even though Bortoluzzi requested that intervention of the national secretary of 
the Fascist Agrarian Syndicate, Luigi De Castri, could intervene, the Venetian fiduciary was 
dismissed with the accusation of exhorting farmers to complain against the company without 
supporting the intervention of the police.
423
 This example shows how weak the position of the 
Fascist syndicate was with regard to negotiations with employers. During the Fascist regime, 
employers used to bypass syndicates, being aware that Mussolini was not inclined to break 
his alliance with industrialists and the business supporters of the regime.
424
 The general 
picture given by Fascist syndicates was that they tried to implement ‘class collaboration’, 
disrupting collective solidarity in order to prevent the re-formation of a large workers’ 
network. Between 1926 and 1928 Fascist syndicates made also an attempt to denounce the 
abuses committed by employers, but they never managed to establish themselves as a serious 
stakeholder to counterbalance the predominant role of the employers in negotiations and 
labour affairs. In addition, employers and the Fascist Party never intended to allow the re-
establishment of a strong labour organisation, and therefore the role of the Fascist syndicate 
was essentially focused on exercising surveillance over workers.  
 
       The intention behind Fascist agricultural policy was that the regime wanted to reduce the 
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predominance of farm labourers in the countryside throughout Italy in favour of 
sharecropping. However, with regards to the province of Venice, Fascist agricultural laws did 
not solve the problem of the massive presence of day labourers. In some depressed areas such 
as Cavarzere and Cona, the Fascist legislation that increased the contracted power of 
employers, still favoured internal migration of day labourers looking for better working 
conditions and higher wages.
425
 Mussolini did not make immediate changes to the 
institutional framework of Italian agriculture, and despite the passing of an act in 1923 
concerning land reclamation it was only in the late 1920s that the regime devised a unified 
programme of reclamation.
426
 Mussolini’s law of 1928 on integral reclamation favoured 
investments of private bodies such as cooperative societies, financial groups such as the 
Banca Commerciale, one of the largest banks of the time, and land reclamation companies. 
These privately-owned companies often defaulted, and the living standards of peasant 
workers did not improve. Moreover, companies, Party members and fascist syndicalists were 
often denounced for corruption. It was not unusual for the government to be sometimes 
considered as the ‘profiteer of the peasantry’.
427
  
 The leader of the Italian Communist Party Palmiro Togliatti (1893–1964) saw in the creation 
of the syndicate an opportunity to penetrate the institutions of Fascism and to create a 
network between anti-Fascism and masses.
428
 Togliatti admitted that the main mistake had 
been  
 
not to understand in time that we could and should have taken advantage of every legal and semi-legal 
opportunity still allowed by the Italian situation. It was necessary to utilise the fascist unions to 
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disseminate basic demands (the right to elect workers’ commissions, the observance of agreements, a 





Born into a middle-class family in Genoa, Togliatti joined the Italian Socialist Party before 
the First World War. He served as a volunteer officer during the First World War. He helped 
to found the PCI following the schism in the Italian Socialist Party at the Congress of Livorno 
in 1921. Togliatti became a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 
1924 and while he was representing the party in a meeting in Moscow in 1926, Mussolini’s 
Fascist government outlawed the PCI and arrested all the other leading Communists, 
including Antonio Gramsci. Togliatti became PCI Secretary in 1927 and he remained in 
exile, organising the PCI clandestinely for nearly twenty years. On his return to Italy in 1944 
Togliatti led the PCI in the Svolta di Salerno (the Salerno Turn), joining the government of 
national unity led by Marshal Pietro Badoglio.
430
 Togliatti and other eminent figures of anti-
Fascism such as Eugenio Curiel, an Italian physicist from a Jewish family who 
became a member of the clandestine Communist Party in Venice and then founder of the 
Youth Front (Communist Youth), murdered by the Fascists in February 1945, developed the 
strategy of lavoro legale (legal way), exhorting comrades to join Fascist organisations in 
order to penetrate its institutions and remain in contact with the masses.
431
 The clandestine 
resistance was to complement a ‘legal resistance’ in which the PCI was to take advantage of 
all ‘legal’ opportunities offered by the regime, such as joining the fascist syndicates or other 
influential positions within the regime’s organisations.
432
 Curiel worked as a contributor of 
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the magazine Il Bò, the newspaper of the GUF of the University of Padua, and wrote articles 
about syndicalism, thus facilitating the penetration of some anti-Fascist elements within the 
editorial staff of the magazine.  
 
       A boost to the Communist Party is visible in 1932, with the number of clandestine 
militants reaching the number of 10,000. However, Communist cells were easily broken up 
by the police, which decreased their number to 3,000 in the middle of the 1930s. Workers 
protests were frequent among the Italian workers during the Great Depression. The reason of 
the protests was mainly due to the material conditions of the working class. However, they 
were not compromising the stability of the regime. Therefore, the chance of rebuilding the 
working-class network never materialised.
433
 As we have seen in the previous paragraphs, the 
Fascist repression in Italy was very effective, even if mainly limited to preventive detention 
or forcing employees to continue working, and in rare cases the prefect ordered the arrest or 
confinement of the convicts. In Germany, the level of repression was higher. The industrial 
workforce in Germany was constantly subject to surveillance, intimidation by the Nazi 
authorities and pressure of the police state.
434
 Workers were banned from work or from other 
forms of welfare available to the German population.
435
 In addition, whereas the general 
standard of living for the German population at the end of the 1930s could be considered, as 
Timothy Mason argued, a ‘flourishing consumerist economy’ with a reasonable increase of 
food consumption and luxury goods, there was no sign of such improvement in Italy 
whatsoever. 
  
       Popular opinion seems to have changed to some extent during late 1932 and 1933. This 
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was a result of a slow climb out of economic crisis. Apparently, the change in trend of 
popular opinion was not only due to the progressive passing of the harsh period of the crisis, 
but also because the PCI entered a period of dormancy and even local propaganda became 
easily identifiable and effectively repressed. In addition, the regime not only repressed the 
Communist Party (PCI), but also the ‘Justice and Liberty’ movement. The anti-Fascist 
organisation Giustizia e Libertà (GL) was founded in Paris in 1929 by the anti-Fascists Carlo 
Rosselli, Emilio Lussu, Alberto Tarchiani, and Ernesto Rossi. Mainly formed by exiled 
intellectuals in Paris, GL organised the resistance against Italian Fascism between 1929 and 
1945, forming clandestine groups in Italy and setting up an intense propaganda campaign. 
The strengthening of the regime’s grip on Giustizia e Libertà is confirmed also by a large 
investigation on one of its leaders operating in Venice, the engineer Domenico Pastorello 
who, according to the prefecture, “does not miss any occasion to carry out anti-national 
propaganda and demonstrate his aversion to Fascism and his rebellion to the authority”.
436
 As 
the political police had already reported in April 1933, a ‘reliable’ informer who attended a 
meeting with Carlo Rosselli and Claudio Cianca, came to know that Pastorello was the 
Venetian fiduciary of GL. Carlo Rosselli (1899-1937) , the founding father of Giustizia e 
Libertà, was one of the most influential of antifascist intellectuals in Europe. He was born 
into a wealthy Tuscan Jewish family and he had a successful career as a professor of political 
economics. Rosselli was a reformist, a Liberal Socialist (non-Marxist) theorist who had been 
inspired by the British Labour movement. He took part to the Spanish Civil War fighting on a 
Republican side. Rosselli devoted most of his life to fight against Fascism. He established the 
first underground antifascist newspaper Non Mollare (Don’t give in!) in 1925. He was 
imprisoned by the regime for his subversive political activities and after his escape, he found 
refuge in Paris becoming the mind behind the political movement based in France ‘Justice 
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and Liberty’. Rosselli was one of Mussolini’s most feared anti-Fascist leaders. He was 
assassinated on Mussolini’s order alongside his brother Nello in France in June 1937.
437
 
Claudio Cianca (1913-2015) was a partisan who took part in the resistance firstly within the 
framework of Giustizia e Libertà and then in the Communist Garibaldi Brigade. During the 
resistance, Cianca joined the Communist Party for which he was elected MP in the Chamber 
of Deputies in 1953.
438
 Pastorello reported hierarchically to Cianca and would have 
communicated with him through boats which serviced the Croatian coast of Dalmatia and 
Fiume.
439
 Unlike the other GL divisions which predominantly operated from abroad, namely 
from France, as confirmed by the police in January 1934, Pastorello “never travelled 
abroad”.
440
 Pastorello was in charge of a division which had to maintain relations with those 
anti-Fascists who were actively operating in the Yugoslavia coast. 
 
       Police surveillance and PNF vigilance largely tackled the majority of the well-known 
anti-Fascists and anti-Fascism entered a phase of almost impossible resistance. Even 
activities like discussing politics in taverns or restaurants, or telling jokes, led to arrest and 
confinement. The Venetian prefect also ascribed the turnaround of the popular opinion to a 
changed situation within the party. As we have seen in the previous chapter between 1929 
and 1934, the Venetian Party had achieved a political balance which provided it with an 
apparent stability with Suppiej playing a more independent role (from Giuriati) and with 
Volpi finally achieving the full control of the Venetian PNF. This situation was the basis of 
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Suppiej’s success, because it meant that internal divisions were no longer producing 
paralysis. The federale succeeded as the head of the comitato intersindacale to negotiate 




       In the second part of the chapter we are using records of the police which are an excellent 
source as they provide us with first-hand information of what was happening on the ground. 
However, they are an unrepresentative source because of their tendency to concentrate on 
dissent with virtually nothing on consent, as they are records of an organisation tasked with 
punishing protest. However, if it is enthusiasm that we are looking for in the police records 
— even if in a dictatorial environment — then the Fascist conquest of Ethiopia between 
October 1935 and May 1936 would seem to be the right place to look. The war represented 
the moment that saw the greatest spirit of unity between the regime and the population. It 
moved Fascist Italy into an international arena, raising expectations of greatness among all 
sectors of Italian society. The Ethiopian crisis and the military campaign need to be seen in 
the context of the situation described above, which was of considerable economic depression 
for the Italian economy.  What is clear from the documents is that the population had much 
more pressing problems nearer home in the months leading to the Ethiopian campaign. 
People were not satisfied by what the regime had achieved so far and the war was not a 
priority for the Venetians. As reported by the Fascist syndicate of industry, people thought 
that it was becoming “useless to turn to the job centre to find a job, ridiculing the Fascist 
welfare system”.
442
 A particular place of honour in this trend of disaffection has to be 
reserved for the Fascist militia— the MVSN. People often reacted to Fascist arrogance 
because of the arrogance of the members of the militia. As a Breda worker argued discussion 
with colleagues, the Milizia stradale “was giving so many tickets to kill people financially 
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and in order to fatten up those pigs in Rome”.
443
 Workers did not want to be associated with 
“the Italy of Mussolini, but instead, with the one of [the King] Vittorio Emanuele”.
444
 It also 
happened that large-scale demonstrations were initiated by those who had earlier been anti-
Fascist, such as the unemployed stone worker Vittorio Busatto who was therefore sent to 
confinement by the authorities.
445
 More than one thousand documents scrutinised for the 
period 1929-1934 demonstrate that the protests took the form of forbidden activities, such as 
telling anti-government jokes or having regular conversations with like-minded friends. In 
order to criticise the regime, workers were frequently found provocatively singing the 
Communist hymn “Red Flag” (Bandiera Rossa), such as the butcher Desiderio Bonini in May 
1934, or referring to the cruel murder of socialist MP Giacomo Matteotti;
446
 or they simply 
used expressions like ‘down with Fascism and hurray for Communism’ or sang along to anti-
Fascist propaganda songs such as ‘Red Flag’ in a public place.
447
 Workers hoped that they 
would “screw the [regime] very soon” if they were patient enough.
448
 Some others openly 
declared that “since the blackshirts [were] around, they [would] not work anymore”.
449
 
People were disgruntled because their own living conditions were deteriorating, but the 
regime still felt it appropriate to spend money on celebrations for something the populace was 
ambivalent about anyway. Some Venetians believed that “instead of spending a lot of money 




October 1934, the 
anniversary of the March on Rome, became for some Venetians “the anniversary of 
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 People criticised the regime that celebrated this event every year, spending a lot 
of money, even if people were starving and poverty was widespread.
452
 The volume and 
variety of sources testifying to these sentiments of dissatisfaction indicate that these were not 
isolated complaints, but a general mood among the population (or at least the population of a 
certain political leaning). As John Brown reported for The Spectator in 1935: 
 
… as I have talked to some of the ministries of Rome, corporatism seemed a reality. But to the 
workers (…) the corporative state remained a platform phrase. (…) Skilled workers in the textile 
factories are earning only sixpence per hour, and there are thousands who do not earn the equivalent 
of £1 a week in England. (…) The maximum employment rate pay is only five shillings a week, 
although this may be supplemented by a grant from the local Fascio if a man is a party member.  (…) 
The mass of the working population is outside the unemployment-scheme.
 453  
 
As well explained by Brown’s article, the Fascist corporative system was clearly in favour of 
the employers. Locks-out and strikes were prohibited and strikes leaders were liable to 
detention. For the employers the new Fascist system was much easier to deal with than the 
old socialist unions as the new Fascist syndicates were firmly controlled by the regime and 
influenced by the employers themselves.
454
 In fact, the Fascist syndicates played a crucial 
role for the employers in forestalling any attempt at mass action or demonstration and if a 
really serious dispute arose, it was managed directly by the Party and the Labour Court.
455
   
 
       The decision to launch the Ethiopian campaign in October 1935 has often been seen as a 
response to this situation. Mussolini was conscious of the possible effects of the war on the 
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home front. The war could serve to feed domestic public opinion and divert the focus of the 
internal popular opinion from the economic hardships to the question of the greatness of the 
country and its potential effects on the economy of the nation. It could serve to give the 
regime that stimulus to emotionally connect Italians with the regime. The Ethiopian war was 
also part of a diplomatic game and Mussolini pictured Italy as an offended country denied its 
right to international expansion. 
  
       Popular opinion had little real chance of influencing decisions as Mussolini wanted to 
use the war to turn around popular opinion and launch a message of national unity. The 
crucial steps towards the war had been in late summer and early autumn 1935 when the 
Ethiopian crisis reached its peak. The peak of the propaganda campaign was reached with the 
organisation of the adunata generale (general mobilisation)—a country-wide public 
demonstration, called on 2 October 1935, in which national unity was to be demonstrated to 
the world in all the principal squares of Italy. The adunata was announced in September 
1935. What is important to assess it that, prior to the adunata, the Fascist informers reported 
on many occasions that the war was negatively commented on. In 5 September 1935, a few 
days before the adunata, Venetian workers were complaining that “the Duce [believed he 
could] feed the population with his chatter (…) everybody [had to] know how much vileness 
[was] hidden under the mantle of Fascism that with all means [was] trying to hide the 
extreme poverty”.
456
 Venetians did not reject the war, but they claimed for themselves “the 
right to join the war as well as have the right to have a job”.
457
 The trend of popular opinion 
is even clearer when looking at university students, who should have been the generation of 
Italians educated under the Fascist regime but who had their reservations about the war. In 
October 1935, a Venetian student asserted “I’ve heard university students in Padua complain 
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like those in Milan about the Fascist Government … and I repeat that among them there is no 
enthusiasm for the war. They say that many young people have rushed to enroll in university 
(in Venice, at Ca’ Foscari) in the hope of avoiding being called up”.
458
 That disjunction 
between the party and the people that we have noted in the course of this chapter was not 
bridged by the victorious Ethiopian campaign. The Ethiopian war was only an illusory 
victory.
459
 The war only revealed the continuing need for regimentation and coercion in 
moving Italian popular opinion in support for Fascism. As reported from Venice, soldiers 
who returned from Africa to face further unemployment constituted a common difficulty in 
the later 1930s. Those workers who had hoped to achieve better living conditions fighting in 
the regime’s wars were soon disillusioned. They had helped secure Italy’s position as an 
imperial power and when they returned to their own country they did not “find Italy wealthy, 
but they could only see its extreme poverty”.
460
According to workers, “Italy [had] become 
worse than Russia, because there [was] no employment whatsoever”,
461
 and those who were 
lucky to get a job underlined how badly “the worker [was] obliged to eat after a day of hard 
work”.
462
 For example, a rail worker threatened that if he could meet the “petty politician” 
Mussolini again, he would give him “a piece of iron to strike by himself”.
463
 In reality, 
looking at the statistics, the image of Russia as a “country of starvation” was a mere 
consequence of Fascist propaganda. If compared to the US, in which the high unemployment 
rate (up to 25% in 1932) and decline in production were the most tangible indicators of Great 
Depression, in the Soviet Union unemployment was absorbed by great demand for labor to 
reconstruct the old and build the new plants, mines, canals and roads, and also by 
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       The Ethiopian War clearly confirms the gap between Mussolini’s promises and his actual 
achievements. This picture of rejection of the message of the Party is confirmed by Renzo De 
Felice, who identified a much qualified mass consent for Fascism in the early 1930s, but had 
no difficulty in arguing for a ‘psychological detachment from the Regime’ after the Ethiopian 
War. There was no evidence whatsoever of improvement in workers’ living conditions or 
their consent to Fascist policies. What is really surprising is the speed with which the old 
pattern of complaints, grievances, and resentments reappeared among the population. This 
continuity is more than anything an indication that the Ethiopian War had not served to 
change the realities of provincial Fascism but it had further triggered structural deficiencies. 
The war raised expectations that could not be fulfilled and destabilised the regime. Never 
high during the Great Depression, between the moment of Ethiopian victory in 1936 and 
Italy’s entry into the Second World War in June 1940, popular consent appeared to have 
declined further. Despite victory and the establishment of empire, the authority of the Party 
had not increased.  The measures of the regime from the Great Depression to the conquest of 
Ethiopia in 1936 did not substantially repair the growing disaffection with the regime or the 
bad reputation of the Party. The provincial federations lost contact with the people they 
controlled. As reported by the prefect Catalano in September 1937, criticism towards the 
Fascist hierarchies came also from those who had a reputation as a “good Fascist”, like 
Riccardo Bortali, employed in the ente portuale (port agency). The political police had 
received reported from a “serious and reliable informant that the above mentioned individual 
(Bortali) was frequently found commenting and publicly criticising the regime using 
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disrespectful words towards the top hierarchies of Fascism”.
465
 Bortali was accused of having 
commented about Fascist politics and speaking ill of Starace, the federale, the podestà and 
the consulta. In particular, Bortali criticised the local Fascist system of organisation in 
comparison with the one in Rome that he had recently visited. Bortali argued that the current 
“federale of Venice (Ludovico Foscari) was to be too young for the job (…) and he preferred 
Suppiej (the former federale) who used to listen to the old Fascists”.
466
 He also added that 
Starace and the Venetian federale Foscari should be replaced soon and disappointedly he 
argued that Venice was going to be transformed into a governorship of Volpi or Cini.
467
 
Abuse of power had many manifestations, especially in the militia.  The archives are full of 
documents which bear witness to the fact that ordinary citizens got in trouble over  
expressing dissatisfaction with the arrogance of the MVSN, like the docker Giuseppe Zanon 
who, harassed by some militiamen, asked them to take their blackshirts off as the times were 
about to change and they “would be beaten soon”.
468
 Letters and anonymous denunciations 
produced a fairly standard list of abuses. People talked, and very quickly even the smallest 
rumour could inflate beyond all measure. A further factor in determining popular disaffection 
with the regime was the way in which Fascist officials treated ‘ordinary’ people. After the 
mid-1930s, people visited the regime’s agencies in order to get benefits. However, lack of 
employment availability and the Fascist bureaucracy’s inefficiency was nothing but 
frustrating for people. A typical example was when the unemployed butcher, Gaetano 
Camper, met with the delegate of the Fascist syndicate Enea Sandrin, in San Stino di Livenza 
in order to find a job. Sandrin was responsible for recruitment for the industrial district of 
Marghera. Once Camper found out that the syndicate could not provide him with new 
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employment as the number of people the syndicate could recruit was only limited, he 
aggressively referred to Sandrin as “being worse than Russian”, namely meaning that the 
situation in Italy was not as good as the regime was claiming.
469
 The situation did not change 
towards the end of the 1930s. For example, the popolano Fulvio Bellomo who went to the 
local fascio offices in Venice in order to ask for benefits, and shouted at the local Fascists 
arguing that “he would have willingly repudiated his Italian citizenship as Italy was an 
ignoble country”, and this happened because Fascists had rejected his request.
470
 In the late 
1930s, the repression of a street cell located in a cobbler shop in Mestre demonstrated that, 
despite widespread criticism against the regime, only little space was left for the Communist 
propaganda. From the investigation pursued by the secret Fascist informer, Vittorio Krainz, 
two cobblers, Leone Moressa and Luciano Visentin, were deploying active Communist 
propaganda, whose scope was to “open the eyes of the young in order to show that truth was 
not that one taught by the Fascist regime” by lending books about the Russian Revolution.
471
 
In the cobbler shop the young unemployed used to meet in order to discuss anti-Fascist 
politics.
472
 Krainz was simply a customer and he came to know about Moressa’s and 
Visentin’s Communist orientation just spending time at the shop as a customer, but he 
quickly became a Fascist informer. This is how the police came to know about their 
clandestine propaganda. Further investigation and the direct intervention of the police quickly 
stopped the cobblers’ activity which could not be continued further.
473
 As we have seen 
during the period 1926-late 1930s, the political police and their spies assigned to repress 
political dissent, played a central role in keeping people under control and allowed the regime 
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to have some stability on its road to the Second World War. This role is confirmed by the 
words of the Venetian prefect Catalano in 1939 writing to the Minister of Interior: 
 
The measures (…) have been welcomed with disciplined consent in this city (Venice): we cannot 
exclude that someone (…) commented unfavourably (…). For what concerns the identification of 
these elements who do not publicly express their opinion, they are not easy (to be found); however, 




In late-1930s the work of the police was sure facilitated by the termination of the peak of the 
economic crisis in Italy and the launch of the colonial campaign which contributed to instill 
new hope in the society. Despite Catalano meant that the regime’s stability was never in real 
danger, this was far from saying that the level of police control of society decreased. For 
‘disciplined consent’ in the province, he meant that not significant ‘political’ protests 
happened. The documents consistently show that the State organisations were involving 
many people and, in one way or another, the regime had entered into the lives of ordinary 
people in a very novel way. 
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What certainly did remain a constant of the period before the Ethiopian war and then in the 
following years, was the poor reputation of the regime and the local Party. What emerges 
from this chapter is that the regime was overall successful in implementing and managing a 
police system which guaranteed surveillance and control over the anti-Fascists and the 
dismantling of their local networks of solidarity. The break-up of the anti-Fascist 
communities was not implemented by the regime only through repression. The regime 
focused also on an urban renewal of the local communities which could prevent the re-
formation of an organised workers’ movement such as it happened in Venice with the 
development of Marghera. 
However, although the regime never felt a serious threat from the crisis which affected the 
country during the Great Depression, this work confirms that the regime substantially failed 
in its mission to improve people’s everyday material conditions. This is even more visible 
when Mussolini launched the campaign of Abyssinia in order tackle popular discontent and 
feed population with propaganda of greatness for Italy. However, only after a year from the 
victory in 1937, as it is clearly visible in Venice province, people had realised that the regime 
could not keep its promises. As we have seen in this chapter, economic dissatisfaction 
underlined a progressive lack of enthusiasm for the regime in the face of sustained economic 
hardship as well as political repression.  
The next chapter will move on to a different facet of the tension between established non-
Fascist constituencies like the Catholics and their negotiations for autonomy with a regime 





3. Challenges to the Regime: Venetian Catholics and Youth under 
the Regime (1922-1942) 
 
Introduction 
       In late 1926, the promulgation of the leggi Fascistissime began the transformation of the 
jurisdictional order of the Kingdom of Italy into a totalitarian, nationalist, corporatist and 
imperialist one. This process of integration of the state apparatus into the new Fascist order 
was to guarantee, through the work of the secret police, the political reliability of institutions 
and surveillance over private citizens. Similarly to the Nazi regime, Fascism took over not 
only the political system but also society as a whole. In Germany, the process of nazification 
of the country became known as Gleichschaltung which translated into English language as 
‘coordination’ or ‘synchronisation’. It was the process by which Nazi Germany exerted 
totalitarian control of all areas of life in Germany from economy and politics to media, 
culture and education.
475
 As for the Nazi Gleichschaltung, with the fascistisation of society 
and its integration into the Fascist State, independent associational life also came to an end. 
The regime disbanded political groups, workers organisations and professional associations 
(like press), and even local clubs dedicated to various activities. In their place, the regime 
founded or expanded numerous affiliated organisations intended to marshal support from 
particular groups of Italians. As part of the Fascistisation of the Italian State and society, the 
Fascist regime had set particular importance on winning over young people, which was 
particularly important for a regime that was based on an ideology and that was, even more 
importantly, trying to establish itself as an alternative to earlier or current forms of 
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government. According to Simona Colarizi, Mussolini needed to organise Fascism to survive 
effectively and be perpetuate as a regime after its consolidation phase.
476
 In fact, the political 
socialisation of the youth in an aspiring totalitarian system is essentially a problem of 
succession and continuity. The aim of a totalitarian regime is the formation of a politically 
orthodox subsequent generation that will keep the regime in power and carry out its political 
programme. It is surprising, therefore, that Fascist youth organisations have received limited 
scholarly attention. Only a few historians like Alessio Ponzio, Connor Douglas, Robert A. 
Ventresca, and Sarah Morgan, have focused their attention on the complex Fascist youth 
organisation.
477
 Moreover, the only substantial and comprehensive monograph on the Fascist 




       When focusing on youth organisations in the Province of Venice, this chapter presents 
two rather distinct, but related aspects. Firstly, it examines the efforts made by the regime to 
establish a network of youth organisations which clashed with the pre-existing establishments 
like the Catholic groups. The analysis of the quarrel between Church and regime, aims to 
shine new light on the development of the relations between local Party and local Church, 
with prime focus on the youth organisations. The second section will scrutinize the GUF 
(Gruppi Universitari Fascisti) and the regime’s attempt to create a generation of men 
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completely educated under the Fascist regime. The regime set up youth organisations in order 
to inculcate the basic elements of Fascism (the cult of the Duce, sense of the nation, and the 
acceptance of war and violence) in young minds, to counteract the traditional model of 
socialisation (by the Church), and to provide physical and paramilitary training. 
479
 The 
reason why we have chosen to single out these two specific strands of the Venetian youth for 
analysis is that these were areas that traditionally had relatively large autonomy, and therefore 
they were particularly threatening. In contrast schooling proper was easier to influence for the 
state and is therefore less interesting as a case study. 
 
3.1 The Origin of the Dispute between Church and State 
       In order to appreciate the success or failure of the Fascist regime to persuade Italian 
youth to invest into the Fascist project – often in competition with the previously most 
prominent provider of youth work in Italy, the Catholic Church – it is important to reflect on 
the relationship between Church and State in the decades leading up to the rise of Fascism. 
Therefore, this section will illustrate how the relationship between Church and State evolved 
since the formation of the new Italian State in 1861 and in particular during the decades until 
the rise to power of Fascism. Particular attention will be paid also to the evolution of the 
Catholic movement and its organisations under the different pontificates which characterised 
the Church on the road to face the challenge of the regime. 
 
       The dispute between the Italian State and the Catholic Church, the so called ‘Roman 
Question’, had its origins in the conflict between the secularising tendencies of the Italian 
Liberal State. As Pollard has written: 
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Like other European Liberals, the Italian Moderate Liberals led by D’Azeglio and Cavour enacted a 
series of laws, first in Piedmont and then in the rest of Italy, which wrestled control of such matters as 
education, marriage and censorship from the Church, established freedom of religion for Protestants 
and Jews, dissolved many of the contemplative religious orders and confiscated a substantial portion 




The relationship between the Italian State and Catholic Church differed from those in the 
other European countries as the Pope had been not only a religious authority, but also the 
head of a territorial state on Italian soil. In addition, the process of Italian unification involved 
the progressive dismantling of the Papal State which had comprised a large territory within 
central Italy. The last act of the destruction of the temporal power of the Papacy was the 
Piedmontese infantry corps of Bersaglieri’s occupation of Rome city (Breccia di Porta Pia) 
in September 1870. When Rome was taken by the Italian army, Pope Pius IX (1846-78) 
retreated to the Vatican and proclaimed himself a prisoner of the state. In addition, he 
excommunicated the king and the leaders of the Italian government and forbade good 





       The Roman Question was a big obstacle in the process of the formation of a national 
identity. The war between Church and State lasted for decades and excluded Catholics from 
the political life of the country and as some historians argued, it widened the distance 
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between the ‘real Italy’ and the ‘legal Italy’.
482
 The quarrel between the Church and the 
Italian State made it “very difficult to be both an obedient Catholic and a good Italian. In this 
way, the ‘Roman Question’ constituted a grave spiritual wound in the Italian 
Risorgimento”.
483
 Despite attempts on the part of successive governments following the 
unification of Italy, to find a solution to the Roman Question, the papacy could not be 
persuaded to relinquish its temporal powers and responded to governmental attempts at 
forcing with issue with excommunication of political leaders. 
 
      After having lost its temporal power, the process of revitalisation of the Church, aimed at 
re-evangelising Italian society, started with the creation of The Opera dei Congressi in 1874, 
a Church organisation that promoted Catholic ideas and culture. Adhering to the Pope’s 
conservative line, the Opera served Pius IX and strictly observed his positions publicised in 
the encyclical Non Expedit (1874) which promoted Catholics’ abstention from participating 
and voting in political elections. The Opera was hierarchically organised with headquarters in 
Venice and offices at local level. The Opera did not have a political remit per se but it had 
progressively been involved in protesting against certain Italian Liberal government policies 
which were believed to be anticlerical. In addition, the Opera played a crucial role in 
reaffirming the Pope’s temporal power and acting as a mouthpiece for the view that his 
position effectively made him a prisoner of the State in the Vatican.
484
 From 1887, the Opera, 
under the leadership of Paganuzzi, made a vigorous drive not only for expansion, but also for 
organisational centralisation. Paganuzzi belonged to an aristocratic family of Bolognese 
origin which moved to Venice in 1750. Paganuzzi had been municipal and provincial 
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councilor in Venice, supporting the anti-socialist coalition of Catholics and conservatives 
with the aim of restoring the rights of the Church to intervene in political matters. The 
underlying theme of the life of Paganuzzi was the commitment to the Catholic laity against 
the anti-clerical Liberal state. Paganuzzi was elected president of the Opera in 22 September 
1889. He retained the post until 1902 when, in conflict to the young Christian Democrats of 
Romolo Murri, he left in favour of the Count Giovanni Grosoli Pironi.
485
 Paganuzzi’s course 
responded, as Poggi already argued, to “the novel impulse given to Catholic movements all 
over Europe by the grandiose plan of Leo XIII for the reconquest of the masses”.
486
 The 
appointment of Leo XIII (1878-1903)  led to a normalisation of the church-State relationship 
the Church after the tumultuous years which followed the ‘occupation of Rome’. The Pope’s 
intellectual and diplomatic ability helped the Church to regain much of the prestige lost with 
the fall of the Vatican State. He tried to reconcile the Church with the working class, 
particularly by dealing with the economic and social changes which had triggered growing 
impoverishment of the working class and had resulted in the working class becoming anti-
clerical and being attracted by socialist ideas. Leo helped to reverse this trend. As one 
commentator put it, as the Holy See at the time of the accession of Leo XIII was on bad terms 
with many governments, and as relations between Catholic Church and the people were 
strained, the task of reconciling the papacy with both was “a colossal enterprise requiring the 
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utmost efforts of his genius”.
487
 The 1890s opened the way for the Catholics to begin to 
become socially active.  Giuseppe Toniolo’s foundation of the Catholic Union for Social 
Studies in 1889 and the publication in 1891 of Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical Rerum Novarum, 
triggered the development of Catholic social thought in Italy, France, Belgium, Austria, 
Britain and Switzerland. With regards to the economy, Catholics’ efforts concentrated in the 





       Soon a good number of Catholic rural banks appeared in Emilia-Romagna, Lombardy, 
Veneto and Rome, and the volume of the Catholic cooperatives increased.
489
 Venice province 
was one the leading Italian provinces in terms of the Catholic expansion into economic and 
social life of the country. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, most of the Catholic 
fortunes in the province had been achieved by the work of the priest Luigi Cerutti. Cerutti 
was ordained priest in 1888 and he was appointed vicar of Gambarare (Venice countryside 
village). Cerutti was a typical example of Catholic cooperative leaders. He believed that the 
rural banks were not only a real support for the local population, but also a means for 
Catholic ideals to penetrate the countryside (la campagna) and oppose socialist 
advancement.
490
 Cerutti organised a rural bank modelled on those which Leone Wollemborg 
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was setting up throughout the Veneto in 1890.
491
 The rural banks provided local cooperatives 
with the necessary financial help to be invested in their business such as purchasing seeds, 
fertilisers and other agricultural maerials. Such rural banks were a novelty in Italy and they 
rapidly spread throughout the Veneto and Northern Italy. Cerutti’s ideas were particularly 
welcomed by the Opera Congressi and the president Giambattista Paganuzzi appointed 
Cerutti a member of the organisation’s board in 1893. When Cerutti became vicar of Murano 
in 1897, he tried to extend his ideas to the working class by setting up a local bank for the 
glass factory-workers, but his new initiative was met with a lot more resistance as the bank 
met the hostility of both industrialists and socialist leagues.
492
 On one side, industrialists were 
not keen to deal with organized workers movements, on the other side, the Catholic workers 
banks and cooperatives were competing with the already local well established socialist 
organisations.  
 
      Due to the vast parish network the Catholic social system, built on rural banks and labour 
cooperatives, spread rapidly. The speed of diffusion was due also to the commitment of 
Catholic intellectuals like Ercole Chiri, Don Lorenzo Guetti, Luigi Cerutti, Don Luigi Sturzo, 
Nicolò Rezzara and Giuseppe Toniolo who continued the work begun by the first Catholic 
leaders.
493
 Such thinkers thought that only Catholic cooperation would be able to elevate the 
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status of the agricultural and industrial proletariat. 
494
 The increased importance of the 
Catholics in the economic and social life of the country “raised the question which of two 
evils might be the worse – the consolidation of the bourgeois regime, or the strengthening of 
the ‘subversive’ forces”.
495
 This problem aroused different positions within the Opera 
Congressi and the clash was between those of conservative positions and a modernist wing 
led by the young priest Romolo Murri who had been the promoter of FUCI (Catholic Youth 
Group) and founded the movement Democrazia Cristiana Italiana in 1901, a Catholic 
movement with a progressive approach which intended to open a dialogue with the moderate 
wing of socialism like Filippo Turati.
496
 In 1903, the death of Pope Leo XIII, who had seen 
with benevolence the development of Murri’s movement and the election of Pius X who was 
closer to the more conservative wing of the Opera, blocked the development of the 
Democrazia. As many of Opera Congressi members were now siding with the Democrazia, 
Pius X decided to dismiss the Opera in order to stem its modernist drift, curtailing the 
organisation to pastoral activity.
497
 In order to replace the Opera and set an organisation to 
supervise all the social and economic activities of the Church, the Pope founded Azione 
Cattolica in 1905. Catholic Action was established as a non-political lay organisation under 
the direct control of the bishops. One of the first leaders of Azione Cattolica was count 
Ottorino Gentiloni, appointed by Pope Pius X (1903-1914) head of the Catholic Electoral 
Union and in such capacity he co-authored in 1912 with Giovanni Giolitti the Patto Gentiloni 
which won the Italian elections in 1913.
498
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In the period of transition between the birth of the Opera Congressi and the creation of the 
Catholic Action, the Veneto region – and consequently the province of Venice – was deeply 
affected socially and politically by the blossoming of the Catholic movement. A large number 
of educational, social, cultural, and welfare associations sprang up in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century and the dynamic growth continued until the birth of the Popular Party 
in 1919, spanning every sphere of activity, politics included. Religiosity in Venice and even 
more so in the Venetian countryside had translated into political affiliations.  Local politics 
had been heavily influenced by a coalition of Catholics and conservatives since the late 
nineteenth century. Despite Pius IX’s non expedit instructing Italians not to participate in the 
electoral life of the country, the list of clerical-moderates led by Mayor Filippo Grimani won 
consecutive elections from 1895 to 1919.
499
 In the first two decades, similarly to the national 
movement, Venetian Catholics were polarised into those aligned with the conservative and 
anti-socialist views of the former Opera Congressi, and the ones who were more progressive 




       The role of Catholic Action was greatly enhanced during the pontificate of Pius XI 
(1922-1939) when the organisation was to play a crucial role in the reorientation of Catholics. 
Pius XI’s first encyclical, Ubi arcano, promulgated in December 1922, was directed to 
counter secularism and ‘Christianise’ all aspects of the society. “Pope XI is called ‘the Pope 
of Catholic Action’ because of the vigour and persistence with which he urged the creation 
and the establishment of Catholic Action organisation not only in Italy but throughout the 
world”.
501
 Pius XI had always been suspicious about his predecessor Benedict XV’s plan for 
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a Catholic Party. For Pius XI the Catholic movement had to develop at the level of civil 
society and play more of a background role in education and proselytism rather than being a 
political organisation. The Pope also had doubts regarding the economic, social and political 
line of the newly formed Popular Party (1919) which, in the Pope’s opinion, tended too much 
towards modernist positions.
502
 In the early days of Fascism, following the March on Rome, 
he sent a document in which he invited all the clergy not to cooperate with any political party, 
even with those of Catholic origins. In addition, the Pope called Don Luigi Sturzo, a ‘clerical 
socialist’ who was regarded as one of the fathers of Christian democracy, to resign from the 
post of secretary of the Italian Popular Party. Sturzo resigned in July 1923, before being 




       Pius XI’s strategy was largely influenced by the political situation of the country which 
was facing a serious threat to constitutional democracy with the rise in the power of Fascism. 
Pius XI thought that the project of the constitutional development of a Catholic party was a 
path that was no longer practicable. Conversely, at local level, although the Popular Party 
corresponded to a model of the Christian laity, many Italian bishops looked at the role of a 
Catholic party as an opportunity for the representation of the Catholics’ political interests.
 504
 
For example, in Venice Province, under the leadership of the Patriarch Pietro La Fontaine, 
Venetian Catholics, concerned about the socialists’ advance, thought that a Catholic party 
could be the natural expression of a revitalised Catholic movement which needed support and 
protection.
505
 In accordance with this view, the Catholic newspaper Il Veneto wrote that the 
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Popular Party was “devoted to the cause of the Church and the Pope, and characterised by a 
narrow orthodoxy, projected into social action, an alternative to the Catholic tradition of 




       Since Mussolini came to power in 1922, the relations between the Church and Mussolini 
had improved. In his youth, Mussolini had been a notable mangiapreti (priests’ eater) like 
many of the virulent anti-Catholic Fascist backers such as Farinacci. As a young man, 
Mussolini had shared his father’s opinion of the Roman Catholic Church. Mussolini senior, 
disliked the power of the Church and the young Mussolini referred to priests as ‘black 
germs’.
507
 However, in some conservative sectors of the Catholic Church in Italy, 
Mussolini’s anti-socialist fight was seen with a benevolent eye. We may even include Pope 
Pius XI amongst these, at least for the first decade or so of Fascist rule.
508
 An example is 
Cardinal Pietro Gasparri who was favourable to Fascism and anxious to put an end to the 
‘Roman Question’. Gasparri who was Secretary of the State under Pius XI, held secret 
meetings with Mussolini (the first one in 1923), where they discussed agreements which led 




       A similar scenario was displayed in Venice province. Initially, relations between Fascists 
and Catholics were not particularly warm. The core of the first wave of Fascism was linked to 
the figure of Pietro Marsich who came from anti-clerical and radical-democratic background. 
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However, in Venice as well as in Milan and Turin, on the occasion of the municipal elections 
of 1920, the bishops, fearing the socialist victory, encouraged Catholics to join the National 
Block (Blocchi Nazionali), and therefore an alliance with the Fascists. In Venice, the deal had 
been possible thanks to the good relations between the Patriarch La Fontaine and Giovanni 
Giuriati, the major exponent of the moderate Venetian Fascism who was opposed to 
Marsich’s radical positions.
510
 It was also the future Fascist federale Giorgio Suppiej, a 
practicing Catholic and with a family network among eminent members of the local Catholic 
movement, who facilitated an agreement with the local Catholics.
511
 On his side, the Patriarch 
La Fontaine did not hide some sympathies for the Fascist movement after it rose in power and, 
convinced that Mussolini’s regime could promote full adherence to Catholicism, La Fontaine 
took a line of collaboration with the public authorities.
512
 La Fontaine had been a fervent 
patriot who, during the First World War, engaged the Venetian Church in materially 
supporting people, especially after the dramatic retreat of the Italian Army following the 
defeat of Caporetto in October-November 1917 which directly involved the diocesan territory 
in the theatre of military operations.
513
 Once leader, Mussolini had to decide whether to 
negotiate with the Roman Catholic Church in Italy or not. He chose to work with it and to get 
the Roman Catholic Church to accept the Fascist state while offering the Roman Catholic 
Church an acceptable agreement. To gain credibility with the Church, Mussolini had his 
children baptised in 1923. In 1926, he had a religious marriage ceremony to his wife Rachele. 
Their first marriage in 1915 had been a civil ceremony. Although the favourable actions of 
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Mussolini towards the Church could elicit positive impressions, Venetian Catholics still 
looked at Fascism with skepticism, especially with regards to the anti-clerical origins of 
Fascist ideology and the violence of the squads which was totally contrary to the Catholic 
principle of pietas. The majority of Venetian Catholics active in the various local Catholic 




       The hardest obstacle encountered by Fascism in Venice Province was the aversion of the 
local priests, most of them educated during the last years of the nineteenth century, under the 
reforming pontificate of Pope Leo XIII and therefore belonging to the season of social 
Catholicism promoted by the encyclical Rerum Novarum and prepared to revitalise the role of 
the Church in society.
515
 Those were the priests who were called to ‘approach people’ and 
become protagonists in the renovation of the Catholic movement. It was the local priest who 
had to translate the renewal promoted by the Holy See on a national scale to the local level. 
Thanks to the leading role played by priests, the parish became “the fundamental cell of 
religious and civic development, dominated by the bell, but also gravitating around the 
conference room, the oratory, and religious and social organisations”.
516
 Even Sturzo and the 
Popular Party needed the support of the local priests to mass-mobilise the Catholic electorate. 
They could not ignore the fundamental relation between the priest and the churchgoers.
517
 
Gaetano Salvemini underlined the strong link between Italians and Church: “the 
overwhelming majority of the Italian population, especially those living in the countryside, is 
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formed by tireless workers. (…) The person observing the monumental religious ceremonies 
held in the small villages of Italy is easily persuaded to think that the religious feeling of the 
Italian population is really intense”.
518
 This appears to have been particularly pronounced 
among people in the Veneto region whose predisposition (razza veneta) had made them even 
more adaptable and more responsive to clerical propaganda. “The traditional, ritual soul of 
the Veneto people, is cadenced by the rhythm of the oratories (…) [The Veneto people] are 
universally loved for being (...) of a good character [razza], being good, moderate, 
parsimonious and hardworking people”.
519
 This intense relationship between local Church 
and people from Veneto was the major cause for the initial negative attitude of the Venetian 
priests towards Fascism. Their opinion had been widely captured by the local police, and one 
of the most striking cases was Antonio Cercaiolo, the vicar of the village of Scorzè. Antonio 
Cercariolo displayed immediately his aversion towards the local Fascists and “in 1923 he 
declared from the pulpit that the Fascists were criminals (lazzaroni) in black shirts at the 
service of the lords”.
520
 Although Cercariolo later mellowed in his antipathy towards Fascism, 
he would never conform to the regime. This is evident in the size of the file that documents 
the Fascist military police’s interest in him. His file was continually updated until the mid-
1930s.
521
  Already enjoying an important social role in the local community prior to the 
advent of Fascism, the local priest looked at the Fascists as criminals imbued with anti-
clerical ideology who wanted to destroy the prestige of the Church (and therefore his prestige) 
among the people forming local society. As we will see, despite accepting the directives of 
the Patriarch La Fontaine to find a deal with Fascism, the majority of local priests remained 
highly suspicious of the Fascists. 
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The negative feeling of the local Church towards the regime was also captured by the reports 
of the prefect Iginio Coffari to the Interior Ministry, both before and after the leggi 
Fascistissime (1926-1927). The prefect tended to highlight the close interpenetration between 
Catholic Action and popolari, allowing the idea of the Popular Party to continue its political 
propaganda under the veil of a religious organisation. Frustrated by this suspicion, Fascists 
launched a wave of violence against the Venetian Catholic Action offices.
522
 On the night of 
26-27 August 1926, 250 young avanguardisti (Balillas between 14 and 17 years old) 
surrounded the Catholic circle of San Pantalon in Venice city crying “down with the 
popolari!” and only the intervention of their officials prevented them from destroying the 
Catholic offices. The group of avanguardasti then moved on to Campo San Barnaba to beat  
up a group of young Catholic esploratori (Catholic scouts) wearing the Catholic uniform.
523
 
In the months that followed, the prefect reported a steady stream of similar stories of attacks 
on local Catholic clubs, and priests. Sometimes the Fascists’ attacks possessed a preventive 
character with the aim of intimidating Catholics. An example is the case of two priests of the 
village of Ceggia (North East of the province). Although they had been considered by the 
local police as “disciplined” and of profound patriotism, Don Eugenio Salce and Don Andrea 
Zanette were threatened and insulted by a group of Fascists led by the local Fascist secretary 
Sigismondo Ferraresi in October 1926. In the villages where the Church had established deep 
roots in the local community and the figure of the priest was crucial for the life of the 
community with the Church possessing large popular support, as in the case of Ceggia, 
Fascist action had the opposite effect, putting local people at odds with the Party. This 
happened in the case of Salce and Zanette as the prefect disappointingly had to admit that the 
raid had been inappropriate as the priests were very popular in the village and people were 
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disappointed by their removal.
524
 Most frequent were attacks led by the most intransigent 
wing of the Fascist Party on local Catholics and their organisations. A typical example is the 
case of the Venetian Fascist Pio Leoni.  Former close collaborator of Marsich, Leoni led a 
group of students of the Party in conducting raids against local Catholics, especially against 
those involved in the youth groups. Leoni was a quite typical example of the young Fascists 
who firmly believed that a good Fascist should be radical and emulate the gestures of the 




       The events of 1926 have usually been underestimated by the literature relating to the 
relations between Church and State. Historians’ focus has been primarily on the negotiations 
leading to the sign of the Lateran Pacts and the events which led to consequent stabilisation 
of the relations between Church and regime as discussed for instance in the works of John F. 
Pollard and David I. Kertzer.
526
 Conversely, the year 1926, constituted an important passage 
for the Veneto Church, as the events opened an intense discussion among the various currents 
of thought within the local Church. During the episcopal conference of 24 November 1926, 
the bishops of Padua, Treviso, Vicenza, Belluno, Verona, Ceneda, Adria-Rovigo, Chioggia 
and the Patriarch of Venice, discussed the general situation of the local churches and they 
could not avoid discussing the fact that priests, men, women and young people were beaten 
and even imprisoned by the Fascists.
527
 From that meeting, it was also possible to understand 
what path would be chosen by the Veneto Church with regards to Fascism. The discussion 
brought to light two currents: one led by the bishop of Vicenza, notoriously anti-Fascist, who 
intended to complain to Mussolini about the Fascist violence, and another one which 
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comprised the majority of the local bishops, led by the Patriarch of Venice La Fontaine, who 
intended to promote a more moderate and conciliatory line towards Fascism. The line of La 
Fontaine prevailed and instead of confronting the regime resolutely, the Veneto bishops 
decided to mediate and send a letter to Mussolini regretting the episodes of violence which 
involved local Catholics, but minimising them as a dynamic effect of the ongoing 
normalising process within the Fascist Party.
528
 The letter was a condemnation of the Fascist 
violence, but the impression given was that the Patriarch La Fontaine and the majority of the 
Veneto bishops thought that the Fascist violence would be a ‘transitory storm’ and after that, 




The Patriarch miscalculated what the future would be for the Catholic movement in Italy. The 
events of 1926 happened in a climate of intitmidation. The laws of public security of 1925-
1926 had put all the non-Fascist organisations outside law, intensifying Fascist control over 
society. In addition, the Fascist movement was experiencing a profound transformation which 
heightened the level of the clash between ‘intransigent’ and ‘moderate’ Fascists, leading to 
the dismissal of Farinacci in March 1926. Having defeated the intransigent wing of the 
movement, Mussolini was now looking at how to fascistise society starting with the youngest 
sections of society, giving the former ardito and ras of Carrara Renato Ricci, the task of 
reorganising the Fascist youth movement from a moral and physical point of view. In April 
1926, the Opera Nazionale Balilla was founded, supervised by the Ministry of National 
Education. The ONB was instituted for the physical and moral benefit of youth and it was 
initially meant to be an autonomous ente (Italian word for a State organisation) with the task 
of instructing youngsters to become good Fascists. Nonetheless, in Venice and throughout the 
peninsula as well, the regime sought to regulate and gain control over children’s leisure time 
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activities and private lives. The formal control over the movement was passed on to the 
Ministry of National Education in 1929, which created an undersecretariat for physical 
training and unified boys and girls under a general school programme. The transfer of the 
ONB to the Ministry of Education was an important step considering the fact that it spread 
the movement through the entire school system and made membership obligatory for all boys 
and girls. The ONB was placed under the supervision of provincial committees and it was 
also given its own rigid command structure, leading down through at least five ranks from 
caposquadra to humble cadet. ONB had a pyramid structure and teachers and members of the 
MVSN were assisted by priests and military chaplains concentrating on local and provincial 
discipline. The MVSN had the primarily task of preparing the young for party membership 
through pre-military training. From its foundation, parents were pressured into enlisting their 
children into the ONB. The ONB was the first step towards the fascistisation of new 
generations and it meant the beginning of the process of forming a national youth 
organisation allied with the Fascist movement. The ONB managed out-of-school activities for 
youngsters aged between 6 and 21. The perfecting of the functioning of the organisation 
coincided with the act of banning any alternative ‘free time’ groups – the original lay ‘scouts’ 
were suppressed in 1927, whereas the Catholic scouting organisation called Esploratori went 




       The Catholic youth group had nearly half a million members at the beginning of the 
regime. However, there was a significant decrease in its headcount in 1928 due to the 
dissolution of the Exploratori and other sporting organisations. Only three catholic youth 
organisations remained operative on a national level: Catholic Action (AC), the Italian 
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Catholic University Student Federation (FUCI), and the Catholic Graduate Association.
531
 It 
was Catholic Action that caused the most concern for Fascist authorities because it was 
among the youth that it had its greatest recruiting success.  
 
3.2 Church and State Relations after the Signing of the Concordat (1929-
1936) 
       In Venice province, like in many other Italian provinces, the Catholics experienced 
harassment, violence and limitation of freedom. However, as argued by the Venetian federale 
Suppiej in 1928, the relations between the Church and the State were “formally” good.
532
 As 
we have previously seen, the tendency, or more concisely, the strategy of the Patriarch La 
Fontaine was to collaborate with the government and to be “always” supportive of the PNF 
from the beginning of the regime.
533
 In 1929 the time had come to make a step forward in 
these relations and officially finalise the details of the cohabitation between Catholics and 
Fascists. By 1929 the Fascist Regime had virtually completed the development of its 
structures: a one-state, a secret police state, led by a charismatic leader. As an essential part 
of this process Mussolini had defeated the most intransigent wing of the party led by local ras, 
and had reduced them to a subordinate role in the structure of the Regime. As Pollard has 
written, “In fact the history of the period 1925-29 is in large part a history of the process by 
which Mussolini eliminated the resistance of the Fascist movement to measures by which he 
achieved a stable entente with these institutions”.
534
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       Fascist anti-clericalism lost considerable ground inside the Fascist Party and the 
resolution of the quarrel between State and Church in 1929, the so called Conciliazione, was 
a remarkable achievement for the Church and the Fascist state. With this agreement, 
Mussolini was trying to bring the Roman Catholic Church onto his side to get its support and 
give added credibility to his government.  The Concordat guaranteed the sovereignty of the 
Catholic Church in Italy concerning all religious matters, but it also prohibited any sort of 
political activity. The Concordat was a move towards including those dark corners of the 
Italian society that had still been excluded from the political life of the country and it allowed 
Mussolini to propagandise himself as the ‘man of providence’ (Pius XI’s words) who 
resolved the ‘Roman Question’. The Church’s endorsement of Fascism helped to change the 




       In a speech delivered at the Catholic University of Milan on 14 February 1929, Pius XI 
declared that the Concordat, and consequently Fascism, had “given to God back to Italy and 
Italy back God”.
536
 The deal had led Pius XI to hail Mussolini as his “Man of Providence”.
537
 
The Concordat was welcomed with satisfaction by most Catholics and the Patriarch La 
Fontaine, who held a conciliatory position.
538
 The concept of Providence recurred also in the 
speech of the Patriarch La Fontaine on the occasion of the celebration of the signature of the 
pact: 
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We needed the commanding word of Providence that ordered at the opportune moment: Let There Be 
Light! The word was pronounced and light there was. Two men it (Providence) linked together. On 
one side the Pope Pius XI, on the other side the man indeed called by Providence, the Duce. Do you 
not see how Providence led to it? (…) The spiritual authority of the Pope that might have been 






This was not surprising, coming from La Fontaine, who was said to have been “instrumental 
in the diplomatic negotiations between Church and State leading up to the 1929 conciliation 





       As a consequence of the Concordat, Catholic Action thought they could co-exist with 
Fascist youth organisations and might be able to use Fascism to restore Catholic influence 
and power over the Italian population. Immediately after the signature of the Lateran Pacts, as 
reported by the local bulletin of the Venice Diocese, Catholic Action had to be 
 
…of support for the Church; it is an instrument in the hands of the Ecclesiastic Hierarchy to spread 
the word, and therefore to bring the benefit of our divine religion to every corner of the society. (…) 
The collaboration [with the State] (…) will never have political scope like that of a party. (…) 
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The attempt of the Church to educate youth clashed with the regime’s project to monopolise 
education in the attempt to give birth to the ‘new Fascist man’. As Colarizi argued, “the 
impossible coexistence of two exclusive faiths opened a chasm between the regime and the 




       Although appealing to the Catholic electorate, Mussolini always looked at the Catholic 
movement as a political and social force that stood in his way, as well as Socialism. As 
Kertzer suggested, “at the local level, this obstruction included Catholic Action groups — 
groups of Catholic laymen and women engaged in religious activity under ecclesiastical 
supervision — and various Catholic cooperatives”.
543
 Under the supervision of Catholic 
Action, newspapers, workers and student organisations, but more importantly Catholic 
educational institutions flourished. Mussolini was obsessed with achieving the monopoly of 
youth education; this would have clearly meant the possibility for the movement to breed the 
‘Fascists of tomorrow’. The issue was expressed clearly by a Mussolini in a speech of the 
1929: “The child, as soon as it is able to learn, belongs to the State and to the State alone”.
544
 
The hope that Catholics could openly discuss economic and social issues, or that they could 
simply reinforce their lay organisations such as Catholic Action, was therefore illusory. 
  
        The growth of Catholic Action constituted a serious threat for the regime regarding its 
newly acquired hegemony over Italian youth. In June 1929, Mussolini instructed prefects to 
monitor the clergy and the activities of Catholic Action, showing that he did not believe that 
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the problem of youth organisations had been entirely resolved by signing the Concordat.
545
 
Even the president of the Opera Nazionale Balilla, Renato Ricci, explained to Mussolini that 
the Church “[had been explaining] the Gospel every Sunday for twenty centuries, 




       Vigilance came in the form of an investigation by the carabinieri into the activities of the 
Church in July 1929. The earliest police files on Catholic Action date back to 1927 when the 
Ministry of the Interior first instructed prefects to collect data on the numerical strength of 
catholic organisations in their provinces. The prefect of Venice executed the first report in 
1929, which was followed by a second one in 1931. Similar inquiries were performed in 
other provinces as well, which clearly tended to highlight the presence of popolari among 
both the rank and title and leadership cadres of Catholic Action. The findings cannot have 
been unexpected, since many popolari continued working inside Catholic Action after the 
demise of the Popular Party in 1926 without ever abandoning their democratic and reforming 
approach. As it was reported, “the spies of the regime were everywhere, in the churches, in 
oratories, in the Catholic circles, in the FUCI, in the bishoprics and naturally inside the 
Vatican. And the opinions collected are generally not favourable to Fascism. (…) The 
development of a creeping anti-Fascism is more than suspected in the spring of 1930”.
547
 
More than anti-Fascism, the regime was worried by the progressive detachment of Catholic 
public opinion, especially in the ‘white regions’
548
 where Fascism had encountered resistance 
in its attempt at penetration. This was the case of the Veneto and the province of Venice. 
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Here, compared with the almost complete destruction of the socialist and communist 
organisations, Catholic organisations were characterised by an extraordinary degree of 
strength and vitality which constituted a real threat for the regime. Catholicism could still be 
a political threat as it could count on a dense network of clubs and associations, welfare and 
youth organisations, a flourishing and influential Catholic press, and members who were 
ideologically oriented to the defence of the Catholic faith and institutions against the 
intrusion of the state.  
Catholic expansion in the Province of Venice sparked growing intolerance among Party 
organisers. In Venice Province, the anti-Catholic-Action campaign was sanctioned by 
Giuriati who was also governing the national Party between October 1930 and December 
1931. The conflict began at the beginning of the 1931 in the newspapers as the local Fascist 
press acted in accordance with the Party line, accusing Catholic Action of political activity.
549
 
The impression provided by the prefect about the Venetian Catholic organisations warned the 
party that Catholic Action’s ranks were increasingly moving towards forms of non-political 
organisations, which, however, could suddenly become political.
550
 A report had identified 
that the people involved in the Catholic movement of the Venetian diocese were largely 
professionals and traders in the city of Venice, whereas the members linked to the labour 
movement were predominantly peasants who represented the real social base of the 
movement.
551
 In April 1931, the federale Giorgio Suppiej requested a report on the local 
Catholic organisations’ activity from all the local Fascist secretaries of the province. Local 
Fascist secretaries informed him that local Catholic groups had a generally negative attitude 
towards the regime, being highly influenced by the local priests.
552
 In Musile di Piave, the 
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local Fascist secretary complained that “the farmers care more about the priests than about 
us”.
553
 In Fossò, subversives were among the members of the Catholic organisations, those 
who “could not frontally attack Fascism anymore and try to attack it from the rear”.
554
 The 
local secretaries of San Stino di Livenza, Martellago, Chioggia and Strà simply reported the 
vast presence of former popolari among the ranks of the Catholic Action. The local fiduciary 





       It was the dynamism of the Catholic youth organisations which was the most worrying 
aspect for the regime. The youth branches of the Venetian Catholic Action had their greatest 
recruiting success in 1931, when the number of official members of the organisation reached 
8,520 while only a tiny minority of them had also enrolled in Fascist organisations.
556
 This 
confirmed the national trend which saw 83 % of the Uomini cattolici; 67 % of the Catholic 
youth, 88 % of Catholic Women, and 100 % of the university students not holding PNF 
membership.
557
 Fascists’ frustration with the strong Catholic youth local support provoked a 
series of clashes. Violent acts of intimidation against young Catholics, principally from 
members of the GUF, were initially reported in early May 1931.
558
 The escalation of the 
conflict provoked the prefect’s cancellation of the Council of Ephesus celebration organised 
by the Patriarch La Fontaine for 27 May 1931. The ceremony was meant to be performed 
with the Patriarch surrounded by young Catholics marching and wearing the yellow ribbons 
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which had been emblematic of the Catholic scout groups.
559
 On 29 May 1931, Mussolini 
decided to outlaw all non-party youth groups and decreed the closure of Catholic youth 
circles, which resulted in a further deterioration of the relationship between the State and the 
Church. There were many clashes between Fascist and Catholic groups between the end of 
May and June 1931, which meant that incidents occurred in all provinces. In Venice Province, 
violence was engaged by the blackshirts and those belonging to the outspokenly anti-clerical 
university groups.
560
 On 26 May 1931, a day before the dissolution of Catholic Action, young 
Venetian Fascists accosted catholic churchgoers and ripped their ribbon club signs off their 
jackets.
561
 On the same day 30 students of the GUF stormed the Catholic university circle of 
Palazzo Morosini in Venice where 40 members and the spiritual assistant, priest Scarpa, were 
holding a meeting. Several chandeliers, chairs, tables, and other pieces of furniture were 
damaged.
562
 A few days later, following the official termination of Catholic Action, groups of 
50-100 young Venetian Fascists mostly belonging to the GUF tried to invade the 37 Catholic 
circles of the province. “They were able to penetrate (...) seven youth clubs (...) destroying 
furniture, chandeliers, shattering glass (...). They fought with thirty young Catholics and three 
of them were slightly injured (...).”
563
The attacks were justified by Mussolini who expressed 
his regret over “the manifestly parasitical attitude and hostility of some sectors of Catholic 
Action”.
564
 Fascism was “absolutely determined not to tolerate a multi-colored anti-Fascist 
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movement finding refuge and protection under either old or new flags”.
565
  This document is 
really important as it shows that Catholics had a genuine agency which could contest Fascism. 
 The process of shutting down the Catholic youth leagues took place in stages between May 
and September 1931. On 3 June 1931, the prefect of Venice communicated to Mussolini that 
he had closed 238 catholic youth groups.
566
 Mussolini exhorted the ecclesiastical hierarchy 
“to overcome the old grudges and outdated ideologies of the Popular Party that had become 
the Catholic Action (...)”
567
as “the Fascist regime sincerely wants peace but is not afraid of 
war”. He made clear that when Fascism “goes to war it endures until the end with 
indomitable energy”
568
. Mussolini’s closure of Catholic Action triggered a united reaction of 
all the hierarchies of the Church. On 29 June 1931, Pope Pius XI defined Fascism as a “pagan 
worship of the State” and a “revolution that snatched the young from the Church and Jesus 
Christ, and which inculcates hatred, violence, and irreverence in its own young people”.
569
 
The regime drew intense criticism from the lower clergy, especially from those local priests 
who had always been suspicious about Fascism, such as the parish priest of Spinea, Eugenio 
Florian who actively participated in managing and building up the local Catholic youth 
groups. He defined the Fascists as “contemporary false prophets and Pharisees”.
570
  
The reaction of the local priests was vehement and not even the Patriarch La Fontaine 
renounced the publication of the encyclical Non abbiamo bisogno (We do not need) issued by 
Pope XI in June 1931 to condemn the crisis between State and Church.
571
 The encyclical 
“protested that Catholic Action, both by its nature and essence and by our specific and 
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categorical directives and dispositions, is outside and above any kind of political activity. (…) 
they said it had banners, badges and membership cards and all the external elements of a 





       The quarrel between the Church and State over Catholic Action was resolved by an 
agreement published on 2 September 1931 whereby the organisation was allowed to devote 
itself exclusively to providing spiritual education and caring for the religious needs of its 
members.
573
 Mussolini’s directing and seeking to channel youth activities away from 
Catholic circles did not discourage Catholics from reorganising their movement. They were 
able to rebuild a dense network from the beginning of 1932. The restorative process was 
much faster in the Province of Venice than elsewhere, as some youth groups continued 
meeting the Patriarch La Fontaine covertly during the period of being banned from doing so. 
As was already reported by the prefect in June 1931, “the combative clerical element, after 
being a bit quiet apparently, now began to show signs of activity again”.
574
 Having shrunk to 
slightly more than half of its earlier membership, Catholic youth circles reappeared in 
January 1932 and were able to attract 5,944 members (3,133 men and 2,811 women). 
Another noticeable aspect was that the majority had still not joined the regime’s organisations 
with only 104 members adhering to the Fascist Party.
575
 This leads to the conclusion that the 
totalitarian grip of the Catholics sought by the Fascist Party through violence and military 
discipline ended up increasing Catholic resistance. Catholic discontent stemmed from the 
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policy of youth fascistisation conducted by the regime with even greater insistence after the 
plebiscites of March 1934 and December 1934, when military training became mandatory for 
the male population from the age of 18. As a matter of fact, local priests and youth organisers 
even discouraged the youth from joining the Balilla. In 1934, the local Fascist secretary of 
Scorzè was surprised that the posters bearing the effigy and some sayings of the Duce were 
removed by young Catholics on the instigation of priest Antonio Cercariolo whose aversion 
to the regime was widely known.
576
 The note reported that Cercariolo “had always hindered 
the enrolment of children in the ONB and he had never attended official patriotic 
demonstrations. He propagandised among young people not to join the activities of the party, 
and conversely, he encouraged them to join organisations run by Catholic Action”.
577
 
Concurrently, the prefect also certified the re-building “of real scouting teams within the 
Venetian Catholic Action which are give the name of a saint”.
578
 He added that in the 
previous months in Mirano, likewise “in other municipalities of the dioceses of Treviso, 
Venice, and Portogruaro, the clergy was more eager to increase the number of members of 




       La Fontaine’s adherence to Fascism was more ambivalent than suggested by Renzo De 
Felice.
580
 Until he died in 1935, like Pius XI, the Patriarch preferred to maintain some 
distance between the Church and matters of State and he was, above all, concerned with the 
preservation of the moral authority of the Church and the Pope. Despite the fact that the 
Church regarded the Fascist regime as the first line of defence against the possible socialist 
conquest of power, the State had to “respect the fundamental rights of the Church and of the 
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family over Christian education”. For the Pope “every educational and scholastic monopoly 
that obliges all families physically and morally to join the school of the State was unequal 
and illegal”.
581
 “It was unlikely that La Fontaine was a devout Fascist as was his successor, 
Cardinal Piazza, who went as far to suggest the ‘inseparable unity’ of the ‘Christian tradition 
of the House of Savoy and the imperial power restored with the fasci of Rome’”.
582
 
The real leap of quality in the Catholic adherence to the Fascist regime was found when the 
sanctions of the League of Nations were imposed against Italy. As Gerolamo Lino Moro 
suggested in his article in the Catholic newspaper La Settimana Religiosa, “the decision to 
starve a land that is ‘the mother of all knowledge and the cradle of all progress’ (…) pushes 
us to rally around the leader, in the belief that the embargo might produce the effect of 




3.3 Sustainable Fascism? The Fascist University Groups (1927-1942) 
       This section will examine the role of the so-called ‘second generation’ of young Fascists 
and their attitudes towards the regime. Considerable research has been devoted to the 
complex organisation of the Fascist Party in Italy. However, little interest has been shown in 
the history of the GUF (Gruppi universitari Fascisti) up to now. This is particularly 
surprising given that the GUF was the keystone of Fascist expansion into totalitarianism. 
Destined to take over the political and intellectual leadership of the nation, university students 
represented the elite of the middle class from which Fascism derived its social base. Young 
people were accorded a privileged position as it was especially important for the regime to 
generate a second generation of true young Fascist believers willing to succeed the ‘first hour’ 
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Fascists. Those born between 1910 and 1920 formed a generation entirely grown up under 
Fascism and should theoretically have been most convinced by Fascist indoctrination. 
 
       Generally, this theme has been studied by paying little attention to the organisational and 
ideological instruments applied by the regime to establish a new generation of Fascists. In 
addition, the claim that the regime failed to fascistise university students has been used as the 
main evidence to prove that it was unable to create its own ruling class, thereby undermining 
its totalitarian ambition of regeneration through the Party. The explanation reduces the 
historical and political significance of the Fascist regime. Conversely, Italian historians like 
Luca La Rovere and Simone Duranti have recently been scrutinising university groups with 
the precise aim of reconstructing the structure, formation, selection, and employment of the 
new political elite. La Rovere and Duranti have substantially dismantled the traditional 
‘memorialistic’ theory in which the young generation had rejected Fascism, and moreover, 
they argued that historians have intentionally underestimated the results of the fascistisation 
process of university students in order to rehabilitate the educated youth en masse and allow 




       Initially, the student groups were set up spontaneously and were greatly extended in the 
mid-1920s owing to Secretary Augusto Turati, who worked towards the absorption of pre-
existing independently formed university groups.
 585
 During that period, the GUF had a weak 
national organisation with modest results in terms of recruitment. The steady decline in the 
number of students joining university groups during this period had two main reasons. Firstly, 
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there was the still persistent link of faculties with the former Liberal culture. Higher 
Education was still reliant on professors with marked Liberal backgrounds and therefore 
university education was still not a vehicle for Fascist cultural indoctrination. Most professors 
in Venice were old Liberals and some eminent ones like, Gino Luzzatto and Silvio Trentin, 
signed Benedetto Croce’s anti-Fascist manifesto of intellectuals in 1925.
586
 Secondly, 
students were by far the group holding the most radical positions within the movement, and 
they were largely purged from the Party by secretary Augusto Turati during his vast 
campaign of ‘normalisation’ of the party. For example, radical fascists were still looming 
large within the Venetian student movement. Until 1927, the Venetian GUF had been notably 
involved in clashes with the Catholic youth groups, and in violently manifesting criticism 
towards the hierarchies of Venice University. As was reported by Ferruccio Truffi, Director 
of the Venice Business School, in 1927, the protest was caused by the duration and contents 
of the courses. “The discontented (…) were led by a group of Fascist students”,
587
 and their 
secretary Pio Leoni expected the regime to grant them “the privileges afforded by the 
ministry in favour of ex-combatants”.
588
 As Truffi reported to Volpi, now Minister of Finance, 
on 1 June 1927: 
 
When I entered the school I was greeted by uproars and whistles from a group of 50 students. (…) 
They protested for the publication of the new exams calendar and they said that they could not accept 
it. (…) Students walked away carrying on shouting, and then I knew that at the moment to leave the 




The leaders of the attack were members of the Fascist university group. As Truffi reported: 
                                                 
586
 Gino Luzzatto and Silvio Trentin decided to sign the Manifesto and were being forced to leave the Royal 
Business School. 
587








Discontent appeared suddenly in March, when a group of students expected that I violated the 
procedures in their favour, extending to them the concessions made by the Ministry in favour of the 
ex-combatants. For what has been reported to me then, the discontent of March was led by a group of 
students of the university Fascist group. (…) Some days later, I knew that during a meeting of the 
Fascist students [the secretary of the Fascist students group] affirmed that those concessions were 




Truffi communicated to Volpi on 13 June 1927 that he had decided to close the school in 
order to avoid a new wave of violence. Truffi had already identified the secretary of the 
Fascist university group, Pio Leoni, as the political animator of the disorders. Truffi wrote:  
 
Mr Pio Leoni secretary of the university Fascist students group, led the protest at least in its first 
phase and he aimed to obtain not only the modification of the exams calendar but also my resignation. 
Leoni sent me a letter that was, for its form and substance, really unpleasant, in which he wanted to 




The appointment of the new Party secretary Turati, with his project of a ‘party like a Church’ 
in which the Party had to control all aspects of society, meant the removal of pockets of 
radicalism and independence within the Fascist movement and the integration of the youngest 
into the regime’s life.
592
  The leader of the university students, Pio Leoni, had been expelled 
from the party and Turati appointed a party commissioner to re-establish order within the 
Venetian Business School of Ca’ Foscari. As we have seen in the first chapter, Turati made 
ample use of party commissioners to normalise the party at local level. Truffi was replaced by 
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the Senator Davide Giordano who was appointed extraordinary commissioner for the period 
between 1927 and 1930. Giordano was a surgeon and a famous historian of medicine. He was 
a proud nationalist and one of the founders of the National Alliance together with Pietro Orsi 
and Giovanni Giuriati. Giordano had been Mayor of Venice between 1920 and 1923. In 1924 
Giordano was appointed Senator.
593
 Following Turati’s national guidelines, during his first 
speech at the inauguration of the new academic year, Giordano immediately reaffirmed the 
centralising force of his figure as member of the regime. Giordano’s intentions were to 
restore the authority of the regime at local level. He declared: 
 
My first aim is to express my admiration and appreciation to prof. Truffi. (...) The surgeons tend to (...) 
prune the suspect branches so that the healthy will be not deprived of the support and they will not be 
contaminated (…). It is reasonable to impose pruning.  (...) If someone tells you that my words are 
severe (…) do not believe in that.  New times and the country are waiting for you (...) They solemnly 
need you to be virtuous citizens of this great Italy and to serve it with indefatigable study. Because 
only by studying does the spirit dominate the material and give life to the brute material. Mens agitat 
molem [The mind moves the matter]. (...) Many of you will have the magnificent responsibility to 
represent this Italy over the mountains and the oceans, so that it is no more a derided Italy called the 




In a predominantly moderate environment like the province of Venice, the persistence of 
radicalism among Fascist university groups was a discouraging factor which prevented 
students having more moderate backgrounds from joining Fascist student organisations. For 
example, the Statute of FUCI had forbidden the members of the Catholic university group to 
join the GUF. The fact that FUCI members had been reluctant to join the GUF was also 
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greatly influenced by the still high number of popolari among their ranks, but first and 
foremost, by the local hierarchies’ concern regarding the preservation of the moral 
independence of the Church from political affairs, as the Patriarch La Fontaine aimed to do in 
Venice.
595
 However, the fascistisation of the education system was realized between 1929 
and the early 1930s. The process took many forms. First and foremost, the regime increased 
the political content of school courses including the study of the ‘Fascist doctrine’. Secondly, 
the Grand Council decreed in March 1930 that all the faculty heads and the university rectors 





       Although Turati’s course (1926-1930) had normalised the party and reaffirmed the 
sovereignty of the Party over the provincial Fascism, Carlo Scorza,
597
 member of the Fascist 
Direttorio and ras of Lucca (Tuscany), appointed to direct the University Group in 1930, 
reported to Mussolini in July 1931 that worryingly, the university groups still possessed 
“complete autonomy (…) towards Fascist federations (…), with loss of prestige for both 




       It was under Achille Starace, the so-called ‘mastiff of the revolution’ and Party Secretary 
from 1931 to 1939, that Fascist youth organisations underwent an extraordinary expansion.
599
  
From this point of view Starace was much more effective than his predecessors Augusto 
Turati and Giovanni Giuriati and the expansion of the regime’s youth organisations reached 
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its peak between 1936 and 1940, concurrently with the growth of party membership from 
2,027.440 to 3,169.846.
600
 Starace developed a new strategy by assigning the PNF to control 
the Gioventú Italiana del Littorio in 1937. The organisation was created to replace the 
Organizzazione Nazionale Ballilla. Starace rearranged the entire Fascist youth movement 
along the lines of the Hitler Youth (Hitler-Jugend).
601
 He was appointed Party Secretary 
primarily for his unquestioning and fanatical loyalty to Mussolini. Nonetheless, he managed 
to make the presence of the GIL in the Italian society remarkably influential and he also 
worked towards enhancing the maniacal ‘Myth of the Duce’ from an early age of children’s 
lives by staging massive parades and marches in favour of Mussolini. School propaganda was 
an important means of conveying the heroic image of the Duce. As it was reported by the 
Venetian girl Rita Ballarin in her primary school diary, teachers constantly promoted the 
image of Mussolini as a the man who pacified the country by rallying “the best fighters who 
had returned to their homes mutilated in the war, and they came together in a bundle led by 
the Duce heading for Rome. The king was pleased and gave the command of the homeland to 




       Starace not only focused on familiarising children with Mussolinismo. He also targeted 
his attention on creating an authentic Fascist ruling class able to take positions of 
responsibility within the PNF.  Starace worked towards expanding the movement by 
investing in the GUF half of the budget assigned to the PNF.
603
 From 1932 onwards, elite 
university students could participate in the so-called Littoriali dello Sport (Lictors’ Sporting 
Games). The Littoriali della Cultura e dell’Arte (Lictors’ Culture and Arts Games) were 
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announced the following year and the Venetian GUF’s Il Ventuno became the official 
national newspaper reporting on the cultural and arts games. In 1932, the board of Il Ventuno 
described their work as a literary and cultural avant-garde. Later, the journal became “the 
official magazine of Littoriali of Sport, Culture, Art and Labour” appointed to record the 
events and results of competitions.
604
 The Il Ventuno forged high profile figures both in the 
cultural and political fields. Francesco Pasinetti, the founding father of Il Ventuno, was the 
first Italian student who graduated with a thesis topic about the history of cinema, Armando 




It was the Littoriali competitions that could serve best to illustrate the centrality that Fascism 
now gave to physical strength. As Il Ventuno reported, sport was the privilege of a few 
amateurs before the Fascist Revolution,
606
 whereas it was popularised and made accessible to 
a wider public under the regime. This meant that even the tiny desolate village of Concordia 
Sagittaria in the eastern part of the province of Venice could establish its annual cycling 
competition.
607
 As some clandestine anti-Fascist leaders admitted, sports remained the most 
effective means of neutralising and indoctrinating youth. Especially by the mid-1930s, it was 
difficult to distinguish sports from military training with youth embracing such kinds of virile 
sports as marching, boxing, shooting, or hard individual sports such as cycling and alpinism. 
Although sports became increasingly popular also among the Venetian lower classes, 
activities involving literature, art, cinema, fashion, and consumer items that were advertised 
in the official GUF newspaper Il Ventuno, remained practically confined to the middle and 
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upper middle class elite. The most educated members of the upper middle and upper youth 
classes found an entity in the regime that supported their social expectations and interests 
about nationalistic themes, physical and paramilitary activities. In Venice province, many 
nationalist upper-middle and upper class clubs and their leadership had already declared their 
support for physical and paramilitary education. Even though the Littoriali succeeded in 
obtaining the passive consent of the Italian bourgeoisie and mobilising the upper-middle and 
upper classes of the province, they struggled to evangelise the Venetian working class in 
which the myth of the new man failed to resonate. Since the beginning of the twentieth 
century, Venetian workers’ parties thought that any kind of sports activity was “a disguised 
form of nationalism and irredentism (...) a war cry, a snare and delusion for those committed 
to the brotherhood of people’. According to Elia Musatti, the first Socialist deputy in Venice, 
elected for five consecutive legislatures from 1909 to 1929 and very popular among the 
proletariat, workers should have rejected sports as they did not match the interests of the 
proletariat. Consequently, nationalism, irredentism, and sporting activities were condemned 
in socialist youth branches and Musatti “harshly criticised those better-off youths in the City 
(of Venice) who for decades had been involved in modern sports, target shooting, gymnastics, 
basketball, cycling, rowing, and football being evident examples”.
608
 Under Fascism, with 
none of this socialist counter-propaganda, sport could be used to ‘nationalise’ young workers. 
As Corner argued “for most young people, youth, educational, and sporting organisations 
would be the principal point of contact with the regime, but there would be a radical 
difference for those who left school at thirteen or fourteen (the vast majority) and those who 
carried on to a higher level”.
609
 Generally, Italian working teenagers were forced to perform 
manual labour in fields or factories; therefore, they tended to flee the organisations of the 
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regime. What shed additional light on the attitude of the working class towards physical and 
paramilitary activities was an internal study of the GIL completed in May 1939 which 
highlighted the regime’s inability to contact many young people in the Mezzoggiorno and the 




       Popular sporst such as football, alpinism and cycling became more available for the 
lower classes through the Fascist Dopolavoro, although sports still remained an activity for 
better-off young. The Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro (OND) was set up with the aim of 
involving and mobilising masses in favour of the Fascist regime and involving people in a 
countless number of events. The events were often jointly organised by the OND and GIL, 
(Gioventừ Italiana del Littorio), also co-operating with Fascist university groups. The OND 
proposed a series of activities: theatrical dramas, excursions, visits, and sport events. 
Participation was sometimes compulsory as in the case of the public clerks of Chioggia, 
whereas in the countryside it was rather an occasion for the community to come.
611
 The 
Venetian OND in conjunction with the GIL, focused on re-educating the new generation 
about seafaring culture which had made most of the city’s fortunes at the time of the 
Serenissima. This happened by assigning young people to manage cultural, recreational, and 
sport events. For instance, the NUF (Nucleo Universitario Fascista) of Chioggia was directly 
responsible for organising the local ‘Fish Festival’ (Sagra del Pesce), which was established 
for the first time in 1938 in order to support the regime’s autarkic propaganda. The opening 
of the ceremony was chaired by the Duke of Genoa and the Minister Edmondo Rossoni. As 
reported by booklet of the event sponsored by the local NUF and the OND: 
 
You, foreigner, who come to Chioggia for this ‘Fish Festival’, think that the event has been organised 
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not only to eat the fresh fish cooked by the chioggiotti (people from Chioggia) (…), but the event has 
also been arranged, first and foremost, to promote the most glorious fleet of the world that first 
understood the directives of the Duce: (...) having all the coasts at our disposal, we have to realise 




The regime insisted on the Venetian identity with a particular reference to the ‘return to the 
sea’. As quoted in F. Mariani-F. Stocco-G. Crovato, La reinvezione di Venezia: tradizioni 
cittadine negli anni ruggenti, “youth and adults had to be educated to the seafaring life and a 
new generation steeped in the ancient and eminent traditions of the city (...) had to be formed. 
(…)  The seafaring tradition of the Dominante, which had to be known and remembered by 
all the citizens, was revitalised by the Fascist organisations and the sports clubs thanks to the 
picturesque regatta”.
613
 For example, on
 
19 August 1939, the NUF of Chioggia was able to 
organise a magnificent regatta from Chioggia to Venice with 400 traditional boats (bragozzi). 
Giuseppe Volpi chaired the event supported by the attendance of both the Italian and German 
Ministers for People’s Culture, Dino Alfieri and Joseph Goebbels. The presence of Volpi at 
such kinds of events was not unusual as the Venetian GUF could obtain financial support 
from the ‘Venetian Group’ (Gruppo Veneziano) of industrialists backing Volpi.
614
 The use of 
the GUF was not confined by Starace to creating the structure of training concerning the new 
ruling class. The feeling of being an already active element of a new ruling class was 
expressed by Armando Boscolo, the local secretary of the university group of Chioggia: 
 
Education has finally found a solid place within the regime as Fascism wants to train its future leaders. 
Those young already been called to hold positions of responsibility in GIL and the Party, they will 
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not be going to be only ‘future’ bosses (capi) of the lazy bourgeoisie. On the contrary, they will be 
the vanguard that precede the small mass of students (goliardi) who are going to realise the 




The vital role that the GUF had in the life of the party under Starace was also confirmed by 
Venetian federale Suppiej who reported that the party’s management was heavily influenced 
by “the disproportionate number of activities carried out by the university group (...)”.
616
 
Documents regarding the Venetian GUF confirm that this trend did not change in the 
following years.
617
 The Venetian secretary of the GUF, Gianluigi Dorigo, wrote to 
Chancellor Lanzillo in 1938, hoping that Ca’ Foscari could “adequately” finance the 
Venetian GUF due to the importance of their action, initiatives and especially for their 
contribution to developing “the integral education of the Fascist university students as the 
DUCE required.”
618
 Several elements indicate that the Venetian gufini, other Italian Fascist 
students, considered themselves the embodiment of the regime during the 1930s and they also 
hoped to take over the leadership of the country in order to carry on with the project set out 
by Mussolini. Unsurprisingly, this belief of the gufini sparked confrontation with all those 
who were critical of Fascist integralism. Having been educated entirely within the framework 
of the regime, the gufini were among the most ardent supporters of the Fascist totalitarian 
project. Therefore, any reluctance to deliver the regime’s messages by the regime provoked 
their institutional criticism as well. For example, criticism arose regarding the rector Agostino 
Lanzillo towards the end of the 1930s. Agostino Lanzillo was appointed rector of the Royal 
Advanced Institute of Economics and Commerce in Venice in 1935 and remained in charge 
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until 1939. At the beginning of his career he was a revolutionary syndicalist, but later on he 
became a close collaborator of Giuseppe Bottai and contributor to the journal Critica 
Fascista, which was founded and edited by Bottai himself from 1923 to 1943. The journal 
sparked the cultural debate on the future ruling class. Critica Fascista also focused on the 
interactions between Fascism, youth, and society. Furthermore, the publication rallied the 
critical vanguard (fronda) within Fascism, insisting on reforming the State and society. 
Lanzillo was appointed a few months before the appointment of Bottai as Minister for 
National Education. His directorate seems to have been characterised by the increasing 
instability of the relations between the GUF and the members of the Royal Institute, which 
was probably due to his critical stance on the failure of the economic and social policies of 
the regime. 
   
       The organisation of Littoriali provided the opportunity for young Fascists to express their 
criticism of Lanzillo’s work, and such situations sometimes escalated into real institutional 
clashes. For example, Lanzillo called the secretary of the GUF to order in 1938 because 
“when someone is connected to the Royal Institute, certain indispensable forms shall be 
maintained”.
619
 Lanzillo also complained about not having been invited to the Littoriali of 
cinema organised by the Venetian GUF.
620
 The rector was also criticised for his “pliable” 
attitude towards professors not completely aligned with the regime. More specifically, 
Lanzillo was accused of tolerating anti-Fascist professors within the institute. A striking 
example was the case of Italo Siciliano, an expert on French studies and professor of French 
language and literature, who became rector of Ca’ Foscari in 1953. Siciliano received 
anonymous threats (later identified to have been sent by members of the GUF) that focused 
on the anti-Fascist nature of his political views, and likewise, Lanzillo was targeted as well 
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for tolerating Siciliano’s anti-Fascist stance. Fascist students knew “the (political) likes and 
dislikes of the professor very well”.
621
 The gufini’s main demand was for a generational 
change in order to give a boost to the Fascist revolution. Even though the youth valourisation 
campaign of the regime was launched in 1934, the number of students in responsible 
positions began to rise dramatically with Italy’s entrance into the war, reaching a peak of 
10,776 students (equivalent to about 8 % of all the students enrolled in the GUF) in 1941. In 
Venice province, this process was slower due to the solidity of the traditional local elite 
power and the tendency to an internal co-opting. Therefore, it was only in 1942 that the 
Venetian party saw the first gufino to be appointed federale of the Province of Venice.
622
 The 
widespread intransigent behaviour of the Venetian gufini and their criticism of the institutions 
of the regime seems to confirm that the regime reached its goal of educating a second integral 
generation of Fascists in the province of Venice. In agreement with La Rovere and Duranti, 
the present thesis also aims to dismantle the long-standing proposition accredited by the 
memoirs and historiography of the GUF and supported by De Grand, which holds that the 
infiltration of discontent of the late 1930s “took on an air of fronde as the young Fascists 
engaged in their own generational warfare against an ageing Fascist political class”.
623
 What 
emerges from this work is that young people demanded generational change motivated by 
their resolute political faith in Fascism which indeed brought about situations that 
occasionally led to real institutional criticism. They invariably aimed to continue the ‘Fascist 
revolution’. Although historians have questioned whether the critical propositions of the 
gufini towards the regime really constituted a form of hidden anti-Fascism or not, there is no 
doubt that young Fascists  during the closing years of the 1930s were calling for a better and 
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 In my view, extending the search concerning the origins of the new 
anti-Fascism to all university students was often inappropriate, even though it constituted a 
specific objective of a tiny minority. Despite post-war reminiscences contributing to the 
emergence of the idea that youth were gradually abandoning the activities of the GUF in 
order to join the militant anti-Fascist groups, it remains an interpretation that can only be 
considered retrospectively.
625
 Furthermore, this way of understanding the course of events 
can be explained by the post-war political necessity to rehabilitate a generation educated 
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4. The Venetian Jewish Community under Fascism (1922-1944)  
 
Introduction 
       This chapter will discuss the racial campaign launched by Benito Mussolini against 
Italian Jews between 1938 and 1943. This section will investigate the origins of the Fascist 
Race Laws, discussing the influence of the colonial ventures of the regime in Africa and 
Middle East on the development of race legislation within the Fascist regime. In order to do 
that our analysis will begin with the success achieved by Mussolini in Ethiopia in 1936. The 
discussion will provide a serious challenge to the established narrative of the ‘Good Italian’, 
which involved the fallacious assumption that the Italian Race Laws did not constitute a 
serious threat for Italian Jews because they were not completely enforced and could be easily 
evaded.
626
 The chapter will discuss the racial campaign until 1943, when Italy was occupied 
by the Nazis. It will demonstrate that the implementation of the Race Laws was also 
influenced, but not officially encouraged, by the progressively closer relationship between 
Mussolini and Hitler after the Pact of Steel in 1939, which formally ratified the pact of 
friendship, and military and political alliance, between Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany.  
 
       The Italian historian Renzo De Felice was the first historian to draw attention to the 
severity of Italian Race Laws. His study, The Jews in Fascist Italy: A History, was based on 
extensive research conducted in Italian Fascist archives as well as the study of Italian Jewish 
primary sources. The first edition of the monograph was published in Italian in 1961 and 
revised in 1993. However, De Felice’s book was for a long time confined to the Italian 
language audience. The author’s work had a limited international circulation as an English 
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language translation only appeared fourty years after the original and after the author’s death 
in 1996.
627
 However, the study of the Italian Jewish Community under Fascism (in the 
English language) progressed significantly between the late 1970s and the late 1980s with the 
research of Meir Michaelis, who documented the relations between the Fascist and Nazi 
regime with regard to the development of the anti-Semitic campaign.
628
 Michaelis argued that 
Fascist Italy’s embracing of racism was determined by Mussolini alone. Italian Race Laws 
were not forced on him by Hitler nor by the radical racist wing of the Fascist Party. With this 
contention, Michaelis refuted De Felice’s tendency to put the blame for antisemitism and the 
Holocaust in Italy on the country’s German occupiers during the later stages of the Second 
World War, leaving the Italian people and Mussolini relatively free of guilt (the myth of the 
‘Good Italian’). By the 1990s, the work of a new generation of historians such as Michele 
Sarfatti and Liliana Fargioni Picciotto shed further new light on the topic (in the English 
language too), extending the debate to an international audience. They established that anti-
Jewish policies in Fascist Italy began earlier than had previously been accepted in the 
historical literature. Michele Sarfatti’s The Jews in Mussolini’s Italy: from Equality to 
Persecution established that the Fascist regime waged a debilitating campaign against Italian 
Jews during the period 1938-1943 and therefore before the Nazi occupation of Italy in 
September 1943. This placed Mussolini at the head of a puppet Fascist state known as the 
Republic of Salò and the Nazis, in collaboration with Mussolini’s republic, implemented their 
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‘Final Solution’ on Italian soil.
629
 The Italian Race Laws in certain respects went further than 
the initial German equivalent of 1933 which had primarily regulated miscegenation and 
mixed marriages. In contrast, the Italian Laws ruled that Jews could no longer join the 
military service; they were banned from any state employment and from owning businesses, 
land or urban buildings. They also contained specific provisions relating to revocation of 
Italian citizenship from those who had obtained it after 1919. In addition, Susan Zuccotti and 
Alexander Stille, alongside the German historian Klaus Voigt, were among the first to 
establish that the Italian regime’s attitude toward Jewish refugees in 1933–45 was 




       Regional studies have already discussed the ‘Jewish Question’ from a local perspective 
and these include books by Fabio Levi for the case of Turin, Enzo Collotti for Tuscany and 
Silvia Bon for the account of Trieste in he North East. The Venice archives offer no great 
surprises. Sources are generally consistent with the picture at the national level. An 
examination of the Race Laws and a comparison with other northern communities reveals a 
number of similarities, but also some interesting differences. These differences can be 
understood as a result of the differing size and composition of the relevant communities; of 
differences in regional history and culture: off more geographical factors, like proximity to 
the border (accounting in part for the large number of foreign Jews in Turin and Trieste). 
Different levels of organisation in the Jewish communities were also important factors. Some 
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of these differences relate to factors such as the size and wealth of the Jewish community, the 
level of commercial competition, and the organisation and priorities of the local Fascist Party. 
This research will provide some opportunities for significant comparisons with the 
communities of Turin, Trieste and Ferrara. The chapter will highlight the differences between 
the communities with regard to the implementation of the Race Laws and thus revealing how 
they impacted on the local economy of Venice province. This will allow us to demonstrate 
that Venetian Jews were holding important positions within the local economy, and it will 
investigate close links of the economically powerful sections of the Jewish community with 
local Fascist leaders such as Giuseppe Volpi.  
 
        The question of Italians’ participation in the Fascist campaign of racism deserves further 
exploration. Therefore, this chapter on the Venetian Jewish community is meant not only to 
serve as survey of the measures taken against Venetian Jews after 1938, but also as a 
reconsideration of the question of the popular support for Mussolini’s race campaign. The 
chapter will focus on the local Jewish community, the dynamics of integration within 
Venetian society and the crucial role Jewsplayed in various Venetian social and interest 
groups. It will analyse the effect of the Race Laws on the Venetian Jewish community, the 
reaction of local people and the way in which Fascists and elites responded to the persecution 
of Jewish citizens.  
 
       The principal source material will be the police and prefectual reports held in the 
Direzione Generale di Pubblica Sicurezza; they will be supplemented by a variety of 
secondary sources. The aim is to explore the behaviour of police, prefects, Fascist 
organisations and ordinary Venetians which would be difficult to measure at the national 
level. At the same time, this chapter aims to point out that Fascist anti-Semitism was not 
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shaped according to Nazi racial laws, but on an autonomous basis, following previous racial 
legislation introduced in Abyssinia by the colonial government. The argument of this chapter 
will dismantle the post-war myth of the ‘Good Italian’ which proved to be important in 
minimising the extent of the impact and the implementation of the Race Laws in Italy. Thus, 
it will demonstrate the culpability of the Fascist regime and local Fascists in persecuting Jews. 
Furthermore, it will show that despite awareness of the ongoing Holocaust, Italian military 
and civilian authorities supported the Germans in deporting Jews from Venice.  
 
4.1  From the Ethiopian Campaign to the Publication of the Racial 
‘Manifesto’ in 1938 
      Arguably, the Mediterranean and North African colonial ventures of the Fascist regime 
were crucial in influencing the racial turn which was established in Italy after the 
promulgation of the Race Laws. Almost simultaneously with the anti-Jewish campaign, the 
regime was heavily involved in an expansionist campaign in Africa to conquer Ethiopia and 
Somalia in order to integrate them with the previous colonial possessions in Libya. The 
‘civilising’ mission implemented by Mussolini in the colonies which turned into a genocidal 
colonialism carried out under the regime, appeared to have been increasingly implemented 
with a racist vision in mind.
631
 The conquest of Ethiopia underlined the racial distinctions 
between the ‘white Italian soldiers’ and the ‘African natives’.
632
  Imperial expansion – 
together with the increasing phenomenon of racial mixing, which was a political 
embarrassment for the regime – occasioned a new body of legislation, the laws for the 
protection of the Italian race in the colonies which for the most part predated the Race Laws 
against Jews. The colonial laws and the Race Laws inevitably shared a number of common 
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principles, including prohibition of interracial and extramarital relationships, and other 
provisions designed to preserve the dominant role of the white Christian Italians and prevent 
races mixing which was considered morally and racially dangerous. The colonial laws shared 
certain ideological assumptions with the Race Laws and were presented as part of a common 




       Therefore, these Mediterranean and North African colonial ventures appear to have 
influenced the racial rule which had been established in Italy, opened the doors to a relatively 
new premise of scientific racism, and influenced governmental decisions with regards to the 
implementation of racial legislation in Italy. This situation laid the foundations for the 
publication of ‘The ‘Manifesto of Racial Scientists’ or the ‘Manifesto degli Scienziati 
Razzisti’ in July 1938, a collaborative of ethnic Italian intellectuals and university professors 
chosen by Mussolini. The Manifesto was intended to promote the biological, cultural, and 
natural primacy of race, eugenics, and racial stratification as basic parameters of Fascist 
imperial expansion. The ideas promoted by the Manifesto provided diverse and often 
contradictory concepts regarding racial discourse, which included the Nordic Aryan racial 
identity of Italian citizens, anti-Semitic ideas, anti-Africanism, and references to the 
uniqueness of the Italian race by providing a biological definition of race. According to the 
Manifesto, human races biologically exist and the majority of Italians were an Aryan race; 
and it established which races were intended not to belong to this group.
634
 The Aryan group 
did not include those of African, Oriental or Jewish origins. The Manifesto also claimed that 
the Italian Race was more closely related to Germans than North Africans.
635
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       The Manifesto proved to be a decisive shift to the development of Italian racism and 
promoted certain ideas with regards to conservation of the purity of the race. Conservation of 
the race included the banning of sexual relations with people of non-Aryan race. The 
prohibition of mixed race relationships shows that this racial ideology was promoted in 
reality.   
 
4.2 The Proclamation of the Race Laws (1938-1939)                                                                                               
       On the eve of the racial laws, according to the Fascist census, 40,000-45,000 Jews lived 
in Italy, representing about 1.1 per thousand of Italy’s entire population. Between 1931 and 
1938, over 97 percent of Jews were recorded as living in northern and central Italy, more 
specifically between the Alps and the cities of Rome and Ancona.
636
 Following a trend from 
the previous century, they had by now abandoned the small towns and minor provincial 
capitals in favour of mid-sized to large cities, focusing in particular on the major regional and 
national industrial and commercial centres. In 1931, Venice was the seventh largest Italian 
urban centre after Rome, Milan, Naples, Genoa, Turin, Palermo and Florence (in descending 
order). At the same time, Venice had the greatest concentration of Jews after Rome, Milan, 
Trieste, Turin and Florence.
637
 Nationally, the process of urban concentration had started 
during the Liberal age, producing a growth in the number of Jews and the greatest 
demographic increase took place between 1911 and 1938, with a significant growth occurring 
also within the Venice community which increased from 1,405 in June 1911 to 2,365 in 
August 1938. Venetian Jews were concentrated in the capital rather than being spread over 
the province, and the community was medium-size, differing from larger northern Italian 
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communities like Turin and Trieste which respectively accounted for around 4,000 and 6,000 
Jews in the late 1930s, being then among the largest Italian communities with Rome.
638
  
Like other northern Italian Jewish communities, the majority of Venetian Jews had Iberian 
ancestry.
639
 Their assimilation into Venetian social and economic life occurred during the 
Risorgimento. A large number of Venetian Jews took part in the independence wars in 1848-
49 with the Venetian Rabbi being a member of the provisional government of the San Marco 
Republic, led by Daniele Manin.  Owing to the legacy of Serenissima, Venetians of Jewish 
background had long been integrated into political, commercial and social life, with their 
patriotism being clearly expressed in the First World War and commemorated in a memorial 
to the community’s war dead at the Tempio Spagnolo in 1923.
640
  Their integration had 
progressively produced a social fracture within the community itself and there was therefore 
a great diversity among Venetian Jews at the local level. Venetian upper class Jews were 
distinctive in their culture and attitude. Since the Liberal age, the upper class and 
predominantly secularised Jews who had progressively achieved an important status, had left 
the ghetto to live among other Venetians joining the main central quarters of Venice (San 
Marco); meanwhile, the Jews from lower classes, the poorest, remained confined in the 
ghetto area (Canareggio and San Geremia quarters). The story of the Venetian Jews reflected 
that of Jewish assimilation elsewhere. More prosperous Jews often visited the synagogue 
only for great celebrations expressly addressed to the wealthy class of Jews. In addition, they 
tended to employ private tutors to give elementary instruction at home because Jewish 
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schools were mainly designated for the Jews of lesser means.
641
 Venetian upper class Jews 
had left the ghetto a generation ahead of many Italian Jews and tended to take a measure of 




       Venetian Jews did not have a uniform economic status; nevertheless, documents confirm 
a national trend and demonstrate that Venetian Jews were, on average, higher earning than 
their Italian peers.
643
 Even in their professional choices and fields of economic activities, 
Jews displayed specific characteristics that were frequently associated with their high 
educational levels and their urban status. On the eve of the Race Laws, Venetian Jews were 
bourgeois professionals employed in Liberal arts, businessmen, financiers, bankers but they 
were also teachers, lawyers, workers, merchants, and artisans, with a estimated 40 % of the 
community’s children born 1932-35 resulting from ‘mixed’ marriages in.
644
 In terms of social 
and economic status, the overwhelming majority of Venetian Jews possessed a great level of 
wealth, but the number of people assisted by the Community on a regular or occasional basis 
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       While Venetian Jewry in many respects followed the national trends, with regard to 
economic activity they differed markedly from other north Italian communities. Venetian 
Jews were exceptionally concentrated in finance and insurance-related activities, unlike their 
counterparts in cities like Ferrara, where Jews had primarily rural interests, or Turin, the 
second largest industrial city after Milan in the late 1930s which included a large percentage 
of working class people, but also an important core of intellectuals. In addition, foreign Jews 
were almost absent in Venice. Foreign Jews were especially numerous in other regions 
bordering with Venice like Trento and Trieste which possessed a strong legacy of Austrian 





       From the early days of the Fascist regime until the proclamation of the Race Laws, it 
appears that Fascist sympathies ran deep among Venetian Jews and as if to emphasise this 
point, Jews were present in many of the key organisations of the city, from the Fenice opera 
house to the Volpi-led Assicurazioni Generali insurance company, to the Fascist Party. 
Among the most important Fascist Jews was Max Ravà, businessman, president of the 
Istituto di Credito Fondiario who was to hold a leadership position within the national and 
the local Jewish community until the proclamation of the Race Laws. Ravà was friendly with 
various Fascist leaders, in particular with his patron, the gerarca Giuseppe Volpi. The former 
was determined in his support of Fascism, backing the Jewish newspaper La Nostra Bandiera 
(Our Flag) edited in Turin which had been founded by Ettore Ovazza in 1934 in order to 
tackle the idea that was spreading that Italian Jews were predominantly philo-zionists. This 
assertion requires a bit of background.  The progressively negative attitude of the regime 
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towards the Zionist movement was linked to the engagement of Fascist Italy with nations and 
governments in the Arab Middle East. The initial strengthening of political, military and 
cultural ties between the Arab nations, especially with Palestine, and Fascist Italy were meant 
to challenge the presence of the British authorities in the region. However, the Duce and 
other Italian nationalists increasingly began to fear that an influential Zionist movement could 
act as a rival nationalism and therefore alienate the Italian Jewish community. In particular, 
Mussolini thought that the Zionists possessed feelings of allegiance to two homelands, with a 
strong preference for Palestine. This was deeply disturbing to Mussolini who turned the 
Italian Zionists automatically into suspects. Therefore, Mussolini turned to support the 
Revisionist movement led by Ze’ev Jabotinsky, who was outspokenly anti-British and used 
Zionist revisionists to disrupt the British presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Jabotinsky 
was both a nationalist and a Liberal democrat whose Revisionist Zionism was based on the 
political Zionism built on the thought of Theodor Herzl, the founding father of modern 
political Zionism. His philosophy contrasted with that of the socialist oriented Labor Zionists, 





       Mussolini, following the failure of his attempts to enlist the support of the Zionist 
organisation for Italian ambitions to take over the Palestine Mandate from the British, 
attacked ‘international Zionism’ and turned his support to Arab nationalism.
648
  
From 1934 and then after the racial laws, the aim of the bandieristi (supporters of the La 
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Nostra bandiera) was to collaborate with the regime in order to isolate Zionist and anti-




       Venetian Jews with a general pro-Fascist attitude comprised the majority of their 
community, with bandieristi and Fascist Jewish commissioners leading the community until 
the Race Laws. As Levis Sullam argued, the process of nationalising and fascistising 
Venice’s synagogues proceeded rapidly. For example, the prayer for the king was extended to 
include the Duce. The 25th anniversary of Vittorio Emanuele III’s reign in 1925 and the 
founding of the empire in 1936 were celebrated. Depending on the occasion, Nationalist 
songs and the Fascist hymn ‘Giovinezza’ (Youth), were added to the official liturgy. These 
celebrations saw the majority of the Venetian Jews participating, sanctioning the fusion of 




       Although Venetian Jews were well integrated, the Zionist movement had some following 
within the community, distracting part of the members from their primary loyalty to Italy and 
the regime. A Venetian Zionist Federation had been already established in 1903 and in line 
with the national movement, it underwent a transformation in the second and third decade of 
the twentieth century, rejecting the philanthropic aspects of Zionism that had been dominant 
at the beginning of the century. As reported in the statute established in 1922, the Venetian 
Zionist Group aimed at supporting “the creation of a national homeland for the Jewish people 
in Palestine based upon basic human rights” and “cooperating to realise the secular 
aspirations of Israel and re-establishing a Jewish Palestine”. In addition, the group aspired to 
“raise the level of Zionist awareness among its members through the organisation of regular 
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meetings, conferences, Hebrew language classes”, and working for the “the dissemination of 
the Zionist propaganda among the Jews within the Venetian Jewish community” and “outside 
propaganda directed at non-Jews aimed at defending Jewish dignity”.
651
 These activities laid 
the foundation for the future realisation of a pioneering nationalist spirit on the part of the 
youngest Jews. The increase of the Zionist group’s activities at the beginning of the 1930s 
caused a period of instability within the Venetian Jewish community which resulted in the 
resignation en masse of the entire board chaired by the fascistophile Max Ravà in 1934. The 
period of uncertainty in Venice coincided with the period of Achille Starace as national 
secretary of the Fascist Party, who not only launched a grandiose Fascistisation campaign 
over Italians (‘Going to the People’), but also aligned himself with Mussolini’s attacks on 
international Zionism, and an imposition of a stricht control over Italian Jewish communities 
as well.  Although the majority of Venetian Jews were philofascist, Starace’s new policies 
created tension between Jews and Fascists. The government imposed the young Jewish 
lawyer Aldo Coen Porto (whose three immediate relatives were later deported to Auschwitz) 
as government commissioner over the Venetian Jewish community in 1934. Coen Porto was 
replaced in 1937 and his successor, the Jewish businessman, Aldo Finzi, remained in charge 
until a member of the community, Giuseppe Jona, was elected president in 1940.
652
 Giuseppe 
Jona was born in Venice on 28 October 1866 to a Jewish family. He enrolled at the 
University of Padua and graduated in medicine in 1892. He practiced as a doctor at the Civil 
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Hospital of Venice, which he entered in 1896, remaining there until 1936. On 10 April 1921 
he was elected president of the Ateneo Veneto and he remained in charge for four years.  In 
October 1938, following the promulgation of the Race Laws, Jona was forced to leave the 
University as were all the other Jewish staff. On 16 June 1940, a few days after Italy’s entry 
into the war, he became President of the Jewish Community of Venice in which he had 
already worked as a counsellor from 1932 to 1934. During his presidency, the Jewish 
population went through hard times, under fire from heavily anti-Semitic propaganda. After 
the German occupation of Venice, following the armistice of 8 September 1943, the situation 
worsened, with raids in the ghetto and the deportation of Venetian Jews to the death camps. 
In order to ensure the Nazis did not obtain the list of Venetian Jews, Jona committed suicide 




       While the discord within Italian Judaism between philofascists and Zionists was 
intensifying, Fascism was engaged in the campaign for the conquest of Ethiopia in 1936. The 
new colonial war was approved by the majority of Italian Jews in the synagogues and in the 
Jewish press. Venetian Jewish views were in line with the national trend, being inspired by 
pro-Fascist sentiments and patriotic ideals. Coen Porto and Finzi’s administrations proved to 
be satisfactory to the authorities and the prefect, Catalano, reported the profound patriotism 
of the Jewish community, which donated four kilograms of silver stripped from the 
synagogues during the Ethiopian war, with Rabbi Ottolenghi joining Volpi in the collection. 
The Jewish community formally donated 50,000 lire to the local branch of the Fascist Party 
to celebrate the new empire in East Africa.
654
 However, the conquest of Ethiopia led 
Mussolini officially to embrace racism and anti-Semitism. The foundation of the Empire, and 
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the acquired dominion over millions of Africans, pushed Mussolini from racist theory to 
practice, imposing an apartheid-like system on the colonies. In addition, Mussolini’s 
increasing alignment with Hitler led him to promote more openly anti-Semitic positions. 
Given the supreme significance of racist antisemitism in Nazi Ideology, a Fascist-Nazi 
coalition could not function without the adoption of similar polices. Mussolini’s decision to 





       The racial turn taken by the regime with the conquest of Ethiopia in 1936 had immediate 
consequences on a local level. The existence of a well-integrated and prosperous Jewish 
community, with wealthy Jews forming the backbone of Venice’s economy, meant the anti-
Jewish campaign from the beginning took on a particular flavour and accusations were to be 
worse than in many other cities. The ‘work of paring down’ had local Fascists as protagonists 
from 1936, and Venice’s anti-Semitic campaign had centred on the real or perceived political 
and economic power of Jews. As a Fascist informer pointed out, the campaign was 
orchestrated by local Fascists with the approval of central authority, and it was organised in 
order to oppose the confirmation of the “well-Known” Max Ravà as the head of the Venetian 
Istituto di Credito Fondiario in 1936. The aim of the campaign was to eliminate a “really 
powerful Jew” from the eminent position which he still enjoyed in Venice.
656
 Ravà’s removal 
was not an isolated phenomenon. Similar cases were happening in nearby provinces like 
Ferrara where a campaign was launched in the same year (1936) against the Jewish podestà 
Renzo Ravenna. From a local perspective, the case of Ravà represented only the first chapter 
of a process which closely involved the Party and the economy of the city in the late 1930s. 
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Ravà’s dismissal from the Instituto di Credito Fondiario in 1936 directly involved Giueppe 
Volpi who had patronised his ascent in Venice. Given the make-up of the Venetian business 
groupings and Volpi’s friendship with Alberto Musatti and other leading figures of the 
Venice’s Jewish community, the anti-Semitic campaign represented a drastic change in terms 
of local power relationship, as Venetian Fascists were cynically taking the seats left by Jews 
in economic organisations or in the Party, weakening Volpi’s network of influence. As if to 
confirm it, the government requested local authorities to carry on an investigation of Volpi’s 
entourage, and a file was opened on the Venetian Fascist federale, Ludovico Foscari, in 
November 1938. Foscari was suspected by the prefect of being married to a woman of Jewish 
origins.
657
 The anti-Semitic campaign touched eminent national figures of Fascism and Volpi 
and other gerarchi with Jewish connections tried to safeguard their interests and those of their 
Jewish clients. For example, Volpi, Balbo, Federzoni and Grandi, spoke against the Race 
Laws during the meetings of the Grand Council.
658
 The marginalisation of Jews started with 
those who held holding influential positions in society and therefore many Jews may at this 
stage have remained unaware of any persecution or limitation of freedom in the mid-1930s. 
However, the case of Ravà (1936) clearly demonstrated that the racist campaign had already 




       Mussolini had an ambivalent attitude and tried to mediate diplomatically between 
international Jewry, the Western powers and Germany. However, his attempts to appeal to a 
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moderate Zionism had vanished by 1938 with the promulgation of the Italian Race Laws. 
Although it has been well established that the Germans never encouraged official racial 
legislation in Italy,
660
 Mussolini’s imitation of the Nuremberg Laws can be ascribed to the 
diplomatic positioning of Italy alongside Germany in the late 1930s and Mussolini’s will to 
please his ally.  
 
       Although policies were already hostile to the Venetian Jews, in the months before the 
promulgation of the Race Laws in November 1938, an informer confirmed that the general 
attitude of the Venetian community towards the regime was still positive. As it was reported 
to Mussolini, the Rabbi Adolfo Ottolenghi as well as all the other leaders of the Venetian 
Jewish community were generally considered “subservient to the regime’s institutions” and 
“of good moral and political conduct”.
661
 However, following the proclamation of the Race 
Laws, Venice settled into a pattern not wholly dissimilar to other cities. The 1938 racial 
campaign was conducted through the media, the central and local state administration and 
graffiti campaigns, and soon after the Race Laws had been promulgated, people could read on 
the windows of important Venetian cafe’ and bars that “Jews were not welcome” anymore.
662
 
The history of a well-integrated Jewish community changed drastically as the racial 
legislation had immediate local impact and hit Jews badly. As reported by an anonymous 
informer, Venetian Jews were demoralised and materially hit by the Race Laws.
663
 More 
clearly still, Rabbi Ottolenghi was slapped when Fascists congregated in the ghetto, and rocks 
and rubbish were hurled at the synagogue, which was stained with graffiti urging “death to all 
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 Another case pointed out by an anonymous informer, involved the well-known First 
World War veteran and lawyer Raffaele Levi. When Levi complained about not being served 
by the waiter at the cafe’ Quadri, he was rebuffed by the owner who stated that they did not 




       Looking at the documentation, there are a number of decisions around relatively less 
significant questions like listening to the radio, bans to Jews to keep shops.
666
 Most of these 
anti-Jewish actions were similarly on a national scale, and much of the effort appears to have 
gone into surveillance activities rather than enforcement of the law. A number of restrictions 
were implemented by Public Security, under the pressure from the Party, rather than 
Demorazza, which was the department responsible for the enforcement of the anti-Jewish 
legislation in the Ministry of Interior. 
667
 However, some significant differences with other 
Italian communities were apparent in respect of police surveillance. A first difference was the 
issue of foreign Jews. Of major importance in Rome, Turin, Trieste and other bigger Italian 
cities, it was largely absent in Venice. This meant that Venice did not face the problem of the 
persecution of Jews who had emigrated from other countries. This considerably simplified 
the process of identification of the people to persecute. A second difference relates to the 
denunciations. While in Venice the majority of denunciations and other reports came from 
individuals, while in Turin organisations such as Fascist syndicates and professional unions 
took the lead. This reflects the difference in size and composition of the communities, but 
also a higher degree of ideological involvement of various Fascists in the persecution of Jews. 
Given the relatively small size of the Venice community, the level of denunciations was not 
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as high as in acommunity like Turin or Trieste. A third difference relates to the level of 
Jewish community resistance. While in Venice, not unlike from other small-middle size 
communities like Ferrara, there was relatively little organised resistance to the racial laws, in 
Turin such actions were more common, ranging from simple administrative petitions to a 
variety of increasingly sophisticated strategies, often with the assistance of sympathetic non-
Jews, designed to avoid or limit the effect of the racial provisions.
668
 Lack of organisation 
was probably due to the individualistic composition of the community which mainly included 
wealthy Jews who cared only about their own safety. As one might expect, in Venice some 
petitions were made by middle and upper class Jews with some minor attempts made in some 
financial circles and certain key sectors where Jews possessed a great deal of influence. As 
the prefect of Venice reported, a petition was addressed to Mussolini by a group of war 
veterans and first-hour Fascists. Mainly employed in financial organisations, these Jews were 
willing to include letters, medals for valors and decorations received in the First World War, 
or patents of the March on Rome. They believed that the racial laws were only a temporary 
price to pay for Mussolini’s alliance with Hitler.
669
 The most characteristic aspect of the Race 
Laws in Venice was the issue of wealthy Jews. The archives include a steady flow of Venice 
police documents in which the main recurring theme was that the anti-Jewish laws had 
particularly impacted on some eminent Jews who were direct supporters of the regime. Upper 
class Venetian Jews were accused of working against Fascism and being part of a British-
Masonic conspiracy or portrayed by the Fascist propaganda as unscrupulous usurers.
670
 The 
Jewish members of the Volpi’s entourage would not survive unaffected by the anti-Semitic 
legislation. Volpi not only faced losing important Jewish members of his entourage in Venice; 
similar results were observed also in Trieste where the gerarca had an extensive Jewish 
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network of contacts through the Assicurazioni Generali. Venice and Trieste shared the 
operational centres of the insurance group which was the biggest in Italy. The Assicurazioni 
Generali had grown as a traditional Jewish stronghold since its foundation under the Austro-
Hungarian Empire. Much of the Fascist effort appears to have gone into the replacement of 
Jews within this organisation. Eminent Jews in both locations had to leave immediately after 
the promulgation of the Race Laws. Marco Ara, former decorated First World War captain, 
Venetian Fascist patriot who used to lead his centuria during the regime’s official parades in 
Piazza S. Marco was obliged to leave as a board member in Venice; meanwhile, in Trieste, 
his cousin Edgardo Morpurgo had to resign from the role of president, being replaced by 
Giuseppe Volpi. Racial laws provoked an exodus of Jews from the company.
671
 This 
involved managers and employees, and sometimes Jews decided to resign ‘voluntarily’ 
before being officially affected by the new racial legislation. As De Lagarda argued, 
unemployed Venetian squadristi, largely without adequate qualifications, occupied the empty 
chairs of the company.
672
 Assicurazioni Generali was not the only big organisation where 
Venetian Jews were meticulously registered and expelled. In Portogruaro, the industrial 
group Perfosfati provided the regime with the list of all Jewish partners and expelled all 




       Rules regarding financial groups, ownership of large enterprises and real estate questions 
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were very important for the regime and these were in order to take control of the major 
centres of power of the country. However, commerce and the professions did not escape 
attention altogether as Jews were prominent among professional bodies like the lawyers. 
Venetian Jewish lawyers were predominantly in civil and commercial law firms as they were 
heavily involved in banks, big commercial and industrial groups. 13 out of 23 Venetian 
Jewish law firms were involved in managing capital and legal activities for big interest 
groups, with an informer complaining that they were damaging the activities of the “aryan” 
firms.
674
 Whether a business organisation or a professional association, the sector involved in 
the expulsion of the Jews contributed to implementation of the laws, providing the police 
with the necessary information. To reinforce this thesis, the most notorious case, regarding 
the expulsion of Jewish professors from the universities, shows that while sympathy may 
have been expressed on an individual basis, in general deans and faculties continued to apply 
the norms and expelled colleagues and students. This was because deans and the management 
of the universities did not have an alternative option and they could not avoid the application 
of the law; and the opposition to the directives of the government would have meant their 
exclusion from the university. For example, the Rector of Venice Business School, Agostino 
Lanzillo, investigated the Aryan status of students and professors and he communicated to the 
Minister Bottai the list of Jewish professors, assistants and readers to beexpelled from Ca’ 
Foscari. On 3
.
November 1939, the Council of Faculty, through the words of Prof. Cesare 
Lombardi, emphasised the gravity of the loss of such diligent and efficient scientists and 
professors, but the order was executed according to the law.
675
 In addition to the expulsion of 
Jewish professors, new courses on racial policy were instituted and academic books or 
textbooks edited or revised by authors of Jewish race were prohibited by Lanzillo, who 
                                                 
674
 ACS, DGPS, b. 7/f, Pennisi to the Minister of Interior, 12 February 1939. 
675
 ASUV, “Scatole lignee”, b. 31/b, Agostino Lanzillo to Giuseppe Bottai, 3 November 1939. 
255 
 





       Venetian Jews did not receive much sympathy from their Venetian neighbours after the 
proclamation of the Race Law in November 1938. The notes of the police and their 
informants did not show any strong objection raised by Venetian society to the application of 
the laws. As revealed by the prefecture documents related to the ‘subversive episodes’ that 
occurred in Venice in 1938, signs of popular disapproval towards the racial laws had been 
very rare with minor cases among the popular classes.
677
 Given the sources used – especially 
those of the police which whose repression focused on dissent towards the regime’s decisions 
– if solidarity was to be shown, we should have found more cases of people protesting against 
the Jewish persecution. Indeed, people did not publicly protest, nor did the Venetian Jews 
receive much help from their Catholic fellows or hierarchies. Despite an anonymous informer 
reporting in November 1938 that the Venetian priests and churchgoers had an initial negative 
opinion about the Italian Race Laws, comparing them to the German ones, there is no record 
of following criticism. This does not mean that there was no criticism, but it was never to be 
public from the Catholic hierarchies. Nor did the patriarch of Venice Aldeodato Piazza do 
much to support the Jewish cause. He did not address any official or unofficial directive 
specifically in support of the Jews in the province. The Venetian Catholic hierarchies had 
been almost silent towards the Jewish persecution. The patriarch of Venice Aldeodato Piazza 
acted according to the official line of the Vatican. Piazza was a First World War veteran and 
a patriot. Like most of the Italian cardinals of the Fascist period, Piazza was conservative and 
anti-Communist. Piazza’s views were those of the current of the Catholic Church that the 
priest and leader of the Italian People’s Party, Luigi Sturzo, called ‘clerico-fascism’. Some 
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members of his party, almost all laymen, were either drawn directly into the Fascist 
movement or followed Mussolini in order to rally Catholic support for the anti-Communist 
and pro-Catholic policies of the regime. However, from that time, the term clerico-Fascist 
was also applied to designate individual members of the clergy, like Piazza, who were 
supporters of Fascism on such issues as the invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 and the introduction 
of the Racial Laws in 1938. The papacy (and thus the church hierarchies in Italy) was an 
essential component of ‘consensus’ on which the Fascist regime relied on during its over 
twenty years’ existence.
678
 Piazza often publicly expressed words of appreciation for 
Mussolini. Despite the prefect reporting that he openly declared that the concept of “racism” 
was against the “universal values” of the Church,
679
 in the famous ‘speech of the Epiphany’, 
Piazza declared he had understood the concern of the “superior people to preserve the 
hereditary purity of the race”.
680
 The position of Piazza was related to the institutional role he 
held. The patriarch was not in a position to openly criticise the regime for the promulgation 
of the Race Laws. However, we do believe he could have acted differently, and maybe 
informally, to provide Venetian Jews with support, at least in the first phase of the 
persecution. As we will see later in the chapter, with the German occupation in 1943, things 
would be made more difficult, especially in order to provide any form of assistance to the 
Jews. 
 
       While in some cases Venetians expressed individual solidarity to Jews on a personal 
level, people’s compassion as a whole did not appear to present a serious threat to the regime 
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for the informers. In 1938, the prefect reported that “the racial campaign [had] everywhere 
aroused much interest, but public opinion [was] aware of the eminently moral, social and 
political purposes that the Fascist government [was] pursuing and orienting in their 
favour”.
681
 This does not mean that criticism was not present among sections of Venetian 
society, but the fear of the regime’s repression prevented people from openly expressing 
dissent towards the Race Laws. Open criticism would have led to persecution by the regime’s 
political police and, in the worst case scenario, imprisonment. 
  
       By 1940 that support allegedly diminished. Individual feelings of compassion became 
more frequent, but only because of the difficult conditions encountered by those Venetian 
Jews badly hit by the racial laws.
682
 The moment of greatest economic hardship occurred in 
1940 when the revocation of the street peddling licences affected poor and there was high 
unemployment among the Venetian Jewish working class.
683
 In addition, among the wealthy 
Jews there was a general attitude of apathy towards the lower-class Jews’ living conditions 
and they were reluctant to give help. Indeed, better off Jews were accused of stinginess in a 
flyer circulated in Venice by a group of “poor fellow Jews” in 1940.
684
 This tells us that there 
was not a strong cohesion within the community and therefore systematic resistance would 
have been almost impossible to organise. Diversity among the Venetian community created a 
gap and a lack of cohesion which prevented wealthy Jews from supporting poorer Jews 
during the persecution. 
Throughout 1940, Venetian informants noted a general impression that the regime’s attention 
to the ‘Jewish Question’ and the vigilant application of its discriminatory measures had 
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waned. In reality, after Italy’s entrance into the war, Venetian authorities engaged in a 
broader effort to prevent corrupt or ‘defeatist’ Jewish opinion from infecting the general 
population. This effort was assisted by local informers and a single incident can capture the 
spirit of this phenomenon in Venice. On May 1940, the prefect of Venice was reported by the 
Voluntary Militia for National Security (MVSN) that discriminato Jewish businessman Max 
Orrefice, owner of the company Prati Nuovi, was heard by a militiaman to express his 
criticism towards Mussolini, Starace and Ciano. Although Oreffice was investigated by the 
police and found innocent, the MVSN suggested that he deserved to be punished and 
subjected to surveillance by the Party in order to avoid these opinions spreading.
685
 The 
prefect agrred to this on himself to put him under surveillance. This suggests a tighter and 
rigid central control over the periphery. In addition, a large portion of the local prefect’s time 
was taken up with definitional or status issues, primarily over mixed marriages, the ‘who is a 
Jew’ problem, and the grant or a denial of discriminato status (in the period of the Fascist 
racial laws, these were Jews for whom the racial legislation was not applied for special 
military and civil merits). 
Anti-Semitic propaganda increased further in the media from 1941, when Il Gazzettino di 
Venezia edited by Diego Valeri, launched a vast campaign in support of anti-semitism. 
However, due largely to the complacency of the Fascist leaders, some Jews had already found 
expedient ways of evading the law. It is noteworthy that the bypassing of the Race Laws 
appears to have been carried out primarily by better-off or at least wealthier Jews, which is 
consistent with the trend observed at the national level. Rules regarding personal status were 
more easily evaded by rich Jews than those aimed at the working class or middle classes. One 
way to bypass the Race Laws was the conversion to Catholicism. For example, Jews’ 
                                                 
685
 ACS, DGPS, b. 7/f, Command of MVSN to the Minister of Interior, 14 May 1940. 
259 
 
abjurations and conversions reached a peak of 39 in 1941
686
 and most of them involved 
‘secularised’ Jews with little or no connection with Judaism.
687
 An overall number of 336 
Venetian Jews (secularised and not), mainly belonging to wealthy families, decided to avoid 
any persecution by converting to Catholicism. All but three survived the Holocaust, including 
the notorious bandierista and Volpi’s supporter, Max Ravà.
688
 Ravà represented a significant 
example of how rules could be evaded if you possessed a good network of local contacts: first 
and foremost, the affiliation to Volpi. As if to confirm this, one secret agent reported in 1942 
that some Venetians disliked the way that federale Pascolato - and behind him, it might be 




       There is evidence of increasingly stringent application of the rules with the passage of 
time, but also some foot dragging by local officials, notably after 1943 when a more 
systematic effort to persecute Jews was made. Compared to the 2,189 members of 1938, a big 
drop to 1,209 was registered in 1942, as some families emigrated and others forswore or 
converted on the assumption that laws would not persecute Jews who became Catholics.
690
 
The last census of 1943 registered 1,203 Jews in the Venice region which included the 
province of Treviso and Belluno. Therefore, the local Venetian Jewish community did not 
exceed 1,000 in 1943.
691
 Sarfatti has demonstrated that there was an essential continuity 
between the phase of the promulgation of the Race Laws and the Holocaust eras, which also 
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involved Venice, after the German occupation in 1943. As Livingston argued, the continuity 
is demonstrable on both a formal and substantive level. Formally, there wass not a clear break 
between bureaucratic decisions before September 1943 and those which came after that. In 
Venice, as at the national level, the registration of the Jews continued without interruption 
despite the fall of Mussolini, the Badoglio period, the beginning of the German occupation 
and the birth of the Republic of Salò  in the following months.
692
 From a substantive 
perspective, while there were no systematic deportations of Jews before 1943, information 
gathered in the period 1938-43, from census reports, professional bodies’ lists, police reports 
and denunciations, provided an invaluable source for Nazis and repubblichini to identify and 
arrest Jews in the period following the occupation. These sources became even more 
important since the president of the Venetian Jewish community, Giuseppe Jona, committed 
suicide in the autumn of 1943 rather than turning over the names of his community members 
to repubblichini and Germans.
693
 Liliana Picciotto Fargioni demonstrated that about half of 
these arrests, at a national level, were conducted by Italian or mixed German-Italian squads 
rather than exclusively being German round-ups. Even when Germans conducted the arrests, 
these was typically based on information generated by Italians. The Venice archives suggest a 
similar scenario with Italians and mixed squads arresting people with a noticeable increase 
after 1943. The German brand of anti-semitic deportation in the region was almost inevitable 
following the occupation.
694
 However, what happened showed substantial continuity on the 
ideological and substantial level with what happened before 1943. 
  
Between December 1943 and August 1944, 246 Venetian Jews were deported, and most 
would die at Auschwitz-Birkenau. A plaque announces their names in Campo del Ghetto 
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Nuovo, along with the monument of the sculptor Arbit Blatas dedicated to the Holocaust. 
Most of those were arrested in their home or in the Casa di Riposo Ebraica (Jewish 
retirement home). The Venetian newspapers were totally silent about the round-ups and the 
deportations of Jews. Il Gazzettino denounced the dazzling careers and the illicit enrichment 
of the Fascist leaders, but the Fascist drive to fill positions vacated by fearful and persecuted 




       Continuity was also shown by the Catholic hierarchies. The patriarch of Venice, 
Aldeodato Piazza, appealed to local German authorities, but he only suggested moderation 
towards those Jews who converted to Catholicism. Documents in Catholic and Jewish 
archives analysed by Susan Zuccotti show that the archbishops of Genoa, Turin, Milan and 
Florence worked with Jewish rescuers and recruited a conspicuous number of priests, monks 
and nuns to rescue Jews, while there is no evidence and no testimony to date of such 
involvement for Piazza.
696
 In two reports provided by the patriarch to the Allied authority, 
Piazza declared that he had protested against the “inhuman treatment, illegal arrests and 
iniquitous deportations” without any specific mention to Jews. During the period of the Salò 
Republic, many of his public speeches were quoted in national newspapers, such as Il 
Corriere della Sera, Regime Fascista and L’Italia cattolica, as an example of patriotism in 
relation to the predicted victory of the Axis. During the Nazi occupation of Venice province, 
Piazza saw Germans as a bulwark against Bolshevism. According to the German consul, 
Koester, he condemned Badoglio’s betrayal, in league with Masons and Jews. For Piazza, the 
best solution to the situation would have been a German administration combined with 
“trustworthy Italian circles”. Piazza feared that a vacuum of power, after 8 September 1943, 
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would facilitate a Communist takeover and partisans’ reprisals.
697
 The link between 
Communists and Jews was quite an important factor  explaining why the Church decided to 
support the government of the occupied territories in Venice. In fact, the Catholic Church 
increasingly viewed Communism as a fierce enemy and Fascism, even with its antisemitism, 
was considered as a lesser evil. For many church officials, communism included a large part 
of the Zionist Jews. There was plenty of anti-Semitic propaganda in Europe linked Jews with 
internationalism and Communism and claimed that ‘Bolshevism was Jewish’.
698
 What it 
seems is that antisemitism, in Venice like in the rest of the country, was basically motivated 
by anti-communism, rather than by religious reasons. 
 
       However, historians like Tramontin insisted that it is not possible to provide a clear 
answer about the behaviour of Piazza towards the Jewish persecution and his relations with 
the Nazi-Fascist authority when Venice was occupied.
699
 Unlike Cardinals Schuster in Milan, 
Boetto in Genoa, and Dalla Costa in Florence, Piazza shared the feeble position of Popes Pius 
XI and XII on racism and endorsed the official political line of the Vatican. Tramontin 
justified the silence of the Patriarch as a way of protecting the activity of his assistants, Giulio 
Malpelli and Giovanni Urbani, who were helping Jews behind the scenes.
700
 Tramontin’s 
thesis is only partially credible. More convincing, as Susan Zuccotti argued, Piazza’s activity 
regarding Jews during the German occupation of the province reflected the diplomatic path 
followed by Pius XII who provided no specific directives to the Cardinals. He probably 
believed that a public denunciation of the Holocaust would worsen the situation while 
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helping no one. The Pope feared that a protest, even unofficial, would provoke violent Nazi 
reprisals against Catholics.
701
 In fact, there are some cases in which the Venetian lower clergy 
acted independently to secure the life of Jews. These were sporadic and disorganised actions 
from which emerged a high civic and Christian sense of pietas of the local priests.  As an 
example, archives documented the activity of Don Giovanni Barbaro, Don Alessandro 
Gottardi and the sisters of Holy Hearth and those of the King Christ in Venice city centre. 
Meanwhile, Imelde Pellegrini, in her work Storia di Ebrei, brought new light on the crucial 
role played in Fossalta di Portogruaro, in the north of the province, by don Marcello Labor, a 
priest of Jewish origins who actively helped to save numerous Jewish families who were 
fleeing the persecution in Trieste.
702
    
                                                      
       What is gained is a sense and feel of the Race Laws in an important Fascist city and how 
ordinary Italians, police, prefects, private citizens, responded to them. Some of the features 
observed, notably the campaign surrounding the departure of the wealthier Jews from the 
nerve centres of Venice’s economy, were unique to the city. Venice demonstrates the 
importance of local factors, but also some significant general trends, which although not 
unique to the city, are easier to observe and analyse at the provincial level. The Venice 
archives suggest that there were cases in which rules were enforced beyond the letter of the 
law. There were inevitably unwritten rules and regulations which extended the system 
beyond its official terms. First and foremost, there was the aggressive interpretation by public 
officials regarding dismissals and  some Italian companies fired Jews.
703
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For ordinary Venetians, the Race Laws might well have not been completely convincing, but 
they were enforced and respected, no more but certainly no less than any other law. 
Mythology that the racial laws in Italy were non-violent in nature and Jews were in physical 
danger only following the German occupation in the autumn of 1943, has been contested. 
While this may have been true in parts of Italy, it was rather less so in Venice, where violence 
attempted to isolate Jews and accompanied the racial programme even before the enactment 
of the 1938 laws. 
 
       The issue of antisemitic violence raises the question of timing, specifically, the 
relationship between events before and after 8 September 1943. Recent scholars, notably 
Sarfatti, have questioned this analysis with documentary evidence of Mussolini’s plans to 
persecute Jews before the German occupation. This thesis has shown that Venice notably 












5. The Fascist War (1939-1943) 
 
Introduction 
       For the regime, the Second World War was to be the final stage of the Italians’ 
fascistisation and the completion of Mussolini’s expansionist project, which had started with 
the conquest of Ethiopia in 1936. Despite the historical importance of the so called ‘Fascist 
war’ (1940-1943), most of the post-war research, especially from left wing historians, has 
focused on the events which unfolded between 1943 and 1945, when Italy started to fight 
alongside the Allies turning against its former partner, Nazi Germany. There are many 
reasons why historiography preferred to overlook the ‘Fascist war’: first and foremost, 
because of Italy’s post-war political development which saw the anti-Fascist parties ruling the 
country with the post-Fascists substantially excluded from Italian political life. As we have 
seen in the introductory chapter, the creation of a dominant anti-Fascist culture after the 
Second World War and the almost complete exclusion of the narrative of the defeated had 
created a discursive hegemony in Italian historiography. Academic works were immersed in 
the victors’ vulgata and Italy’s war from June 1940 to July 1943, became a blank sheet in the 
country’s historical consciousness, providing no space for the history of the defeated.
704
 
Secondly, and even more importantly, the Fascist involvement was one of military defeat and 
created a general sense of national shame. Italians had accepted the war in the belief that it 
would be short and victorious. The reality turned out to be different. 
 
       This concluding chapter examines the ways in which the first three years of the Second 
World War impacted on ordinary Venetians and how they responded to the growing pressure 
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of the hostilities, which lasted much longer than anticipated. As it has been presented by a 
growing European literature on civilian involvement in the Second World War, the conflict 
entailed increasing civilian suffering, and as we will see this was also the case in Italy.
705
 This 
makes the initial war years an ideal backdrop against which to evaluate popular Venetian 
reaction to the increasingly challenged Fascist regime,  and it allows a concluding evaluation 
of popular consent and dissent vis-à-vis Fascism in the Venice province.  
 
       The civilians found themselves on the ‘front line’ of the Second World War to an extent 
that was unprecedented. It has been demonstrated that the conflict provoked psychological 
side effects on the population. People were the target of enemy bombardment of cities, they 
were killed throughout the duration of the war, a greater number were injured, they suffered 
malnutrition and their houses were destroyed or damaged. The report Morti e dispersi per 
cause belliche negli anni 1940-45 produced by the Istituto Centrale Statistica in 1957, 
estimates that an overall number of 291,376 soldiers died (this number includes soldiers 
missing) during the Second World War. If we consider the soldiers died and missing from 
each division of service, 201,405 soldiers were from the Royal Army, 22,043 from the Royal 
Navy, 9,096 from the Air Force, 354 from the Colonial Army, 91 were chaplains and 45,078 
belonged to other groups such as the Fascist Militia (MVSN), police, Guardia di Finanza 
(Financial Police), firefighters and prison guards. With regard to theatres of war, 74,725 
soldiers died and were missing in Italy, 2,060 in France, 25,430 in Germany (including 
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Austria), 49,459 in Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia, 82,079 in Soviet Union, 22,716 in 
Africa, 487 in Asia, 130 in America, 61 in Oceania and 28,438, during sea operations, while 
4,619 could not be categorised.
706
 With regards to civilians, the overall number of deaths was 
153,147 with 61,432 of them caused by aerial strikes.
707
 With regards to the place of 
residency, the Veneto region had overall losses of 40,603 (29,316 soldiers and 11,287 
civilians) with the  province of Venice mourning the deaths  




       The question of popular opinion on the home front during the Second World War will be 
at the centre of this chapter and we will attempt to convey something of the diverse 
challenges that ordinary people experienced in the province of Venice during the Second 
World War. We will show how diverse the responses to the war were, drawing attention to 
the way in which different social classes were affected by the conflict and comparing various 
facets of the civilian experience.  
  
      This chapter will shift the reader’s attention from the existing and extensive literature on 
Italian war operations of the Second World War, such as Giorgio Rochat’s Le guerre italiane 
1935-1943: dall’impero d’Etiopia alla disfatta, to the daily experience of the population. 
Such a study will make an important contribution to the ongoing debate which has been 
opened by the works of Philip Morgan, Christopher Duggan and Richard J. B. Bosworth. 
Philip Morgan has done a remarkable job in demonstrating that the war served to show that 
the ideological commitment of most ordinary Italians to Fascism was by then fairly 
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superficial. This case-study will contribute to discerning the limited results achieved by the 
regime in fascistising Italian society and ‘making Italians’. This work will argue that the 
conflict certified the disintegration of Fascism and the dissolution of any sense of national 
community.   
The chapter follows a chronological structure and – within that chronology – we have opted 
for an investigation of popular opinion as found in the police reports, with a supplement of a 
varied secondary literature, which allows us to identify specific shifts in popular opinion vis-
à-vis the Fascist regime. As previously discussed in the introduction with regards to 
methodology, police reports are not an objective description of how things really were; they 
are impressionistic sources; they are sources provided by informers who have their own 
agendas, preconceptions, interests in portraying certain people in a certain way at certain 
times. But they nevertheless provide us with very useful information, and with the necessary 
caution and supplement of alternative sources, they provide the reader with an effective 
measure of shifts in public opinion. These sources are interesting as they reveal that there was 
not just one single experience of the war for the Venetians. The ways in which the conflict 
impacted on people varied according to a set of circumstances like age, gender, race, political 
beliefs, occupation, social class and personal psychology, which were unique to each 
individual. There were several variables concerning the war’s impact at a local level, but 
patterns substantially reflect lukewarm support for the regime’s war, such as lack of 
ideological conviction, disillusionment at the lack of achievements of the regime, lack of 
interest in the political changes, namely the fall of the Duce; genuine opposition to Mussolini 
and his ideas or the broader phenomenon of totalitarianism; opposition to the alliance with 





       This chapter will show that while the conflict, created the demand for social unity, it also 
led to many pressures and divisions within Venetian wartime society. Therefore, attention 
will also be paid to the many sectors of everyday life affected by the conflict such as 
consumption and work, in order to assess what kind of popular attitude was progressively 
adopted in the course of the war. This chapter, which concludes our research on Venetians 
under the Fascist regime during the ventennio, will provide with clear evidence that the 
regime failed at “making Italians”. Soon, after the first defeats, in contrast to their German 
peers, many of whom fought until the end alongside Hitler, Italians turned to individualism, 
and more than other things, they stopped being patriotic (and Mussolinian) and failed to be 
the national Fascist community of true believers that the regime expected them to be. 
 
5.1 Venetians and Italy’s Entry into the War (1939-1941) 
       This section will discuss how Italy’s entry into the war was perceived by the Venetians 
and what feeling, whether patriotic or defeatist, was expressed by the population in the year 
before the war (1939) and during the first two years of the conflict. Among the different 
sections of the Venetian, as well as Italian, population, discussions about the potential entry 
of Italy into the war intensified towards the beginning of the 1939. Even then, Venetians 
looked at the conflict as something inevitable. According to police reports, the war became a 
regular topic with diversified approaches to it. On one side, some Venetians opposed the war, 
thinking that Italy should not join the war in alliance with Nazi Germany, praying that 
Mussolini would remain neutral. On the other side, some were positive towards Mussolini 
and the regime, hoping that the war would be short and victorious for the Axis.
709
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       As early as September 1938, the Italian military had planned to invade Albania. On 7 
April 1939, Italian forces landed in the country and within a few days, Italian troops had 
occupied the majority of the country. Albania represented a territory that could guarantee 
Italy its ‘living space’ (spazio vitale). The Fascist concept of spazio vitale was similar to 
lebensraum in German National Socialism, and its definition was “that part of the globe over 
which extends either the vital requirements or expansionary impetus of a state with strong 
unitary organisation which seeks to satisfy its needs by expanding beyond its national 
boundaries”.
710
 The spazio vitale provided the basis on which Mussolini’s foreign policy was 
built and its territorial extent was to include the basin of the Mediterranean Sea (the Roman 
Mare Nostrum) and extended from southern France in the west, from Tunisia to Egypt in 
Africa, to Greece and the Balkans, and then to Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey and Palestine.
711
 
The concept of the ‘vital space’ was useful for Italy in order to propagandise the necessity to 
occupy neighbouring countries so as to ease its overpopulation and launch an aggressive 
expansionist strategy in the Balkans. Soon, after the occupation of Albania, Benito Mussolini 
consolidated the German-Italian relations which started in 1936 by signing a full defensive 
alliance with Nazi Germany (the Pact of Steel) on 22 May 1939. The pact was designed for a 
joint war against France and Britain.  
 
       According to Fascist intelligence, the plans of the forthcoming mobilisation were already 
known in the anti-Fascist environment. An example is the letter intercepted by Fascist 
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censorship in June 1939. The anti-Fascist, Renzo Casoli, was sharing secret information with 
his ‘compagno’ (companion) and father Remigio Casoli. The letter reported the following:  
 
Remigio, the moment is critical and after a lot of efforts it will be difficult to safeguard the peace. 
The mercenary bourgeoisie will be the last one to play. We need to move quickly. The preparation 
for the mobilisation is ready. 2,000 tanks have been equipped and every division is now led by 




Although considered a great power, and on paper to have a strong army, Italy was relatively 
weak compared to the other European major countries involved in the war. Italy was still a 
predominantly agricultural-based country, with demographical and economic characteristics 
more similar to a developing country. Italy had a considerably lower industrial production in 
comparison with France and Britain, especially with regard to those sectors crucial for war 
operations such as mechanisation. Furthermore, most raw materials had to be imported and 
Italy was deeply affected by the blockade imposed at the outbreak of the war. This meant that 
Italy had to import raw materials such as coal from Germany, becoming deeply dependent on 
its ally. In addition, Italy’s economy had been significantly debilitated by the campaign of 
Spain and Abyssinia which had increased the country’s debt dramatically.
713
 As Marco 
Fincardi argued, “the Italian political and military authorities, and equally the industrialists, 
who took lucrative government orders for the production of military aircraft and equipment 
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       The Italian Royal Army (Regio Esercito) was comparatively weaker than other armies. 
Italian armaments, including tanks, were of poor quality and the bulk of the artillery had 
already seen action in the First World War. Italian authorities were conscious of the need to 
modernise military equipment and investments were made before Italy entered into the war, 
but the country’s weak economy did not allow the full implementation of the rearmament 
plans. Mussolini’s Under-Secretary for War Production, Carlo Favagrossa, had estimated that 
Italy would have not be prepared for major armed conflict until at least October 1942.
715
 In 
addition to the lack of economic resource and armaments, Italy had significant problems in 
establishing an efficient senior leadership for the war operations. The Comando Supremo (the 
Italian High Command) consisted of only a small nucleus of people who had to inform the 
individual commands about Mussolini’s strategy. On some occasions, Mussolini took the 
lead of some operatons such as the Greece campaign, to avoid any kind of 
miscommunication. Generally, the three service commands, Army, Navy and Air Forces 
were used to working independently, developing individual plans for the war. Therefore, the 
Italian army possessed a clear lack of belief in inter-service cooperation. This clearly affected 




       Despite these considerable military weaknesses when entering the war, Fascist 
propaganda portrayed Italy as a ‘proletarian nation’ fighting to become wealthier and gain a 
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place of importance at international level.
717
 The propaganda focused on ‘glorifying’ the 
superior will of the Italians, people of a still relatively poor country, who would fight  against 
capitalistic and plutocratic Western democracies by compensating for their material 
inferiority with esprit de corps and with superior faith against their enemies, corrupted and 
impoverished by their materialistic societies.
718
 As Christopher Duggan correctly wrote, “the 
regime’s obsession with the primacy of ‘will’ and ‘faith’ helped to perpetuate the 
anachronistic idea that it was the superior ‘spirit’ of a country that would enable Italy to win 
the war”.
719
 Italians could finally express the values learnt from the regime’s pedagogy: the 
love for the Motherland, the pleasure of the heroic gesture, and the consistency of the 
Italians’ superiority of will and (Latin) race.  
 
       Based on the more than 800 documents scrutinised for the years 1940-1941, our research 
draws a rather less idyllic picture. Venetians seemed to have been worried about the war after 
only a few months of its start and an initial shift in popular opinion can be detected. In 
contrast to their predecessors in 1915, people had a fairly clear idea of what a major war 
would entail. Venetians, as with the majority of their fellow Italians, were not particularly 
enthusiastic about fighting a war. What was evident was a sense of people’s tiredness of 
living under the constant condition of a quasi-war. The regime’s wars and the autarkic policy 
had already inflicted upon them significant material limitations.
720
 Ordinary Venetians were 
already exhausted after their recent contribution to Italian wars in Abyssinia and in Spain. 
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Many Venetian popolani, like the peasant First World War veteran Umberto Dal Borgo, were 
aware that the war would worsen their lives andthey thought, therefore, that poor people 
should not join the war, but should “let the Fascists go to the front [alone]”.
721
 The general 
apprehension about the impact of the war was exacerbated by the fear of those Italians whose 
children were conscripted into the armed forces. They had first-hand experience of war and 
its brutality; and they would have been under no illusions about the chances of their sons’ 
return from the front. Parents knew that their children were under a mortal threat. The 
Venetian citizen Franco Rossi summed up the situation like this: “I have fought in the 
Ethiopian war and I have two sons in the army. I would prefer to cut off their heads and take 




       The war began on 10 June 1940 with Italy’s declaration of war on Great Britain and 
France. After having invaded France and started the war operations in East Africa in June 
1940, Italy launched the invasion of Greece in October 1940. Although Greece was a less 
militarily prepared country, the Italian attack failed miserably with the Greek army able to 
counter-attack and force the Italians to retreat. The Greek counter-offensive was facilitated by 
the neutrality of Bulgaria and the support of Britain. As Sadkovich has written: 
 
[The] Greeks not only expected the attack, but disposed of prepared positions, interior lines, and a 
rough equality in men and material, and the Italian divisions were rapidly forced onto the defensive 
and back into Albania. As the Greek quagmire consumed more equipment and men, supplies became 
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If the invasion of Greece ended in failure, the war was also going badly in North Africa. 
Although outnumbered, the British army counterattack on 9 December 1940, caused heavy 
casualties to the Italians who were pushed back more than 500 miles. In addition, a month 
later, British troops were able to capture the port of Tobruk in Libya from the Italians. In 
December 1940, after the humiliating failure of Mussolini’s attempt to achieve a blitzkrieg 
(quick victory) in Greece, the questore reported that the PNF had become the minority local 
faction that was still pro-war with the majority of local Venetians not committed to 
supporting the conflict. Ordinary Venetians were disorientated by the news reporting that the 
attack on Greece had failed. The majority blamed the army and the leaders with a particular 
reference to foreign minister Galeazzo Ciano in terms of responsibility.
724
 Criticism of Ciano 
was directed at his flamboyant and luxurious life style which contrasted sharply with the 




       Mussolini decided to enter the war at a point when German troops were rapidly 
progressing in Northern and Western Europe, but as soon as Italy failed to achieve immediate 
victories and the war became prolonged and its outcome increasingly uncertain, people 
understood that the conflict would last longer than the regime had originally predicted.
726
  
This research on the Venetians’ perception of the war confirms that Italians, to a large extent, 
disapproved of a war conducted in partnership with Nazi Germany. Despite Mussolini 
presenting the conflict as a ‘parallel’ war, fought alongside Nazi Germany but pursuing the 
specific Italian objective of controlling the Mediterranean, Germans continued to be 
perceived negatively, even when they came to the rescue of the Italian forces in the Balkans 
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in 1941. Police reported a deep suspicion about relying upon on a German ally that was 
permanently ‘Germanocentric’ in its approach. Anxiety and disapproval arose even among 
those who considered themselves as loyal supporters of Fascism. filofascist Venetians 
showed consternation about the ruthlessness of the German troops. Venetians were to a large 
extent unconvinced of the aims of a war conducted in alliance with Nazi Germany. As an 
anonymous Fascist wrote, Fascists should not have supported German rapaciousness: “We, 
Italian Fascists, have a blind faith in our leader. But it must not be said that the Italy of 
Vittorio Veneto will fire even a single bullet because the pederast Hitler wants to devastate 
Europe. The Roman Empire fell and Napoleon faded and they were much more powerful 
than Mr. Hitler”.
727
 Documents show that Venetians were not enthusiastic about their nation 
having binding alliance with the Nazi regime. In Venice province, cultural and political anti-
Germanism had traditionally been strong and was rooted in the difficult relationship with 
Austria, which had ruled Veneto for more than 60 years (1798-1866). Many Venetians had 
fought against the Habsburg Empire during the wars of independence, which led to Venice’s 
unification with the Kingdom of Italy in 1866. Numerous reports sent by the Police to Rome 
emphasised that the alliance with Germany was widely resented by the local population and it 
was still fresh in their minds that Germans had been enemies during the First World War 
(1915-1918). Leaflets invited Venetians not to fight alongside the Germans as a sign of 
respect for all the Italians who had been killed by Germans during the Great War.
728
 There 
was a widespread belief that the friendship being displayed by the Germans was only a 
facade and in reality Italy was marching for the triumph of Pan-Germanism in Europe. The 
sense of fighting on the wrong side has also been reported by the author Anna Bruni Benson, 
who grew up in Venice during the regime and attended the University of Venice from which 
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she graduated after the war with a doctoral degree in Foreign Languages and Literatures.
729
 
She remembers that her father used to tell her that: “If we join Hitler and we win, it will be in 
effect a German victory and we will be Hitler’s slaves. If we lose, we will have to suffer all 




       From December 1941 Italy was also at war with the USA. The USA was still perceived 
by Italians, especially by the middle class, as the land of opportunities and prosperity, but 
first and foremost the land of migration. Although the USA was derided in the Fascist 
propaganda (even before the war started), Venetians, many middle-class Italians were 
strongly attracted by the consumerism and materialism of US culture. As Simonetta Falasca-
Zamponi suggested, “caught in the contradiction between economic rationales and cultural 
demands, the regime opted for an ambiguous co-existence with, and incorporation of, 
consumer culture – a coexistence it denied, however, at the level of rhetoric”.
731
  The 
ambiguity of the regime towards the US had already been commented on by Italo Balbo 
when visiting the US in 1933. On that occasion, Balbo urged Italian immigrants to be proud 
Americans, but not to forget that they were also Italians, in this way reinforcing the dilemma 
of the relationship between the regime and the USA.
732
 Given the ambiguity of the Fascist 
regime’s attitude towards the US, it was not unusual for the police to report, for example, that 
the wealthy Venetian middle class man and former broker, Domenico Biasotto, argued that 
the war would make Italy poorer. Biasotto thought that Italy could become a wealthier 
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country thanks to emigration to America and there was no reason to fight against the United 




5.2 Communication and rationing: the failure of Mussolini’s strategy and 
Propaganda (1941-1942) 
       Two aspects of war planning were of crucial importance not only for the war itself but 
also for how the conflict would be perceived by ordinary Italians in the Veneto and beyond: 
the feeding of the nation and the control of information. As Robert Mackay argued, “in two 
areas of pre-war planning ‒ rationing and information ‒ official concern for morale is 
discernible behind the ostensible purposes of seeing that people were fed and told what to 
do”.
734
 This section will focus on Mussolini’s failure to deliver on either of those home front 
strategies.  
 
        Much of the war-time propaganda is faced with the problem of how to manage the 
discrepancies between the brutalities of the war and the need to present a positive picture of 
the progression of the conflict in order to persuade the population about the necessity to 
continue to engage in hostilities. The situation was particularly extreme in Mussolini’s Italy, 
as the reality – right from the start – was a bleak one with little opportunity to present the war 
positively.
735
 Even given this proviso, it is difficult not to be critical of Mussolini’s ability to 
inspire his people. As the war progressed, Venetians and Italians of all classes became less 
and less trusting of his proclamations, rare as they were. Mussolini made only four public 
speeches during the war. His reticence caused widespread disappointment in the country. 
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Mussolini’s silence generated popular rumours about the reality of the war and about his 
ability to lead the country to the victory. The failure to speak became a cause of the Duce’s 
decline in popularity.
736
 Mussolini could not propagandise anything as Italy went through a 
series of demoralising defeats after it joined the war. Documents from the Venetian archives 
substantially confirm the general distrust towards Mussolini’s propaganda and 
communication. The popular feeling is well described by an anonymous Venetian who 
commented when following one of Mussolini’s speeches:  
 
Mussolini has found the courage to speak. To say what? To say that Germans are strong, very strong, 
arch-strong and their weaponry can cover all of Europe including Italy. (...) In Rome, people 
applauded only when he spoke about the Nazi [victories]. In Venice, our hearts have become ice. We 
believe Mussolini has lost his dignity and his mind. He has also found the time to make sarcasm on 
the Greek situation, when the extraordinary Fascist army is going from defeat to defeat. (...) We all 
need to hope in a British victory as they will be kind with us and we will be free. Fascism and 
Germans is a dreadful combination.
737  
 
In addition to Mussolini’s lack of effective communication, the inefficiency of the regime’s 
political intelligence and the inability to control the spread of unfavourable and critical 
sentiments through effective censorship contributed to growing unease among the population. 
Allied radio broadcasting, such as “Radio Londra”, made crucial information about Italian 
war operations easily accessible for ordinary people, spreading alarming news about the 
Italian war ventures that contrasted sharply with the regime’s account.
738
 Venetian people 
came to know that the Fascist army was unprepared and weak. For example, two ordinary 
Venetian postal officers, Scarso and Murru, were able to get substantial information about 
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Italian military operations, kept secret by the regime, through simply listening to forbidden 
Allied radio broadcasts. The information related to the British occupation of Bengasi and the 
sinking of the Duilio, which cost the lives of 7,000 Italian soldiers.
739
 As Fincardi suggested 
 
After Italy entered the war, the arrival from the skies of appealing messages from the enemy, and the 
start of various Italian language broadcasts by enemy radio stations, put an end to the political 
monopoly of information which had lasted for some 15 years: this represented a sudden and 
powerful change for the stability of a totalitarian system. From then on, faced with Italy’s obvious 
military disaster and exposed to a system of mass communication that was more credible than that of 




An example of successful Allied propaganda (especially from the British side) was the drop 
of leaflets advising on how to oppose the dictatorship, which was charged with direct 
responsibility for their miserable material conditions. Leaflets condemned Mussolini as the 
only person responsible for taking Italy into a disastrous war. The distinction made between 
the Fascist dictator and his people suggested that things would automatically get better for the 
Italians if Mussolini and his regime had gone, re-establishing democratic institutions within 
the country.
741
 Mussolini and his intelligence service did not have a systematic information 
strategy to persuade and control people in order to keep the public in a positive mood and 
tackle defeatism. Defeats in battle seemed to have had a huge impact on the population, 
greater than the regime’s propaganda, and this meant that people did not believe their leader 
and instead chose to believe Allied propaganda. In addition, the poor quality of air-raid 
shelters, the nature and the organisation of evacuation plans, united to the large shortages of 
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food and supplies, promoted a perception of inefficiency and corruption of the regime’s 
institutions. Therefore, people believed the regime was responsible for the suffering to which 
the population had been exposed.
742
 Italian people, brought into a war which caused them 
years of longstanding uncertainty, did not react against their enemies, but instead, they 
criticised their government for the problems of their everyday life. The regime’s credibility 
had been easily undermined by the war and, on the other side, the regime’s propaganda was 
unable to trigger popular support for Mussolini and genuine conviction in the Fascist ‘cause’. 
Consequently, the regime was not able to prevent scaremongering among the population or 
remove misconceptions. The regime failed in what the British Government did well: ranking 
home propaganda “at least equal in status to all measures of offence and defence”.
743
 
Churchill believed that rumours and false intelligence could be harmful to morale and 
therefore he ordered the Ministry of Information to set up a campaign to tackle it.
744
 Venetian 
soldiers back from the front on leave also contributed to the spread of alarming news. They 
complained about the superior equipment and weaponry of enemy troops and the non-
availability and malfunctioning of their own. They blamed the technological gap and the 
incompetence and unpreparedness of the military command and the Fascist regime.
745
 The 
repeated news regarding Italian army defeats progressively detached Venetians from Fascism 




       Much of Mussolini’s propaganda, the imperial campaign of Ethiopia and the autarkic 
policies implemented within the country since mid-1930s had been designed to prepare Italy 
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and the Italians for a large war, but the clash between propaganda and reality was nowhere 
more visible than in Italy. Even a charismatic leader who did not deliver on what he had 
emphasised most strongly for years could hardly survive even with excellent war 
propaganda.
747
 The unexpectedly long conflict became an enormous burden, especially for 
the working class, and food supply was another crucial area in which the regime failed to 
deliver. However, we have to go back to the autarkic system established by the regime since 
late 1930s to understand the extent to which the regime failed to deliver in this sector. 
Supported by a vast campaign of propaganda, autarky developed in the years 1937-1939, and 
practically consisted in reducing imports and increasing exportsas much as possible. Firstly, 
the regime tried to prevent the importation of luxury or not strictly necessary goods, which 
were, as far as possible, replaced by surrogates. Secondly, the importation of raw materials 
was exclusively permitted only to state companies or governmental agencies such as AMMI 
(Italian metallic minerals company), ACAI (Italian coal company) or AGIP (Italian oil 
company). Thirdly, and more important for our discussion, the regime tried to achieve 
complete self-sufficiency in agriculture. In this sector, the Fascist government adopted a 
monopolistic system that consisted in ammassi obbligatori (mandatory stockpiles) of wheat 
and other cereals that were managed by the Italian Federation of Farmers (Federconsorzi), an 
organisation with provincial offices, in which big landowners loomed large. The food 
stockpiles controlled by the state were intended to make use of an eventual surplus of 
essential foodstuffs in order to guarantee regular supplies at stable and fair prices for both 
producers and consumers. Overall, the policy of autarky, apart from the positive propaganda, 
was a means by which the regime put into effect a forced development of some industries 
such as chemical, iron and steel, hydroelectric power, and artificial fibres. However, it failed 
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to provide an adequate supply of consumer goods to the population.
748
 As Gianni Toniolo 
suggested, “private consumption per capita (...) declines steadily until 1936 (the only partial 
exceptions being 1932 and 1935) when a recovery begins.
749
 
During the pre-war period, the Venetian countryside had been self-sufficient in terms of 
agricultural production. The overwhelming majority of the province was dependent on the 
agricultural markets of Sottomarina, Cavarzere, Riviera and Portogruaro which already 
during the Liberal age had exported a substantial amount of their production to the rest of 
Europe.
750
 Venetian agriculture, which in the years of the Fascist regime profited from the 
availability of manpower, started to suffer due to a reduction of the workforce during the war. 
Manpower was largely utilised by the regime to fight on the various Italian fronts and 
contrary to Nazi Germany, Italy could not rely on forced labour recruited in occupied 
countries.
751
 In addition, falls in production had been triggered by the war’s massive demand 
for fertiliser and fuel. The regime should have done more to increase agricultural production 
from the Ethiopian war, as the campaign utilised most of the available resources of the 
country, and Italy did not have enough stockpiles to supply internal demand.
752
 On the 




The problem was not only food production but also the system of food rationing. As in most 
war economies, since 1940 consumer goods had become scarce and consequently, if available 
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at all, expensive in the ‘official’ market. The lack of consumer goods increased with the naval 
blockade and the necessity to supply the army. Food rationing started in autumn 1940 and 
concerned olive oil, butter, pasta, rice, and flour. The rationing of bread was applied in 
October 1941. Inflation, already rampant in the years before the outbreak of the war (1938-
1939), increased dramatically, especially for food stuff. Inflation led to food shortages, non-
existent rations and a thriving black market.
754
 The system of the ammassi aimed at tackling 
the diffusion of the black market. However, requisitioning deprived Italians as well as 
Venetians of goods like coffee or even staple foods such as bread, flour, pasta, and corn. In 
reality, the black market was a response to rationing itself and to the lack of availability of 
food. While illegal, the black market became a driving force in the home front for those who 




       Rationed food disappeared from shops’ shelves and its price on the black market 
increased dramatically. By 1941, Italy’s wheat imports (coming mostly from Romania) were 
reduced dramatically from the previous two years, to be redirected to Germany. Food 
rationing and Italy’s economic and military situation made the nation ever more dependent on 
Germany for war resource.
756
 Between 1941 and 1943 the Fascist distribution system did not 
guarantee the basic food supply for Italians and ammassi regulations had been repeatedly 
violated by the producers, with the mandatory transfer of the production to the ammassi 
obbligatori being avoided in favour of the black market. The evasion of the ammassi’s rules 
by the producers made ineffective the regime’s effective requisition of production and 
resulted in the impossibility to supply the provincial organisations set up to distribute the 
ammassi. It therefore became impossible for the government to supply the major cities 
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through the official channels of the regime.
757
 Ordinary Venetians were obliged to access 
alternative markets. Food shortages forced families to find food on the black market, 
sometimes traveling to the Venetian rural mainland to buy products found only scarcely (and 
when found, at unreasonably high prices), or not at all in Venice’s shops. On the streets and 
in workplaces, local Fascist officials became the target of criticism and insults from the 
population. As the primary sources reveal, Venetians affected by shortages only wanted the 
end of the war without caring about a Fascist victory. Criticism came from the workers to the 
management of the Workforce Office (Ufficio di collocamento) during the war. The Ufficio di 
collocamento was a job center that under Fascism was responsible for managing employment 
locally. The office was under the control of the corporative bodies. Employers were obliged 
to hire those workers registered to this office and they could choose among the list of 
members, giving priority to the PNF or fascist trade unions members, based on their seniority 
of membership.Therefore the system of the uffici di collocamento was very discretionary and 
re-established system clientelism or patronage like personal recommendations 
(raccomandazioni) from which the party members could clearly benefit. The ufficio di 
collocamento worked well in the periods of low unemployment level, while in periods of 
crisis like during the war, the office completely failed its mission.
758
 This created a sense of 
detachtment among the workers who were thinking to be paying the highier price for the 
‘Fascist war’. An example of criticism came from factory worker, Giacomo De Benedetti, 
employed at the Montecatini factory in Marghera who protested at the Workforce Office 
(Ufficio di collocamento) for having overpaid some tickets for the daily soup. De Benedetti 
criticised the local Fascist official as follows: “You [Fascists] always want to be right. We 
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hope the British will come soon to beat the crap out of you”.
759
  The function of these offices 
was surely directed to minimising these protests, but at the same time, they were the ‘eyes’ 
and the ‘ears’ of the regime at local level, reporting this criticism to the local questura.
760
 
These local offices would tend to defend their activities against criticism, however, most of 
the time no drastic actions against the individuals were taken by the Questura and it became 
almost normal that critic people would look forward to the arrival of British (or American) 
‘liberators’.  
 
       Of all the restrictions, none were more irksome than those imposed by food shortages. 
The rationing system obviously also involved bars, taverns and cafes and certain kinds of 
food such as meat, bread and pasta, scarcely available in the market, had been forbidden by 
law on certain days of the week. Therefore, it was impossible for people to find meat or other 
restricted goods on the ‘forbidden days’.
761
 As a result, the Fascist rationing system became 
increasingly unpopular. A protest in a popular osteria in Venice led to the police arresting the 
popolano, Giuseppe Pedarsini, because persistently requested meat on a forbidden day. 
Questioned by the police, he replied: “I do not care about the laws. As far as I am concerned, 
those [Fascists] who make the laws can stay without meat. I want meat and chicken”.
762
 
Rumours regarding how much better the Germans were supplied reached the Venetian 
population, worsening their attitude towards the regime.
763
 However, the crucial difference 
between Italy and the other countries was in the overall implementation of the rationing 
system. Mussolini did not have a clear plan for rationing and distribution; neither was he able 
to improve the situation in due course. He expected Italian people, who had proven 
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themselves during the autarkic period, to be capable of enduring more shortages and 
deprivation than their counterparts. Conversely, in countries like Great Britain and Germany, 
officials were well aware that failure to ensure an adequate food supply could lead to the 
collapse of morale. The British Government had prepared well in advance a fully 
comprehensive scheme for the rationing of essential foods. By the outbreak of war ration 
books had been printed, to be issued at the point when the Government judged shortages were 
serious enough to stoke unwanted inflation and cause discontent among the less well off.
764
 
The food rationing system implemented in Germany or in the UK showed that keeping up 
morale was important for sustaining the war effort. As effectively explained by Morgan and 
Duggan, it was even more important for the very existence of the regime. In fact, morale was 
inherently linked to the peculianty of Italy’s situation which can be summarised a poor nation 
trying to become rich.
765
 The regime’s certainty that the supremacy of the ‘will’ and ‘faith’ of 
an army and a people would bring about victory, contributed to a catastrophic lack of 
preparation.
766
 Italy’s economy was never capable of withstanding a long war. When 
rationing had been introduced, food consumption reduced by 25 %. Soap, coffee and tobacco 
became luxury products and were sold at eight times the pre-war price on a thriving black 
market.
767
 The Italians fought a guerra dei poveri (the war of the poor) and the total daily 
calorific intake dropped from 2,631 calories in 1940 to 2,112 in 1943 and 1,865 in 1944 - 
considerably below the First World War level of around 2,600 calories. Italy could not absorb 
the costs of total war, and lira notes in circulation doubled between 1939 and 1941, while the 
deficit increased fivefold.
768
 As Morgan argued, rationing was introduced by the regime “as 
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measure of social justice or as a necessary measure of social equalisation”, but in the end it 
led to the realisation of the full extent of difference between the facade and the substance of 
Mussolini’s propaganda.
769
 This disparity between reality and propaganda clearly emerges 
from the documents consulted. When food became short and more expensive, ordinary 
working-class Venetians, unable to maintain their already quite low levels of food 
consumption, began to resent people who did not appear to be as badly affected as they were. 
The Venetian lower class complained constantly about those who were surviving the war 
unaffected and who were making profits out of the black market. The war increased material 
inequalities and profiteers took advantage of the situation. The police informer Paolo Sol 
denounced as ‘crooks’ two employees at Venice’s Supreme Court, Angelo Rizzo and 
Vincenzo Napoli, whom he claimed had been celebrating every Italian defeat; and they were 




       National cohesion, one of the main aims of Fascist policy since 1922 and already fragile 
before to 1940, disappeared as the war progressed and one of Fascism’s main objectives, the 
‘making of Italians’, was broken by the material conditions of the war.
771
 Class difference 
was far from vanishing into a French kind of union sacrè as the poorest were complaining 
that the richest were being advantaged materially by the war.
772
 Venetian popolani, as the 
majority of the Italian popular classes, felt that they were paying the higher cost for the war. 
Many, like the Venetian popolana, Elena Baessato, noting that the majority of Venetians 
were starving, stopped caring about the destiny of the country. She simply thought that “all 
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those praying for an Italian victory should get lost”.
773
 In particular, among the workers, there 
was a fervent wish for the arrival of the Russians and it was not unusual to find the prefect 
reprting to his superiors that Venetian popolani were sayng such things such as “the heroism 




5.3 Popular Disaffection with the Regime (Late 1941-1942) 
       From the beginning of 1942, it seems that disaffection towards the regime started to be 
expressed openly in bars, pubs, restaurants and shops, where people were often commenting 
sarcastically with a defeatist attitude on the ‘negative rumours regarding the war’, ridiculing 
the regime’s conduct of the war.
775
 Police and informers were registering the progressive loss 
of appeal of the dictatorial charisma of Mussolini. Defeat by defeat, the Duce was losing 
credibility. The prefect Vaccari reported that strateghi da caffe (cafe’ strategists) were 
spreading anti-Fascist jokes regarding the regime in pubs and taverns. The mockery of 
Mussolini, the regime and the Party soon became an everyday activity among ordinary 
Venetians.
776
 In July 1942, the police informer Angelo Piccoli argued that many people no 
longer believed in victory, but were hoping for a quick end of the conflict, whatever the 
outcome was going be. Piccoli also added that the Venetian home front had been seriously 
undermined by the pernicious ‘plague’ of defeatism which was spreading among some 
sectors of Venetian society, and he suggested that the regime should adopt more restrictive 
measures against those wanting the end of the nation.
777
 Despite we could reasonably doubt 
that Piccoli was using his real name or what he was reporting was authentic as the kind of 
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circles he moved in were unknown, he surely anticipated what would become a general shift 
in the public mood in early 1943. Although the regime introduced new measures in order to 
tackle the black market and replace incompetent or corrupt prefects or federali, the situation 
could not be turned around as the local administration and economy and morale had been 
irremediably affected by the course of the war, and the overwhelming majority of the people 




       In mid-1942, there was the feeling that many Venetians as well as the majority of Italians 
had ceased to be a national community. The low morale in the Venice Province was even 
more striking as Venice city had been spared Allied bombing. It stood safe most of the time 
and the population was not affected by the violent incursions that were wrecking so many 
European cities; and the province did not experience any dramatic evacuations like Milan, 
Turin and Genoa. In addition, the Veneto can be regarded as an example of how the 
Superintendencies for Monuments and for Galleries, played a crucial role in protecting works 
of art, creating numerous shelters in the region from 1940 to 1945.
779
 Urban life was not 
completely disrupted and Venice suffered much less than in the First World War, when by 
1918 it had been reduced to a small naval garrison and its economy ruined.
780
 
However, the regime’s heavy-handed approach and its terror system could still work and 
sentiments of protest never translated into open rebellion, even when in the summer of 1942, 
isolated strikes hit Turin and Milan. According to the documents consulted for this period of 
1942, threats were reported, such as the discovery of leaflets or wall writing encouraging 
opposition to the regime, but the police still seemed to keep control of the situation. For 
example at the factory Vetrocoke of Porto Marghera, writing appeared on the wall inciting 
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workers “to organise a white strike”. After the police investigation, two men were arrested as 
responsible for instigating workers’ unrest.
781
 Although this kind of protest did not constitute 
a serious threat for the regime, workers were progressively detatching themselves from 
Fascism. They were refusing to sacrifice their material life for the regime by manifesting 
openly their criticism requesting an increase on their wages and improvement of work 
conditions. In addition, the police chief of Venice reported cases in which groups of old 
subversives (the term to refer to Socialists, Communists and Anarchists) were trying to make 
contact with the Venetian factories’ workers in order to organise a collective protest in the 
industrial districts of Marghera and Mestre.
782
 An example was the worker Virginio Fabbri, 
of the Cantieri Navali, secretly encouraging colleagues to “follow the teaching of Lenin and 
Stalin”.
783
 During the first years of war, the police apparatus could still repress protests, but 
the regime could not prevent these protests to progressively become an act of political 
disagreement towards the fascist conduct of the war. Although still ill-coordinated, the 
workers actions in 1942 were becoming more and more ideological and the fall of Mussolini 




       Popular dissatisfaction with the realities of the war and disillusionment with the political 
and ideological manifestations of Mussolini’s Fascism were prevalent not only among the 
working classes. The disaffection increasingly undermined any support the regime might 
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have had from the elites on whose ‘buy-in’ Mussolini’s power had relied for much of the 
Duce’s time in power. It was the diminishing lack of support of this important section of 
society that became the final mail in the coffin of Mussolini’s rule. If the early detachment of 
the popular classes is not a surprise, given all the problems caused by the war to their daily 
life, the progressive disengagement of the Venetian bourgeoisie from the regime is more 
striking. Political criticism from the bourgeoisie, which formed the backbone of the regime in 
the Venice province, started to appear with the growing fear of war-induced impoverishment. 
Lack of supplies, the negative impact of the war on the local economies and quality of life 
touched the lives of everyone, but more and more those of the better off in Venice in 1942. 
One branch of the local economy that suffered particularly strong setbacks during the war 
was the tourist trade. An example is the case of Luigi Soma, owner of the Albergo Villa 
Pannonia in the Lido of Venice, who criticised the regime’s unreasonable rationing policy 
alluding to the better standard of living people were enjoying in other countries involved in 
the war. Soma complained also about the dramatic tourism decline in Venice.
785
 There was a 
depressed mood in Venice province where businessmen and guest-house owners feared for 
their businesses. Increased taxation, problems in obtaining sufficient foodstuffs, and 
bureaucratic food rationing controls were said to be creating obstacles for local economy. 
Soma had to apologise to clients for the low standard of their meal and service, hoping that 
the following year everything would be better with a wider availability of food and possibly 




       Even the great German victories on many fronts failed to convince. Conversely, the 
Venetian bourgeoisie started to look at the Anglo-American-German duel with 
disillusionment, sure that whoever won, Italy would not get the reward expected by the 
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regime. They hoped that “this war would have neither winners nor defeated, in order to avoid 
a new Versailles for Italy”.
787
  
The Venetian bourgeoisie withdrew its support very rapidly from about 1942 onwards. 
However, whatever discontent there was among the bourgeoisie, it was of no great political 
significance. Complaints focused on the regime’s incapacity to safeguard their economic 
interests. According to the Fascist informers, similar sentiments of discontent were expressed 
in many circles of industrialists and among the Venetian noblesse, who had actively 
supported Fascism in Venice province since its seizure of power. In this case, their 
detachment from Fascism mirrored that of their leader Giuseppe Volpi, who, by 1942, was 




       The general scepticism of the middle and upper classes never constituted a real political 
danger to the regime, but it started to translate into progressive ideological detachment.
789
 
With the progression of the war, they no longer associated themselves with Fascism. Wealthy 
Venetians and the bourgeoisie became progressively indifferent towards the result of the war. 
By the end of 1942, some eminent upper class Venetians not only became reluctant to renew 
their party membership, but as a Fascist informer reported, they were also regularly meeting 
at Harry’s Bar (the most exclusive and most expensive restaurant of the time in Venice) 
without caring about the destiny of the regime. They were leading luxurious lives and now 
openly expressing doubts regarding the regime’s conduct of the war. Among these gagà 
(young man who flaunts precise elegance, giving himself the airs of a great lord), we can also 
find Domenico Giuriati, the son of the former national secretary of the PNF, Giovanni 




 Volpi world will also take an active part on the dethroning of the Duce during the Grand Council of 25 July 
1943, and was then arrested by the fascist republicans in December 1943. 
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Giuriati, who had been re-called to the army as Colonel of the Royal Navy.
790
 The middle 
class no longer cared about the destiny of the regime. The bourgeoisie looked at Britain and 
America as the best model of a liberal society and they were now hoping for an Anglo-





5.4 The Rapid Collapse of the Regime in Venice (Mid-1942-1943) 
       The final section of this chapter focuses on the last year of Mussolini’s rule between 
summer 1942 and July 1943, with the specific aim of showing how the regime sought to use 
propaganda to involve people in the regime’s war. Documentation related to the last year of 
the war when Mussolini was in charge of the regime substantially confirmed that the Duce’s 
propaganda of hate against those countries that were inflicting defeats on Italy had rarely 
been accepted by Venetians of all classes and levels. Quite the contrary, they tended to blame 
the incompetence of their leaders who had taken them to war. People complained that 
Fascists did not know warfare, they were cowards and the ruling class was a ‘bunch of crooks 
and delinquents’.
792
 The revulsion towards the Fascist regime is also documented in the 
material consulted, especially with regards the end of 1942 and the beginning of 1943. We 
can find documents in which ordinary Venetians recollected positive military achievements 
of the Liberal government in the First World War with still a tenuous appreciation for the 
Monarchy.
793
 By contrast, Mussolini’s popularity seemed completely doomed and Fascists 
were blamed for their military failures. Starting from mid-1942, there was the feeling that 
Venetians had already reached the conclusion that the war was lost and Mussolini was not the 
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right man to lead the country anymore. It was also possible to capture the people’s realisation 
that the Italian army was not strong enough to lead the country to victory.  
 
       What emerges from the documents consulted is that ordinary Venetians were not looking 
for the Italian final victory anymore, but they hoped to return to a normal life. Defeat by 
defeat, the disappointment carried a sense of expectation of peace. The desire to put an end to 
the war was greater than the humiliation of losing the war. However, the peak of the Venetian 
demoralisation can be located in the dreadful winter of 1942–1943, which coincided with the 
serious military reverses in the Russia and North Africa. Despite Italian soldiers showed to 
fight bravely without clear direction from senior leaders, Italians were largely defeated 





       However, by May 1943, the Italians had lost North Africa, receiving considerably less 
help from the Germans than they in turn gave Germany on the Russian front.
795
 The heading 
towards a clear defeat and the manpower demands of the armed forces, which meant the 
deflection of millions of people from their personal careers, started to become also a 
psychological burden that was no longer acceptable. This shows that the support for the 
regime was only lukewarm; and in contrast to other countries which faced imminent defeat, 
such an experience did not lead to a national rallying cry, but to the population withdrawing 
support from the leadership. Conscription alone recruited 4.5 million people born between 
1901 and 1923; very few Italians had welcomed it positively. Among them would be 
                                                 
794
 Sadkovich, ‘Understanding Defeat’, 27–61. See again G. Rochat, Le guerre italiane 1935-1943.  After the 
battle of Stalingrad in late 1942–early 1943, the Italian army was brought up to the front line, to hold it and 
cover the German retreat. Around 80,000 Italian troops died. 
795
 Sadkovich, ‘Understanding Defeat’, 51. 
296 
 
workers, clerks, or students whose degrees had yet to be completed. By early 1943, students 
started to feel that the war was not worth the derailment of their future plans. As an example, 
the Venetian student, Antonio Marras, after having failed the Spanish language examination 





       In July 1943, Mussolini fell after having been voted down by the Fascist Grand Council 
and he was arrested at the king’s order. Throughout the country, Mussolini’s departure 
generated a wave of patriotic enthusiasm and the mistaken belief that all the promises of 
Anglo-American propaganda were about to come true. It was reported that the population of 
Venice celebrated with a Carnival-like atmosphere.
797
 Anti-Fascist political prisoners were 
released and the urban personnel, from the prefect Vaccari down, were also replaced. On 8 
September the new Prime Minister, Field Marshal Pietro Badoglio, signed the Armistice with 
the Allies in an attempt to take Italy out of the war. Badoglio did not care about the territory 
still under German control and after September 1943 Venice province, like the rest of the 
northern Italy, was subjected to a new Fascist republic called the Repubblica Sociale Italiana 
led by Mussolini under the control of the Germans. The Venetian members of the Grand 
Council who favoured the fall of Mussolini, Volpi and Cini, were arrested. 
 
         An account of the last days of 1943 underlines the diffidence and the scepticism of the 
overwhelming majority of ordinary Venetians towards the new Fascist Republican Party, 
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which in January 1944 was only able to enroll 4,140 members, 0.6 % of the province 
population, as opposed to the 88,684 who had been PNF party members in January 1943.
798
 
The first four years of war saw a gradual and escalating popular disapproval of Fascism, its 
ideology and – more significantly – its policies. As dissatisfaction with the regime grew, 
criticism of Mussolini became more pronounced and the gradual breakdown of the Fascist 
regime culminated in Mussolini’s dismissal in July 1943. Popular sentiment in the Veneto, as 
in Italy more generally, demonstrated that the Italian Fascist leadership had approached the 
conflict badly prepared economically and militarily. The picture drawn from the Venice 
province is that the regime managed the conflict poorly from a logistical, strategic and 
propaganda perspective. Mussolini raised expectations of a short and victorious war that he 
would never meet. In addition, the Duce never succeeded in convincing his people that being 
allied with Nazi Germany was the best option for the country. Italy faced disastrous military 
defeats which exacerbated already low morale. Venetians, alongside other Italians, suffered 
hardship and shortages of basic foodstuffs caused by the regime’s lack of strategic 
preparation of the war. If nothing else, the rapid collapse of war is the most striking proof of 
the questionable ideological commitment of most ordinary Venetians (and Italians) to 
Fascism. Consent had been opportunistic and superficial. This does not make them ‘good 
Italians’, but it goes a long way towards explaining the volatile foundations on which the 
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9. Conclusions  
 
      This thesis charts the development of the Fascist movement, Party and regime in the 
Province of Venice. It also contributes to the ongoing scholarly debate on the nature of the 
Fascist dictatorship. It constitutes a study of the local and regional allegiances, but with wider 
implications for our understanding of fascist ventennio.  
 
       In the first chapter, this thesis has shown that open support of the local elites to the 
regime manifested itself very clearly since 1924, the year in which Volpi officially joined the 
Fascist Party. The regime had to reach a compromise with men who opportunistically jumped 
on the bandwagon of Fascism to further their own goals without being convinced about 
Fascist ideology. However, Venice in itself did not act as a limiting agent for Fascism. On the 
contrary, the relationship between the local elites and the regime was one of mutual 
advantage. On the one side, the substantial failure of the regime in imposing “first-hour 
fascists” at local level, allowed the traditional elites to control the power. On the other side, 
the local elites made it simpler for the regime to control all the economic and political 
processes. An example is the project of the industrial district of Porto Marghera, supervised 
by Giuseppe Volpi and greatly developed under the dictatorship. From only one company in 
1920, the number increased up to 16 companies in 1922, 27 in 1924. In 1928, the number 
grew to 55 with an overall number of 4,880 employees.
799
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Volpi's mind and it was not the product of local entrepreneurship. Instead, it was a complex 
and well-articulated financial and industrial capital investment project, with initiatives to 
                                                 
799
 M. Reberschak, ‘‘Gli uomini capitali: il ‘gruppo veneziano’ (Volpi, Cini e gli altri)’, 
http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/l-ottocento-e-il-novecento-2-la-societa-veneziana-gli-uomini-capitali-
il_(Storia-di-Venezia)/ (Accessed: 19 September 2016). 
299 
 
integrate Venice into national and international markets. Marghera attracted great Italian 
financial and industrial companies which were allowed to receive extensive settlements, 
significant exemptions and tax breaks, and reduced production costs. Marghera was probably 
the most spectacular result achieved by Volpi. On the other side, the project became an 
important instrument of propaganda for the regime, an example of the big Italian companies’ 
investment. 
 
       The reason for the overlap in interest between the Venetians and Mussolini can also be 
ascribed to Mussolini’s desire to defend the values of romanità, on his quest to Italianise the 
Adriatic coast (on the Yugoslavian side), and on his determination to restore Italy’s “place in 
the sun” and to turn Fascist Italy into an empire. All this converged with Volpi’s plan to 
restore the greatness of Venice, but also with the Venetian values (venezianità), with local 
traditions and culture characterised by a hint of nostalgia for the former Serenissima Empire. 
Throughout this thesis, the idea of a set of fascist values shared in large part by the local 
population has frequently been mentioned. A common set of values, therefore, made it easier 
for the regime to infiltrate these social groups such as local elites, entrepreneurs and ordinary 
people. However, different networks had different identities according to the social, cultural, 
and political background of their members. This fragmented local society created a complex 
social jigsaw which Fascism constantly struggled to fit in. As we have seen, Venetians 
workers and Catholics were sometimes openly in contrast with Fascism and its coercive 
methods. But, more than other things, certain Venetians groups were so tightly linked to the 
Serenissima culture, that obliged the regime to mediate with local powers in order to avoid a 
level of local fight. Intellectuals and local former liberal conservatives would not be ready to 
renounce the urban and cultural traditions of the city, making it difficult for the regime to 
implement changes. The clearest example of the clash between the ‘new’ fascist Venice and 
the ‘traditional’ Venice was the question of the construction of the bridge to connect Venice 
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to the mainland. In this respect, the clash between the most progressive wing led by Volpi, 
and the traditionalists, led by Molmenti initially, and then by Giuriati, was the most evident. 
Therefore, this thesis crucially focuses on the continuity of local tradition and the way in 
which the Fascist regime managed to fascistise (or not) local society. Continuity with the past 
was very important for the Venetian elites, which remained strong throughout the Fascist 
period, with their steadfast defence of the heritage of the Serenissima and of its centrality in 
Italian colonial history and predominance over the sea. However, the predominance of the 
traditional ruling class at local level would never be perceived as a threat to the regime; on 
the contrary, it seems that the old Venetian aristocracy allowed the regime to reach most of 
its goals. Although it is undeniable that Venice politically constituted a fertile terrain for 
Fascism, however, it would be a mistake to think that this meant that the traditional as well as 
the industrial and entrepreneurial elites, were fully committed to the regime. In an apologetic 
commentary which wanted to defend his father post-eventum, the son of Giuseppe Volpi 
declared in an interview that his father was not a “the fascist prejudicially described by many, 
but a man who gave work to thousands of Venetians”.
800
  In Venice, the fascist dictatorship 
was not directly capable of establishing a rooted control and consensus among the Venetian 
social groups. As we have seen the overwhelming majority of the podesta’ or federali were 
coming from the traditional local elites and the resistance and the hostility of the Catholics to 
the regime were significant. This thesis shows that ‘fascistisation’ of the society was in many 
respects limited and superficial, and failed to displace or override regional traditions. 
 
       The second chapter, on the working-class networks, has demonstrated how difficult it 
was for the workers to avoid the force and violence of the regime. The anti-fascist network 
relied heavily on the continuity of their traditions dating back to the Biennio Rosso. The ‘old 
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generation’ of workers tried to keep the anti-fascist movement alive and organise, without 
significant results, a workers’ movement, leading to some strikes against unemployment in 
the 1930s, which were promptly managed by the police. On the other side, the younger 
generation of workers was more attracted to the benefits that the regime could provide them. 
In addition, they had no experience of class struggle and therefore they had no reason to 
collide with the regime and therefore risk losing their jobs. A perspective of this kind reveals 
the importance of the intertwining of consensus-making and repressive policies, which should 
be viewed not as standing in contrast to one another but as an integral part of the 
establishment and consolidation of the regime. In this respect, this research is particularly 
significant as it emphasises the importance of the fascist use of violence by noting that it also 
involved ordinary Italians in the policies of the regime and the use of repressive measures as 
a strategy of self-defence or attack against possible opponents or enemies. 
 
       The third chapter dedicated to the Catholic Church, has demonstrated how traditional 
institutions with officially no political power, could still influence and direct the population 
and reduce – or even challenge and sabotage – the popularity of a dictatorship. Even after the 
closing of Azione Cattolica in 1931, the Catholic Church managed to mobilise a large number 
of people, re-establishing its youth organisations quickly in 1932. In Venice, there were 
Church personalities who enjoyed the loyalty of large sections of the population such as the 
Patriarch Pietro La Fontaine, who mediated with the regime during its seizure in power, but 
was never completely aligned to the directives of the regime. The success of the Catholic 
Church, was mainly personified in the leading figures of Azione Cattolica in a city where 
Catholicism was traditionally one of the most important features of daily life. The attempted 
co-optation of youth showed that the regime encountered resistance within the Catholic 
Church and among the strong Catholic milieu in the region. This chapter showed how the 
Catholic Church challenged Fascist organisations. Although, by the late 1920s, the Catholic 
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Church could no longer count on a political party like the Partito Popolare Italiano, the 
Church in Venice still constituted a serious threat to the totalitarian ambitions of the Fascist 
Party. It is true that the social aims of the Catholic Church and of the Fascist Party frequently 
coincided:  for example, in the support to Franco in the Spanish Civil War, the opposition to 
Communism, or the attempt to push local families to a more ‘moderate’ and ‘austere’ style of 
life or women to uphold traditional values. However, as we have seen in this chapter, the 
reasons why these positions were taken by the two institutions were radically different, but 
both were aiming to control local society. When the social aims of Church and Fascism did 
not coincide, displays of the Catholic Church such as parades or simply the numerical success 
of Catholic youth organisations were not particularly welcome to the dictatorship.  
 
       A key theme throughout this thesis has been that of social mobilisation. The capacity of 
non-Fascist independent institutions to mobilise the forces of the entire city is an issue of 
extreme importance for an analysis of Fascist social power at the local level. The ability of 
Catholic groups showed that local traditional institutions such as the Church were still able to 
mobilise and influence a large part of the local population. More than the local working-class 
networks, the Church proved its strength and the ability to resist the Fascist regime in the 
1930s. This ability to resist and mobilise did not just manifest itself in Azione Cattolica, but 
in the capacity of Catholics to safeguard their private sphere and in the ability to create a 
network of mutual assistance which, despite the tight control of the regime, protected them 
from the intrusion of the dictatorship. 
This thesis has shown that Venice remained a complex site of fragmented small systems in 
which continuity with the past, sometimes, even if without being a serious threat, managed to 
challenge or resist to the regime, which could be seen as disregarding or openly opposing 
their local traditions. Practically, the regime did not manage to defeat the social power 




Despite the resistance of certain traditional groups, Fascism’s formal political success, even 
in Venice, should not be underestimated. The dictatorship, after all, rapidly managed to 
defeat political opposition. In addition, this thesis shows that the regime managed to create a 
vibrant, assertive and combative Fascist university students’ organisation (GUF) in the city 
and province that sometimes collided with the ‘old generation’ of fascists who relied on more 
moderate positions in the 1930s. In past research, the claim was that the regime failed to 
fascistise the university youth and this has been used as the main proof that Fascism failed to 
create its own ruling class, therefore undermining its totalitarian ambition. In reality, this 
thesis demonstrates that the regime did not fail to prepare its own ruling class, but rather it 
created a group of party men entirely brought up according to the fascist myths who intended 
to continue the ‘Fascist Revolution’ and bring the totalitarianisation of the Italian society to 
its extreme consequences. However, the fragile Mussolinian regime was not able to ensure 
political space for this generation of new fascists and the war definitively broke any 
possibility for the regime to perpetuate itself. 
 
       Chapter four shows that the implementation of anti-Jewish policies in the province was 
largely effective. The documents which I have consulted do not show a significant rejection 
of the anti-Semitic legislation in Venice. On the contrary, they show how Catholic 
institutions, namely the Patriarch Aldeodato Piazza, and fascist officials profited from the 
legislation to pursue their own interests. In addition, documents confirm that ordinary people 
were generally silent and did not protest the persecution of Jews.  
 
       The last chapter reflects on the specific Venetian angle of the dramatic fall of Mussolini 
from power in July 1943. This part analyses both the causes and the consequences of this 
important event. The chapter shows how Venetians of different classes coped with the 
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pressure of wartime experience, both on the military and the Venetian home front, and how 
Venetians’ experience of the country at war progressively distanced them from the dictator 
and his fascist regime. Over recent years, the debate in Italy has tended to concentrate on the 
role of the Italian Resistance and legitimise the role of anti-Fascism in the postwar time. This 
chapter addresses the issue of the rapid collapse of the regime during the first three years of 
the war, the so called ‘Fascist war’, focusing on how Venetian people responded to the 
burden of the war and how the Italian government at war failed to mobilise and allocate 
human and material resources, creating internal defeatism and detachment from the regime, 
based on a popular perception of everyday misery or inequality of sacrifice. 
 
       The heart of the thesis situates itself along the current debate about totalitarianism, 
Fascism and popular consent and connects them with the question of post-war memory. 
Linked to the capacity of independent institutions to mobilise their forces, the finding is that 
Fascism had to reach a number of compromises in order to stabilise and solidify its power in 
Venice. This thesis also argued that the dictatorship did not manage to fulfil its totalitarian 
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Appendix 1 - List of Venetian Federali 1921-1943 
 
The Federation of the Fascist Party was founded in 21 November 1921 
Name Period 
Rosalino Davy Gabrielli 10 June 1922 
Ugo Leonardi (reggente) 10 June-24 July 1922 
Stefano Sciaccaluga (reggente) 24 July-8 November 1922 
Talete Barbieri 8 November 1922-18 May 1924 
Giorgio Suppiej  18 May 1924 – 17 March 1925 
Pentarchy: Talete Barbieri, Vilfredo 
Casellati, Carlo Brandolini D’Adda, Luigi 
Cappelletti, Giuseppe Toffano  
 
17 March 1925 – 20 July 1925 
Vilfredo Casellati 20 July 1925 – 18 December 1925 
Vilfredo Casellati 18 December 1925 – 10 May 1926 
Vilfredo Casellati 10 May 1926 – 20 December 1928 
Giorgio Suppiej 20 December 1928 – 20 May 1934 
Michele Pascolato 20 May 1934 – 15 October 1937 
Ludovico Foscari 15 October 1937 – 31 March 1940  
Raffaello Radogna 31 March 1940 – 15 January 1941 
Mario Macola 15 January 1941 – 30 July 1942 
Gustavo Piva 30 July 1942 – 13 May 1943 
Alessandro Bonamici 13 May 1943 -  
Source: M. Missori, Gerarchie e statuti del P.N.F. Gran consiglio, Direttorio nazionale, Federazioni 




Appendix 2 - List of prefects of the Venice Province 1920-1943 
Name Period 
Agostino D’Adamo 20 April 1920 – 25 October 1923 
Angelo Pesce 1 November 1923 – 1 January 1925 
Iginio Coffari 3 January 1925 – 16 July 1929 
Giovanni Bianchetti 16 July 1929 – 1 September 1933 
Guido Beer 10 September 1933 – 14 September 1934 
Francesco Benigni 14 September 1934 – 1 August 1936 
Giuseppe Carlo Catalano 1 August 1936 – 21 August 1939 
Marcello Vaccari 21 August 1939 – 20 February 1943 
Luciano Celso 20 March 1943 – 1 August 1943 
Ruggero Plamieri 1 August 1943 – 16 September 1943 
Source: M. Missori, Governi, alte cariche dello Stato, alti magistrati e prefetti del Regno d’Italia (Roma: 











Italian Popular Party 16519 















Table 1: Proportion of votes (%) gained by the 











Italian Popular Party 15968 
Socialist Party – Communist Party 31487 















Table 2: Proportion of votes (%) gained by the 
parties at the 1921 elections - Venice Province 
Italian Popular Party











Italian Popular Party 13812 
Socialist Parties (PSU* - PSM**) - 
Communist Party 
28083 




Sources: P. Corbetta- M. Serena Piretti, Atlante storico-elettorale d’Italia (1861-2006) (Bologna: Zanichelli, 
2008), CD-ROM 
 
*Partito Socialista Unitario (United Socialist Party), The party was founded in November 1922 by the reformist 
wing of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) led by Filippo Turati and Giacomo Matteotti, after they had been 
expelled in October. 
** Partito Socialista Massimalista (Maximalist Socialist Party). This was the name of the far left wing of the 








Table 3: Proportion of votes (%) gained by the 
parties at the 1924 elections - Venice Province 
Italian Popular Party
























Table 4: Proportion of votes (%) gained by 
the electoral lists at the 1924 elections - 
Kingdom of Italy 
Italian Popular Party







Table 5: Proportion of votes (%) gained by the 
electoral lists at the 1924 elections - Veneto 
Region 
Italian Popular Party






Appendix 4 – Proportion of votes per area 
 
Table 1: Proportion of votes (%) gained by the Italian Popular Party at the 1919 and 
1921 national elections in Venetian macro-areas 
 
AREA 1919 1921 
Livenza e Tagliamento 7% 15% 
Piave 19% 30% 
Brenta e Dese 51% 41% 
Area Lagunare 19% 39% 
Adige 3% 7% 






Table 2: Proportion of votes (%) gained by the Leftist coalition (Socialists and 
Communists at the 1919 and 1921 national elections in Venetian macro-areas 
 
AREA 1919 1921 
Livenza e Tagliamento 36% 48% 
Piave 22% 40% 
Brenta e Dese 34% 40% 
Area Lagunare 49% 44% 
Adige 82% 62% 






Table 3: Proportion of votes (%) gained by Liberals at the 1919 and 1921 national 
elections in Venetian macro-areas 
 
AREA 1919 1921 
Livenza e Tagliamento 57% 35% 
Piave 59% 27% 
Brenta e Dese 14% 18% 
Area Lagunare 32% 39% 
Adige 15% 31% 






Table 4: Proportion of votes (%) gained by the Italian Popular Party, the Left Parties 
and the Fascist Party at the 1924 national elections in Venetian macro-areas 
 
AREA Italian Popular 
Party 
Left Parties Fascist Party 
Livenza e 
Tagliamento 
7% 18% 77% 
Piave 17% 25% 44% 
Brenta e Dese 28% 39% 29% 
Area Lagunare 13% 38% 42% 
Adige 2% 11% 87% 






Appendix 5 – Population per economic sector 
 
Table 1: Province of Venice – Population distribution into main sectors – 1931 
Economic Sector Number 
Agriculture and Forestry  90,622 
Industry and Crafts 75,910 
Transportation and Communication 17,809 
Commerce 24,224 
Bank and Insurance 2,223 
National Defence 3,314 
Public and Private Administration 6,632 
Domestic Service 9,568 
Religions and Liberal Professions 8,773 
Land Owners 1,920 
Non dependants without occupation 
(Students, Seminarians, Pensioners and 
Housewives) 
202,511 
Others –Status not declared 3,499 
Totals 447,005 
Source: Istituto Centrale di Statistica, VII Censimento della popolazione del Regno al 21 Aprile 1931, IX, 
Vol. III, Fasc. 27, Provincia di Venezia, Stabilimento Poligrafico per l’Amministrazione dello Stato, 1933, 





Appendix 6 – Councils 
 
Table 1: Areas of the Province – Councils 1931  
Area Councils 
Livenza e Tagliamento  Annone Veneto, Caorle, Cinto Cao Maggiore, 
Concordia Saggittaria, Fossalta di 
Portogruaro, Gruaro, Premaggiore, San 
Michele al Tagliamento, San Stino di 
Livenza, Teglio Veneto 
Piave Ceggia, Fossalta di Piave, Grisolera, Jesolo, 
Meolo, Musile di Piave, Noventa di Piave San 
Donà di Piave, San Michele del Quarto, Torre 
di Mosto 
Brenta e Dese Campagnalupia, Campolongo Maggiore, 
Camponogara, Dolo, Fiesso d’Artico, 
Marcon, Martellago, Mira, Mirano, Noale, 
Pianiga, Salzano, Santa Maria di Sala, Scorzè, 
Spinea, Strà, Vigonovo 
Area Lagunare Chioggia, Venezia 
Adige Cavarzere, Cona 
Source: Istituto Centrale di Statistica, VII Censimento della popolaziopne del Regno al 21 Aprile 1931, IX, 
Vol. III, Fasc. 27, Provincia di Venezia, Stabilimento Poligrafico per l’Amministrazione dello Stato, 1933, 


















Chronology of Italian Fascism  
 
 
1919 – Mussolini founded the Fasci di Combattimento 
 
1919 – Fascists win 2% of the vote in National Elections 
 
1921 – Mussolini founded the National Fascist Party (PNF) 
 
1921 – National Elections –Fascists win 35 seats 
 
August 1922 – General Strike in Italy - Fascists help break a general strike 
 
October 1922 –March on Rome – King nominates Mussolini Prime Minister 
  
Nov. 1923 – Acerbo Law - the party that gained the greatest number of votes in the National 
Election would get two-thirds of the seats in the Parliament 
 
January 1924 – Mussolini occupies Fiume 
 
April 1924 – Fascists win 65% vote at the National Elections through violence and 
intimidation of opponents  
 
April 1924 – Fascists murder Socialist Party leader Giacomo Matteotti. Opposition MP’s 
resign from Parliament in protest (the Aventine Secession) 
  
January 1925 – Press censorship introduced. All independent newspapers closed. 
 
1925 – Pope Pius XI withdraws support from the Catholic Popular Party 
 
1925 – Battle for Grain (1925-1929). Battle for the Lira. Battle for Land. Battle for Births 
 
November 1926 – All political parties (except PNF) are banned. The secret police OVRA is 
established 
 
1929 – Lateran Treaty between the regime and the Vatican 
 
1934 – Mussolini opposes unification of Austria and Germany 
 
1935 – Italy joins ‘Stresa Front’ with Britain and France to oppose German rearmament and 
expansion 
 
1935 – Mussolini invades Abyssinia 
 
November 1936 – Rome-Berlin Axis. First alliance treaty with Germany signed by Count 
Ciano (Foreign Minister) 
 




March 1939 – Italy issues ultimatum to Albania to accept takeover 
 
April 1939 – Italy invades Albania. Albania defeated – King Zog deposed and replaced as 
king by King Emmanuel of Italy 
 
May 1939 –Von Ribbentrop and Ciano sign ‘Pact of Friendship and Alliance’ – known as 
‘Pact of Steel’. 
 
Sept. 1939 – Mussolini declares Italy neutral when Germany invades Poland. 
 
1940 - Believing a Germany victory inevitable, Mussolini enters war. Italian invasion of 
Egypt (from Libya) crushed by British forces 
 
Oct. 1940 – Italy invades Greece from Albania – attack defeated. Germany intervenes to 
prevent Italian defeat 
 
1941 – Italy loses Abyssinia. 
 
1943 – Mussolini deposed but re-installed by Germans in Northern Italy 
 
1945 – Mussolini is executed by the partisans 
 
 
